本文選題：intentional + speaker�。� 參考：《邏輯學研究》2017年01期

【摘要】：要使信念和其他命題態(tài)度語境的量化有意義,存在兩個大的困難。一個是所指稱的對象可能不存在;另一個是共指稱詞項的替換性原則可能會在這樣的語境下被破壞。我將在本文中論證,第一個問題可以通過如下方式解決:將信念對象看成是一類實體,這種實體不管它是否存在,都可以被指稱。我將概述一種存在物的理論來使其可行。此外,我將論證,指示性指稱本身不是直接指稱;而且,當所涉及的共指稱的兩個詞項都以直接指稱的方式使用時,不存在替換性問題。
[Abstract]:There are two major difficulties in quantifying the context of beliefs and other propositional attitudes. One is that the object may not exist, the other is that the substitution principle of co-referential terms may be broken in this context. I will argue in this paper that the first problem can be solved by treating a belief object as a class of entities that can be referred to no matter whether it exists or not. I will outline an existential theory to make it feasible. In addition, I will argue that the indicative reference is not a direct reference per se; moreover, there is no question of substitution when the two terms of the co-reference in question are used in a direct manner.
【作者單位】： 奧斯陸大學哲學系;南京大學哲學系;
【分類號】：B812
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本文編號：1977162