政府監(jiān)管下群體性突發(fā)事件的演化博弈分析與研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-09-01 10:35
【摘要】：進(jìn)入21世紀(jì)以來,隨著我國改革開放的深化,社會(huì)矛盾凸顯,群體性突發(fā)事件進(jìn)入多發(fā)階段,而且與以往相比,規(guī)模更大、涉及的職業(yè)范圍更廣、危害也更突出,對(duì)我國社會(huì)主義現(xiàn)代化建設(shè)已造成不良影響。而政府作為社會(huì)的管理者,控制監(jiān)管群體性突發(fā)事件是政府的基本職能,現(xiàn)如今更成為衡量政府工作能力的一個(gè)重要指標(biāo)。本文研究的主要內(nèi)容為政府如何有效監(jiān)管群體性突發(fā)事件這類問題,目的旨在為政府監(jiān)管工作提供理論支持,同時(shí)為豐富和發(fā)展我國群體性突發(fā)事件的一些基礎(chǔ)性理論研究。 首先,從總體概況、基本特征、主要原因以及利弊性四個(gè)角度深入分析了我國群體性突發(fā)事件的當(dāng)前現(xiàn)狀,并指出我國政府和社會(huì)必須正視群體事件的不良影響,政府監(jiān)管群體性突發(fā)事件有著很重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 政府在應(yīng)對(duì)群體性突發(fā)事件時(shí)發(fā)揮著兩種不同的職能：直接利益的矛盾沖突方、間接利益的控制協(xié)調(diào)方,本文接下來主要分析了這兩種,職能下政府應(yīng)當(dāng)如何監(jiān)管群體性突發(fā)事件。而群體性事件往往由利益訴求不同的群體沖突而造成,此外群體事件的爆發(fā)并不是“一蹴而就”的,往往是不斷模仿和“學(xué)習(xí)”調(diào)整的動(dòng)態(tài)過程。因而,本文引入博弈理論研究政府監(jiān)管下的群體性突發(fā)事件。 為研究政府作為矛盾沖突方如何監(jiān)管群體性突發(fā)事件,本文選擇了現(xiàn)今關(guān)注度比較高的網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件,首次引用博弈理論分析其內(nèi)在機(jī)理。在網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件中,普通網(wǎng)絡(luò)群眾作為無直接利益的參與者,對(duì)于網(wǎng)絡(luò)信息的真?zhèn)螣o法辨別,基于這一點(diǎn),本文首先分析了不完美信息下的網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件。在建立政府與網(wǎng)絡(luò)群眾的博弈模型的基礎(chǔ)上,給出了一些參數(shù)約束下的完美貝葉斯均衡,并指出我國當(dāng)前比較符合部分成功的社會(huì)管理以及接近失敗的社會(huì)管理這兩種情形,強(qiáng)調(diào)了監(jiān)管網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件的重要性,研究表明我國當(dāng)前網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件是當(dāng)前社會(huì)無法避免的,政府應(yīng)當(dāng)通過建立預(yù)警機(jī)制等手段監(jiān)控。 然后,針對(duì)當(dāng)前一些敏感信息“事實(shí)”更容易滋生網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件,建立了這一事實(shí)下政府與網(wǎng)絡(luò)群眾的演化博弈模型,并結(jié)合現(xiàn)實(shí)情況,給出了不同階段下穩(wěn)定性均衡的參數(shù)約束以及現(xiàn)實(shí)意義分析,通過“周久耕事件”的案例分析說明了本文模型的適用性。進(jìn)一步,通過數(shù)值分析說明了信息機(jī)制對(duì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件的演化傳播影響很大。對(duì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件的平息和緩解,主要采用“引導(dǎo)”的方式,平息事件的同時(shí)也有效地緩和了社會(huì)變革中的一些矛盾,并指出網(wǎng)絡(luò)群眾傳播敏感信息的內(nèi)在根源。 接下來,將政府部門視為社會(huì)矛盾的調(diào)解者,運(yùn)用演化博弈理論分析了政府作為利益協(xié)調(diào)者在群體性突發(fā)事件中的重要作用,并考慮公平因素,詳細(xì)分析了一些主要參數(shù)對(duì)決策行為的影響。結(jié)果表明,政府提早介入、公平的利益再分配以及適當(dāng)?shù)膽土P措施有助于減少群體性突發(fā)事件。通過對(duì)案例“重慶市出租車罷工事件”發(fā)展演化歷程及政府協(xié)調(diào)作用的分析,說明了本文模型的適用性。 最后,對(duì)本文的整體研究做了總結(jié),并指出本文研究的不足以及未來研究值得關(guān)注的一些地方。
[Abstract]:Since the beginning of the 21st century, with the deepening of China's reform and opening up, social contradictions have become prominent, mass emergencies have entered a multi-stage, and compared with the past, the scale is larger, involving a wider range of occupations, and the harm is more prominent, which has had a negative impact on China's socialist modernization. Management of mass emergencies is the basic function of the government, and now it has become an important indicator to measure the ability of the government to work. The main content of this paper is how to effectively regulate mass emergencies for the government. The purpose of this study is to provide theoretical support for the government's supervision work and to enrich and develop mass emergencies in China. Some basic theoretical researches on events.
