“黃宗羲定律”與國(guó)家治理——一個(gè)并稅式改革史的角度
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-01-19 16:24
本文關(guān)鍵詞: “黃宗羲定律” 中央集權(quán) 政治治理 出處:《湖湘論壇》2016年05期 論文類型:期刊論文
【摘要】:由于中央集權(quán)的特殊體制,"黃宗羲定律"也反映出稅負(fù)改革與王朝更迭存在著相當(dāng)緊密的互動(dòng)關(guān)系,最終導(dǎo)致了中國(guó)古代社會(huì)周期率的形成。從治理的角度來(lái)看,"黃宗羲定律"是解讀傳統(tǒng)中國(guó)政治治理的隱含密碼,并稅制改革周期律得以形成的重大原因在于中央與地方在稅收博弈中,地方完全失利而財(cái)政權(quán)一統(tǒng)于中央,而中國(guó)特殊體制下的行政開支又無(wú)限增長(zhǎng)。凡此種種,暗稅在歷次并稅制改革后反復(fù)出現(xiàn),國(guó)家的治理從財(cái)稅制度的失衡導(dǎo)致了政治的全面失敗。
[Abstract]:Due to the special system of centralization of power, Huang Zongxi's Law also reflects the close interaction between tax burden reform and dynasty change. From the perspective of governance, "Huang Zongxi's law" is the hidden code to interpret the traditional Chinese political governance. The major reason for the formation of the periodic law of tax reform lies in the fact that the central government and the local government in the tax game, the local government is completely defeated and the fiscal power is unified in the central government. However, the administrative expenditure under China's special system has increased infinitely. In all these cases, hidden taxes have appeared repeatedly after the reform of the tax system, and the governance of the country from the imbalance of the fiscal and taxation system has led to a total political failure.
【作者單位】: 福建農(nóng)林大學(xué);
【分類號(hào)】:D691.2
【正文快照】: 輕徭薄賦是歷代開明君主及有識(shí)之士反復(fù)進(jìn)行過(guò)的強(qiáng)國(guó)富民的實(shí)踐,然而,由于傳統(tǒng)社會(huì)的特性所決定,每一次的賦役改革,又總會(huì)淪為對(duì)以往加征加派合法性的追認(rèn),而解一時(shí)之困的并賦簡(jiǎn)征,卻總是難以一勞永逸,往往在數(shù)十年后甚至僅僅數(shù)年后就成為下一輪加征加派的起點(diǎn)。有學(xué)者將此定
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