本文選題：斯塔爾納克　切入點：絕對概率函數(shù)　出處：《云南師范大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：斯塔爾納克（Robert Stalnaker），麻省理工大教授，研究領(lǐng)域為哲學(xué)邏輯、心靈哲學(xué)與語言哲學(xué)。當(dāng)前關(guān)注的問題是可能世界模態(tài)語義學(xué)的哲學(xué)基礎(chǔ)、條件句邏輯以及用這個分析框架澄清必然和可能、知識概念、普遍知識與相互信念、歸納推理、合理決策、模態(tài)與量化等形而上學(xué)問題。本文主要介紹斯塔爾納克的條件句思想及其面臨的困境。 全文分為四章。第一章是斯塔爾納克條件句思想的淵源。拉姆齊是第一個從根本上推翻客觀概率論而明確提出主觀概率的人。用一句話來講，拉姆齊認為概率是人的主觀信念的量度。 第二章是斯塔爾納克條件句邏輯的主要內(nèi)容。分為絕對概率函數(shù)和反事實概率兩節(jié)。斯塔爾納克條件句邏輯使用了概率理論在條件句命題的分析，他的論證有三個步驟；每一個步驟都包括一個概率系統(tǒng)的解釋。類似于奎因的模態(tài)包含的分級，斯塔爾納克將稱這個系統(tǒng)條件句包含的三個分級。 第三章斯塔爾納克條件句邏輯語義學(xué)。在1968年的《一個條件句理論》中，，提出了一個反事實條件句的形式可能世界語義學(xué)。斯塔爾納克并沒有考慮可斷定性條件是否缺乏真值。他直接根據(jù)真來解釋可斷定性。 第四章斯塔爾納克條件句思想面臨的困境和出路。斯塔爾納克提出了一些最接近前件世界選擇的合理方式的普通條件。這些條件產(chǎn)生了一種條件句邏輯。這個邏輯的許多特征非常符合條件句的特殊論證的語言直覺。這種條件句思想在解決Might-反事實條件句和排中律這兩個問題時卻碰到了困難。
[Abstract]:Starnacle Robert Stalnakern, a professor of science and technology in Massachusetts, studies philosophy logic, philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. The current concern is the philosophical basis of possible modal semantics in the world. Conditional logic and the use of this analytical framework to clarify necessity and possibility, knowledge concepts, universal knowledge and mutual beliefs, inductive reasoning, rational decision-making, This paper mainly introduces Stalnak's thought of conditional sentence and its predicament. The thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is the origin of Stalnak's conditional sentence. Ramsey was the first person to put forward the subjective probability by overturning the objective probability theory. Ramsay believes that probability is a measure of one's subjective beliefs. The second chapter is the main content of Stalak conditional sentence logic, which is divided into two sections: absolute probability function and counterfactual probability. Stalak conditional logic uses probability theory to analyze the propositions of conditional sentences. There are three steps in his argumentation. Each step includes an explanation of a probabilistic system. Similar to Quinn's classification of modal inclusions, Stalnak will call the three levels contained in the system conditional sentence. Chapter III logical semantics of Stalak conditional sentences. In 1968, the Theory of one conditional sentence, A form of counterfactual conditional sentence may be presented in world semantics. Stannak does not consider whether the determinability condition lacks true value or not. He directly explains determinability according to truth. Chapter IV the dilemma and the way out of Starnak's conditional sentence. Stalnak puts forward some common conditions which are closest to the reasonable way chosen by the former world. These conditions produce a conditional logic. Many of the features of logic are very much in line with the linguistic intuition of the special argumentation of conditional sentences, which have encountered difficulties in solving the problems of Might- counterfactual conditionals and middle rules.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：云南師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：B81-06

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