本文關(guān)鍵詞： 國(guó)有企業(yè) 腐敗 內(nèi)部反腐 機(jī)制建設(shè)　出處：《河南科技大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：據(jù)《2014中國(guó)企業(yè)家犯罪媒體案例分析報(bào)告》統(tǒng)計(jì),2014年中國(guó)被媒體曝光的企業(yè)家犯罪案例共計(jì)657例,比2013年度增加194例,增幅42%。其中,涉及國(guó)企企業(yè)家犯罪的案件數(shù)為109件,占案件總數(shù)的16.6%�？梢�(jiàn),在現(xiàn)實(shí)中,作為國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)支柱的國(guó)有企業(yè)是腐敗現(xiàn)象易發(fā)并多發(fā)的領(lǐng)域。建立健全國(guó)有企業(yè)的內(nèi)部反腐機(jī)制,對(duì)于國(guó)有企業(yè)反腐倡廉工作和黨風(fēng)建設(shè)來(lái)說(shuō)是一項(xiàng)全新的課題。經(jīng)營(yíng)者對(duì)其行為目標(biāo)的選擇直接影響了在建立現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的情況下,國(guó)有資產(chǎn)是否可以物盡其用并且保值增值�！敖�(jīng)濟(jì)人”屬性強(qiáng)調(diào)追求個(gè)人效用的最大化,企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者的代理行為也無(wú)獨(dú)有偶。經(jīng)營(yíng)者在企業(yè)中相應(yīng)權(quán)利的逐步強(qiáng)化為其追求個(gè)人利益目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn)創(chuàng)造了有利條件。與此同時(shí),作為國(guó)有資產(chǎn)所有者代理人的企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者的目標(biāo)有時(shí)就會(huì)與國(guó)有資產(chǎn)所有者的目標(biāo)(國(guó)有資產(chǎn)的保值增值)產(chǎn)生利益上的沖突。要解決國(guó)有企業(yè)中存在的問(wèn)題,在外部監(jiān)管發(fā)揮重要作用的同時(shí),建立一套國(guó)有企業(yè)內(nèi)部反腐機(jī)制也必不可少。因此,本文主要從內(nèi)部管理和內(nèi)部控制的視角出發(fā),對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)內(nèi)部反腐的理論基礎(chǔ)和事實(shí)成因、國(guó)有企業(yè)內(nèi)部反腐機(jī)制現(xiàn)狀分析、國(guó)有企業(yè)內(nèi)部反腐機(jī)制建設(shè)這三大模塊進(jìn)行闡述,指出目前國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者的尋租行為、合謀問(wèn)題和內(nèi)部人控制問(wèn)題依然是國(guó)企內(nèi)部反腐機(jī)制建設(shè)的難點(diǎn),并通過(guò)對(duì)當(dāng)前國(guó)有企業(yè)三級(jí)授權(quán)機(jī)制對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)者的監(jiān)督約束現(xiàn)狀、國(guó)企董事會(huì)和工會(huì)的現(xiàn)狀分析,總結(jié)出目前需要通過(guò)強(qiáng)化董事會(huì)的監(jiān)督作用、加強(qiáng)工會(huì)和黨內(nèi)監(jiān)督等內(nèi)部監(jiān)督制約手段,固定薪金和浮動(dòng)薪金相結(jié)合等激勵(lì)約束手段,構(gòu)建企業(yè)內(nèi)部舉報(bào)平臺(tái)、采用網(wǎng)上報(bào)銷(xiāo)系統(tǒng)等信息化手段和落實(shí)廠務(wù)公開(kāi),增強(qiáng)民主監(jiān)督這一系列舉措來(lái)建立一套系統(tǒng)的、有效的、符合我國(guó)國(guó)企特點(diǎn)的內(nèi)部反腐機(jī)制,以達(dá)到防治腐敗的最終目的。
[Abstract]:According to the 2014 China Entrepreneur Crime Media case Analysis report, 657 cases of entrepreneur crime were reported in China in 2014, an increase of 194 cases over 2013. The number of cases involving state-owned enterprise entrepreneurs was 109, accounting for 16.6% of the total number of cases. As a pillar of the national economy, state-owned enterprises are prone to corruption and frequent areas. Establish and improve the internal anti-corruption mechanism of state-owned enterprises. It is a new topic for the state-owned enterprises to fight corruption and promote honesty and the construction of the Party style. The choice of the managers' behavior targets directly affects the establishment of the modern enterprise system. Whether state-owned assets can make the best use of goods and maintain and increase their value. The attribute of "economic man" emphasizes the pursuit of maximization of individual utility. The agent behavior of the business operator is not unique. The gradual strengthening of the corresponding rights of the operator in the enterprise has created favorable conditions for the realization of the goal of pursuing personal interests. As the agent of the owner of the state-owned assets, the target of the enterprise manager will sometimes conflict with the goal of the owner of the state-owned asset (the preservation and increment of the state-owned assets). The problems existing in the state-owned enterprise should be solved. While external supervision plays an important role, it is necessary to establish a set of internal anti-corruption mechanism of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, this paper mainly from the perspective of internal management and internal control. The theoretical basis and factual causes of internal anti-corruption in state-owned enterprises, the current situation of internal anti-corruption mechanism of state-owned enterprises, and the construction of internal anti-corruption mechanism of state-owned enterprises are expounded. It is pointed out that the problems of rent-seeking, collusion and insider control of state-owned enterprise managers are still the difficulties in the construction of internal anti-corruption mechanism of state-owned enterprises. And through the current state-owned enterprise three-level authorization mechanism to the managers supervision and constraint status quo, state-owned enterprise board of directors and trade unions analysis of the current situation, summed up the need to strengthen the board of directors supervision role. Strengthen the trade union and inner-party supervision and other internal supervision and control means, fixed salary and floating salary combination of incentive and constraint means, to build an internal reporting platform. Adopting the information means such as the online reimbursement system and the implementation of the open factory affairs and strengthening the democratic supervision to establish a set of systematic effective internal anti-corruption mechanism in line with the characteristics of state-owned enterprises in our country. In order to achieve the ultimate goal of preventing corruption.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河南科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F276.1;D262.6

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本文編號(hào)：1479507