【摘要】：通過(guò)邏輯分析和語(yǔ)言分析的方法，以邏輯行動(dòng)主義方法論對(duì)認(rèn)知與行動(dòng)主體所面對(duì)的“三個(gè)世界”——思想世界、語(yǔ)言世界和實(shí)在世界的區(qū)分作為分析工具，重新考量了“先驗(yàn)性”、“必然性”、“分析性”三組傳統(tǒng)范疇和克里普克提出的“先驗(yàn)偶然真理”理論，論證了克里普克所舉證的命題并非“先驗(yàn)偶然真理”。 首先，就三組范疇而言，“先驗(yàn)性”屬于認(rèn)識(shí)論范疇，表征某一認(rèn)知的最初獲得過(guò)程獨(dú)立于經(jīng)驗(yàn)�！氨厝恍浴睂儆谛味蠈W(xué)范疇，分為“相對(duì)的必然”和“絕對(duì)的必然”�！胺治鲂浴睂儆谡Z(yǔ)言哲學(xué)范疇，表達(dá)了在語(yǔ)言世界中，語(yǔ)句內(nèi)部的語(yǔ)詞已經(jīng)存在著某種程度的同義，分析語(yǔ)句的否定是自相矛盾的。其次，就名稱理論而言，認(rèn)知與行動(dòng)主體的思維當(dāng)中存在著關(guān)于表示對(duì)象的語(yǔ)詞的內(nèi)涵和外延的意識(shí)或能動(dòng)反映，這種意識(shí)表現(xiàn)在語(yǔ)言世界中就使得名稱具有涵義和指稱。雖然摹狀詞在一定程度上可以是克里普克所謂的“嚴(yán)格指示詞”，但嚴(yán)格化的摹狀詞與專名并非完全等同。 由此，可以自然地得到結(jié)論：“巴黎標(biāo)準(zhǔn)米尺”之例是一個(gè)后驗(yàn)認(rèn)識(shí)的命題，，它表征的內(nèi)容具有目前實(shí)在世界中的“相對(duì)的必然性”，并不具有“絕對(duì)的必然性”。先驗(yàn)認(rèn)識(shí)的例證“海王星”之例及“我思故我在”可以表征實(shí)在世界中的“相對(duì)的必然性”。對(duì)克里普克“先驗(yàn)偶然真理”理論的研究表明，先驗(yàn)真理和后驗(yàn)真理可以表征相對(duì)必然的事態(tài)，不能表征絕對(duì)必然的事態(tài)。
[Abstract]:Through the methods of logical analysis and linguistic analysis, the paper uses the method of logical activism to distinguish the "three worlds" between cognition and action subjects: the world of thought, the world of language and the world of reality. Reconsidering the three traditional categories of "transcendence", "inevitability", "analytical" and the theory of "transcendental accidental truth" put forward by Kripke, the thesis proves that the proposition that Kripke proves is not "transcendental accidental truth". First of all, as far as three categories are concerned, transcendence belongs to the category of epistemology, and the initial acquisition of a certain cognition is independent of experience. Necessity belongs to metaphysical category, divided into relative necessity and absolute necessity. "Analytical" belongs to the category of linguistic philosophy, which expresses that in the world of language, words within sentences already have some synonyms, and the negation of analytical sentences is self-contradictory. Secondly, as far as name theory is concerned, in the thinking of cognitive and action subjects, there is a conscious or active reflection of the connotation and extension of the words of the object of expression, which makes the name have meaning and reference in the world of language. Although the description can to some extent be called "strict demonstrative word" by Kripke, the strict description is not completely equivalent to the proper name. Thus, it is natural to draw a conclusion that the example of "Paris Standard Meter" is a posteriori proposition, which represents the "relative inevitability" of the present real world, but not the "absolute inevitability". A priori example of Neptune and "I think I am" can represent the "relative inevitability" in the real world. The study of Kripke's theory of "transcendental accidental truth" shows that transcendental truth and posteriori truth can represent the state of affairs of relative necessity, but not those of absolute necessity.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：燕山大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：B81-0

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 劉葉濤;;先驗(yàn)偶然真理理論探究——論克里普克對(duì)康德的發(fā)展[J];安徽師范大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(人文社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2011年03期

2 劉葉濤;;辯證哲學(xué)視角下的本質(zhì)主義學(xué)說(shuō)[J];河南師范大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2011年01期

3 鄧曉芒;康德先驗(yàn)邏輯對(duì)形式邏輯的奠基[J];江蘇社會(huì)科學(xué);2004年06期

4 陳波;;反駁克里普克的模態(tài)論證[J];晉陽(yáng)學(xué)刊;2012年03期

5 陳波;;反駁克里普克的認(rèn)知論證[J];學(xué)術(shù)界;2011年05期

6 陳波;;反駁克里普克的語(yǔ)義論證[J];蘇州大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2011年02期

7 龍小平;;對(duì)克里普克先驗(yàn)偶然命題的辯護(hù)[J];西南大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2008年02期

8 張建軍;;邏輯行動(dòng)主義方法論構(gòu)圖[J];學(xué)術(shù)月刊;2008年08期

9 陳波;;存在“先驗(yàn)偶然命題”和“后驗(yàn)必然命題”嗎(上)——對(duì)克里普克知識(shí)論的批評(píng)[J];學(xué)術(shù)月刊;2010年08期

10 惠繼紅;;必然性、先驗(yàn)性和分析性與二維語(yǔ)義理論[J];自然辯證法通訊;2011年01期

本文編號(hào)：2162223