本文選題：認(rèn)知態(tài)度 + 從己信念��； 參考：《湖南科技大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版)》2017年05期

【摘要】：信念等認(rèn)知態(tài)度通常被認(rèn)為是主體與命題間的一種關(guān)系,并且它們的內(nèi)容也被認(rèn)為是具有真假值的命題。但是這種觀念卻無法為從己信念的內(nèi)容找到恰當(dāng)?shù)拿}。而對(duì)"行為解釋論證"和"兩個(gè)上帝論證"的重構(gòu),可以說明從己信念問題的解決需要我們放棄關(guān)于信念等認(rèn)知態(tài)度的主導(dǎo)觀念——命題教條,即信念是主體與具有真假值的命題之間的關(guān)系,轉(zhuǎn)而主張屬性論,即信念是主體與自我歸屬的屬性之間的關(guān)系。在考察了命題主義者對(duì)"兩個(gè)上帝論證"及屬性論的主要反駁后,就更有理由堅(jiān)持屬性論。
[Abstract]:Cognitive attitudes such as beliefs are generally considered as a relationship between subjects and propositions, and their contents are regarded as propositions with true and false values. But this kind of idea cannot find the proper proposition from the content of one's own belief. The reconstruction of "behavior explanation argumentation" and "two God argumentation" can show that from the solution of self-belief problem we need to give up the dominant concept of belief such as belief-propositional dogma. That is, belief is the relationship between the subject and the proposition with true and false value, and the theory of attribute is advocated instead, that is, belief is the relationship between the subject and the attribute of self-attribution. After examining the main rebuttal of "two gods' argument" and attribute theory by propositions, it is more reasonable to insist on attribute theory.
【作者單位】： 南京大學(xué)哲學(xué)系;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金重大招標(biāo)項(xiàng)目(11&ZD187) 江蘇省社會(huì)科學(xué)基金青年項(xiàng)目(16ZXC005) 中央高�；究蒲袠I(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)專項(xiàng)資金資助(2062014261)
【分類號(hào)】：B815.3
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本文編號(hào)：1820455