本文關(guān)鍵詞：艾耶爾邏輯學(xué)觀點(diǎn)述評，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。

艾耶爾邏輯學(xué)觀點(diǎn)述評

艾耶爾邏輯學(xué)觀點(diǎn)述評

本文主要說明了艾耶爾在邏輯實(shí)證主義論方面的一些觀點(diǎn)和對真理和或然性的一些觀點(diǎn)。以及奎因、克里普克對他的兩個教條的評判。作為維也納學(xué)派的重要代表人物,艾耶爾主要受到了石里克和卡爾納普的影響。尤其是在可證實(shí)性原則和對于綜合命題和淺析淺析命題的兩個區(qū)分上。艾耶爾的邏輯實(shí)證主義觀點(diǎn)中,對于綜合命題和淺析淺析命題的區(qū)分開始對艾耶爾的邏輯學(xué)觀點(diǎn)的探討。綜合命題和淺析淺析命題的區(qū)分也是艾耶爾邏輯實(shí)證論的一個基石。在接下來的觀點(diǎn)中著重于對于可證實(shí)性原則的強(qiáng)弱意 義的研究,認(rèn)為如果一個命題在經(jīng)驗(yàn)之中得到證實(shí),那么就說這個命題的強(qiáng)意 義上是可證實(shí)的。如果在經(jīng)驗(yàn)之上是這個命題成為或然得到,那就說這個命題在弱意 義上是可證實(shí)的。闡述了確實(shí)的證實(shí)與部分的證實(shí)之間的區(qū)別,并且說明了為什么沒有任何命題能夠被確實(shí)的證實(shí)和確實(shí)的否定。以及一個命題是否在事實(shí)上有意 義,如果一個命題當(dāng)且僅當(dāng)它表達(dá)可被經(jīng)驗(yàn)確定的否定某個東西的時候,才被承認(rèn)為事實(shí)上有意 義的。艾耶爾還對可證實(shí)的做了區(qū)分,分為：(一)、實(shí)際的可證實(shí)性和原則的可證實(shí)性之間的區(qū)分。(二)、強(qiáng)可證實(shí)性和弱可證實(shí)性之間的區(qū)分。艾耶爾還考察了波普爾的證偽的原則。艾耶爾不同意把證偽原則作為考察意 義的真假的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。討論真理與必定性時候主要闡述了真理的有效的標(biāo)準(zhǔn),然后從經(jīng)驗(yàn)命題和假設(shè)命題等方面討論了真理。艾耶爾認(rèn)為經(jīng)驗(yàn)的命題的效準(zhǔn)不是純粹形式的。我們說一個經(jīng)驗(yàn)命題或者一個經(jīng)驗(yàn)命題的系統(tǒng)是假的,是因?yàn)椴荒軡M足某種實(shí)質(zhì)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn),而不是在形式上有什么缺點(diǎn)。假設(shè)命題的真實(shí)地標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是從它們與用實(shí)物所表示的命題的關(guān)系之中得到的。除了純粹用實(shí)物表示的命題之外,沒有一個綜合命題能在邏輯上不容懷疑,我們并不認(rèn)為任何綜合命題都可能純粹用實(shí)物來表示。并且討論了必定性和或然性。認(rèn)為如果一個與命題相關(guān)的觀察符合我們的期望,那么這個命題的真實(shí)性就會被肯定。但是不會說那個命題已經(jīng)被證明是絕對的有效,因?yàn)閷碛幸粋�觀察來否定這個命題的可能性也是存在的。但是我們可以說,這個命題的或然性被增加了。一個命題的或然性既取決于我們的觀察的性質(zhì),也取決于我們合理性的概念。在此之后,講述了奎因和克里普克對于艾耶爾的兩個教條的評判,也就是淺析淺析命題和綜合命題之分,以及證實(shí)原則進(jìn)行評論�？蛑赋鲫P(guān)于淺析淺析命題和綜合命題區(qū)分理論是現(xiàn)代經(jīng)驗(yàn)論者的一個非經(jīng)驗(yàn)的教條。他首先把一般淺析淺析分為兩類：第一類是邏輯真理,第二類是淺析淺析陳述,奎因?qū)Φ诙悳\析淺析陳述考察了“淺析淺析性”概念,這里要依賴一個和淺析淺析自身同樣需要解釋的“同義性”概念。怎樣去解釋這個概念,奎因得到了三個答案：(一)、定義不是同義性的根據(jù)。(二)、保全真值的互相替換性不是同義性的充分條件。(三)、定義和保全真值得互相替換性都不能說明同義性,所以不能作為淺析淺析性的根據(jù)�？死锲湛耸橇硗庖粋�對艾耶爾的這兩個教條評判的比較典型的哲學(xué)家。他強(qiáng)調(diào)要嚴(yán)格區(qū)別先天命題和必定命題。主要表明了奎因在兩個教條方面對于艾耶爾的不同觀點(diǎn)的評判�？偠灾褪窃谝陨线@幾個方面對艾耶爾的邏輯學(xué)觀點(diǎn)進(jìn)行了闡述和淺析淺析。

