本文選題：道德命題 + 態(tài)度��； 參考：《哲學(xué)分析》2017年05期

【摘要】：準(zhǔn)實(shí)在論把道德命題看作態(tài)度的表達(dá)并發(fā)展出道德語(yǔ)言的邏輯形式和態(tài)度推理的有效性說明。就準(zhǔn)實(shí)在論態(tài)度邏輯總體來說,其真理緊縮論混淆了真理和真值,但有益于糾正真值實(shí)在論、理解推理有效性;其推理有效性說明已經(jīng)觸及一致性的邏輯有效性本質(zhì),因此對(duì)其混淆態(tài)度矛盾與邏輯矛盾的批評(píng)并未切中其要害。準(zhǔn)實(shí)在論語(yǔ)用學(xué)片面理解道德判斷的功能,混淆道德命題、態(tài)度描述命題和態(tài)度表達(dá)語(yǔ)句;通過把道德范疇看作滲透價(jià)值、把道德命題看作以此為基礎(chǔ)的描述,道德命題語(yǔ)義學(xué)屬性的確是反實(shí)在論的,但仍可以按緊縮論解釋的邏輯真說明其推理有效性。
[Abstract]:Quasi-realism regards moral proposition as the expression of attitude and develops the logical form of moral language and the validity of attitude reasoning. In terms of quasi-realism attitude logic in general, its truth contraction theory confuses truth and truth value, but it is beneficial to correct truth-valued realism and to understand the validity of reasoning. Therefore, the criticism of its confused attitude contradiction and logic contradiction does not hit its key point. Quasi realism pragmatics one-sidedly understands the function of moral judgment, confuses moral proposition, attitude description proposition and attitude expression statement, and regards moral category as infiltrating value and moral proposition as a description based on it. The semantic attribute of moral propositions is indeed anti-realism, but it can be explained by the logic of contraction theory.
【作者單位】： 廣東海洋大學(xué)馬克思主義學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社科基金2015年第三批后期資助項(xiàng)目“準(zhǔn)實(shí)在論研究”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):15FZX031)階段性成果 廣東省哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)“十二五”規(guī)劃2012年度學(xué)科共建項(xiàng)目“價(jià)值觀的理性:準(zhǔn)實(shí)在論的啟示”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):GD12XZX01)成果 廣東海洋大學(xué)2012年度人文社科校級(jí)項(xiàng)目“準(zhǔn)實(shí)在論研究:公共決策的一種哲學(xué)基礎(chǔ)”成果
【分類號(hào)】：B81-0
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本文編號(hào)：1971263