Firstly, the current situation of mass emergencies in China is analyzed from four aspects: general situation, basic characteristics, main causes, advantages and disadvantages, and it is pointed out that the government and society must face up to the adverse effects of mass incidents.
The government plays two different functions in dealing with group emergencies: the conflict of direct interests and the control and coordination of indirect interests. This paper then analyzes these two functions and how the government should supervise group emergencies. In addition, the outbreak of group incidents is not "overnight" and is often a dynamic process of constant imitation and "learning" adjustment.
In order to study how the government regulates group emergencies as a conflicting party, this paper chooses the network group events with high concern nowadays and analyzes their internal mechanism by using game theory for the first time. In this paper, we first analyze the network group events under imperfect information. On the basis of establishing the game model between the government and the network masses, we give the perfect Bayesian equilibrium under some constraints of parameters, and point out that China is more in line with the two situations of partial successful social management and near-failure social management. The importance of monitoring network group incidents has been adjusted. The research shows that the current network group incidents in our country are unavoidable. The government should establish early warning mechanism and other means of monitoring.
Then, aiming at the fact that some sensitive information "facts" are more likely to breed network group events, the evolutionary game model of government and network masses under this fact is established. Combining with the actual situation, the parametric constraints and practical significance of stability equilibrium in different stages are given, and the case study of "Zhou Jiuguang Event" is illustrated. Furthermore, the numerical analysis shows that the information mechanism has a great influence on the evolution and propagation of network group events. In order to alleviate and alleviate the network group events, we mainly adopt the method of "guiding" to alleviate the incidents while effectively alleviating some contradictions in the social change. At the same time, we point out that the network mass transmission has a great influence on the evolution and propagation of network group events. The inherent source of sensitive information.
Next, the government departments are regarded as mediators of social contradictions, and the important role of the government as a coordinator of interests in group emergencies is analyzed by using evolutionary game theory. Considering the factors of fairness, the influence of some main parameters on decision-making behavior is analyzed in detail. Through the analysis of the evolution of the case of "taxi strike in Chongqing" and the coordinating role of the government, the applicability of this model is illustrated.
Finally, this paper summarizes the whole research, and points out the shortcomings of this study and some areas worthy of attention in the future.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：D631.43
本文編號(hào)：2216929
[Abstract]:Since the beginning of the 21st century, with the deepening of China's reform and opening up, social contradictions have become prominent, mass emergencies have entered a multi-stage, and compared with the past, the scale is larger, involving a wider range of occupations, and the harm is more prominent, which has had a negative impact on China's socialist modernization. Management of mass emergencies is the basic function of the government, and now it has become an important indicator to measure the ability of the government to work. The main content of this paper is how to effectively regulate mass emergencies for the government. The purpose of this study is to provide theoretical support for the government's supervision work and to enrich and develop mass emergencies in China. Some basic theoretical researches on events.
Firstly, the current situation of mass emergencies in China is analyzed from four aspects: general situation, basic characteristics, main causes, advantages and disadvantages, and it is pointed out that the government and society must face up to the adverse effects of mass incidents.
The government plays two different functions in dealing with group emergencies: the conflict of direct interests and the control and coordination of indirect interests. This paper then analyzes these two functions and how the government should supervise group emergencies. In addition, the outbreak of group incidents is not "overnight" and is often a dynamic process of constant imitation and "learning" adjustment.
In order to study how the government regulates group emergencies as a conflicting party, this paper chooses the network group events with high concern nowadays and analyzes their internal mechanism by using game theory for the first time. In this paper, we first analyze the network group events under imperfect information. On the basis of establishing the game model between the government and the network masses, we give the perfect Bayesian equilibrium under some constraints of parameters, and point out that China is more in line with the two situations of partial successful social management and near-failure social management. The importance of monitoring network group incidents has been adjusted. The research shows that the current network group incidents in our country are unavoidable. The government should establish early warning mechanism and other means of monitoring.
Then, aiming at the fact that some sensitive information "facts" are more likely to breed network group events, the evolutionary game model of government and network masses under this fact is established. Combining with the actual situation, the parametric constraints and practical significance of stability equilibrium in different stages are given, and the case study of "Zhou Jiuguang Event" is illustrated. Furthermore, the numerical analysis shows that the information mechanism has a great influence on the evolution and propagation of network group events. In order to alleviate and alleviate the network group events, we mainly adopt the method of "guiding" to alleviate the incidents while effectively alleviating some contradictions in the social change. At the same time, we point out that the network mass transmission has a great influence on the evolution and propagation of network group events. The inherent source of sensitive information.
Next, the government departments are regarded as mediators of social contradictions, and the important role of the government as a coordinator of interests in group emergencies is analyzed by using evolutionary game theory. Considering the factors of fairness, the influence of some main parameters on decision-making behavior is analyzed in detail. Through the analysis of the evolution of the case of "taxi strike in Chongqing" and the coordinating role of the government, the applicability of this model is illustrated.
Finally, this paper summarizes the whole research, and points out the shortcomings of this study and some areas worthy of attention in the future.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：D631.43
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