【Abstract】 This paper describes Ayer’s view on sources of logic positivism and the perspective of the truth and probability, and Quine and Kripke’s judgement of about Ayer’s two doctrines.As an important representative of the Vienna School,Ayer mainly was impacted by Schlick and Carnap, especially verifiability principle and the distinction between synthesis proposition and analysis proposition.In Ayer’s view of logical positivism, the distinction between synthesis proposition and analysis proposition started from the discussion on the Ayer’s view of logic. Comprehensive analysis of proposition and the distinction between propositions of logical positivism is a cornerstone for Ayer. In the next point in focusing on the strength of the verifiability principle of meaning, that if a proposition was confirmed in the experiences, then say that a proposition is demonstrable strong sense. If this proposition is based on the experience obtained a probability, it said that in the weak sense of this proposition is verifiable.Described with some concrete confirmation confirmed the distinction between, and explains why there is no proposition can be confirmed, and indeed negative. And a proposition is meaningful in fact, If a proposition if and only if it is determined the expression of the experience can be something negative, when before she was recognized as a matter of fact meaningful.Ayer also made a distinction between verifiable,1,the actual principles of verifiability and the distinction between verifiability.2,the distinction between strong verifiability and weak verifiability. Ayer also inspected the Popper’s falsification principle. Ayer has not agreed to the principle of falsification as the meaning of true and false inspection standards.When I discussed the truth and necessity, I mainly expounded the standard of truth validity. And then I discussed the truth in terms of empirical propositions and assumptions proposition. In Ayer’s opinion, the standard of experience proposition is not purely form. We say that an empirical proposition, or a system of empirical propositions is false, because the substance does not meet certain standards, rather than any shortcomings in form.Suppose the proposition is true to the standard and in kind from their proposition expressed by the relationship among received. In addition to the proposition that purely physical,there is no a comprehensive proposition to the logical no doubt, we do not believe that any synthetic proposition may be expressed in purely physical.And we discussed the necessity and probability. If an observation which was associated with the proposition consistent with our expectations, then the truth of this proposition will be affirmed. But that proposition does not say has been proved to be totally effective, because there is a future observation to negate the possibility of this proposition also exist. But we can say that this proposition probability was increased.Probability of a proposition not only depends on the nature of our observations, but also depends on our concept of rationality.Then it gave account of the Quine and Kripke’s view about Ayer’s two doctrines.Namely, it distinguished between the analysis proposition and synthesis proposition and comment on confirm principle. Quine pointed out that the proposition on the analysis of propositions and comprehensive theory of the modern distinction between the experience of those who experience a non-dogmatic.He first the general analysis is divided into two categories: The first is the logic of truth, the second category of statements, Quine on the second category of statements examined "analysis" of the concept here of their own to rely on one and the same need to explain the "synonymy" concept.How to explain this concept, Quine got three answers:1,according to the definition is not synonymous in nature.2,the preservation of the true value of each substitution is not a sufficient condition for synonymy.3,the definition and preservation of the true worth can not explain another substitution synonymous,it is not as analytical basis.Kripke is also an Ayer evaluation of these two typical dogmatic philosophers.He stressed the need to strictly distinguish a priori propositions and the inevitable proposition.And it showed the Quine’s judgement on the two doctrines which was different from the view of Ayer.In short, I described and analyzed the Ayer’s view on logic in all above aspects.

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  本文關(guān)鍵詞：艾耶爾邏輯學(xué)觀點(diǎn)述評，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。