叔本華與尼采倫理學(xué)中的視角主義、相互性及同情本能
發(fā)布時間：2018-07-31 10:35
【摘要】：叔本華與尼采在道德觀上的基本訴求可以說是正相反。前者認(rèn)為道德主體對包括弱者在內(nèi)的他人利益的關(guān)切或同情是道德唯一合法的動機,而后者則主張擯除以同情、憐憫、寬恕為特征的奴隸道德,代之以征服、壓迫、索取為特征的主人道德。叔本華同情倫理學(xué)的根據(jù)在于人類的同情本能,而尼采的強者倫理學(xué)的根據(jù)在于其基于利己主義的視角主義道德觀。從現(xiàn)代倫理學(xué)的視角來看,尼采忽視或否定人類的同情本能,說明其對人性或人類本能的認(rèn)識并不客觀全面。而叔本華凸顯同情本能的作用從現(xiàn)代倫理學(xué)的觀點來看是十分合理的,他對人類同情本能的理解非常接近現(xiàn)代社會科學(xué)和自然科學(xué)的相關(guān)研究。但是叔本華將包括相互性原則在內(nèi)的任何形式的利己因素完全排除在道德的范疇之外,并不符合人類道德進(jìn)化的實際。從現(xiàn)代倫理學(xué)的視角對叔本華、尼采倫理學(xué)中的視角主義道德觀、同情道德觀以及相互性原則進(jìn)行分析,可以讓我們更加清楚地看到人類本性中利己和利他兩個向度在人類道德中所起的作用。
[Abstract]:Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's basic demands on morality can be said to be opposite. The former holds that the moral subject's concern or sympathy for the interests of others, including the weak, is the only legitimate motive of morality, while the latter advocates the rejection of slave morality characterized by compassion, compassion and forgiveness, instead of subjugation and oppression. A master's morality characterized by demand. Schopenhauer's sympathy ethics is based on human sympathy instinct, while Nietzsche's strong man's ethics is based on his egoism. From the perspective of modern ethics, Nietzsche neglects or negates human sympathy instinct, which shows that Nietzsche's understanding of human nature or human instinct is not objective and comprehensive. Schopenhauer highlights the role of sympathy instinct from the point of view of modern ethics is very reasonable, his understanding of human sympathy instinct is very close to modern social science and natural science related research. But Schopenhauer excluded any form of egoism, including the principle of reciprocity, from the category of morality, which is not in line with the evolution of human morality. From the perspective of modern ethics, this paper analyzes Schopenhauer, Nietzsche's ethics of visual angle of ethics, sympathy of morality and the principle of reciprocity. We can see more clearly the role of self-interest and altruism in human morality.
【作者單位】： 南京師范大學(xué)馬克思主義學(xué)院;
【基金】：江蘇省哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)基金一般項目“羅爾斯理性主義倫理學(xué)方法批判研究”(15ZXB004)階段性成果
【分類號】：B82-0
本文編號：2155321
[Abstract]:Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's basic demands on morality can be said to be opposite. The former holds that the moral subject's concern or sympathy for the interests of others, including the weak, is the only legitimate motive of morality, while the latter advocates the rejection of slave morality characterized by compassion, compassion and forgiveness, instead of subjugation and oppression. A master's morality characterized by demand. Schopenhauer's sympathy ethics is based on human sympathy instinct, while Nietzsche's strong man's ethics is based on his egoism. From the perspective of modern ethics, Nietzsche neglects or negates human sympathy instinct, which shows that Nietzsche's understanding of human nature or human instinct is not objective and comprehensive. Schopenhauer highlights the role of sympathy instinct from the point of view of modern ethics is very reasonable, his understanding of human sympathy instinct is very close to modern social science and natural science related research. But Schopenhauer excluded any form of egoism, including the principle of reciprocity, from the category of morality, which is not in line with the evolution of human morality. From the perspective of modern ethics, this paper analyzes Schopenhauer, Nietzsche's ethics of visual angle of ethics, sympathy of morality and the principle of reciprocity. We can see more clearly the role of self-interest and altruism in human morality.
【作者單位】： 南京師范大學(xué)馬克思主義學(xué)院;
【基金】：江蘇省哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)基金一般項目“羅爾斯理性主義倫理學(xué)方法批判研究”(15ZXB004)階段性成果
【分類號】：B82-0
【相似文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條
1 馮銀山;尼采之視角主義道德觀芻議[D];蘭州大學(xué);2014年
，本文編號：2155321
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