本文選題：溢出效應(yīng) + 合作創(chuàng)新��； 參考：《系統(tǒng)工程》2016年07期

【摘要】：針對(duì)重大工程設(shè)計(jì)施工總承包模式(DB)下總承包商和分包商的合作創(chuàng)新問(wèn)題,基于演化視角建立博弈模型,研究在有限理性下二者之間的合作機(jī)制,同時(shí)對(duì)合作創(chuàng)新中存在的溢出效應(yīng)、收益分配、激勵(lì)與補(bǔ)貼對(duì)演化穩(wěn)定策略的影響進(jìn)行了探討。研究結(jié)果表明,在一定的情形下,合作給創(chuàng)新主體帶來(lái)的溢出效應(yīng)、單獨(dú)研發(fā)收益和合作創(chuàng)新的超額收益對(duì)雙方的合作具正效用;創(chuàng)新成本及總承包商的補(bǔ)貼系數(shù)的增加則不利于雙方走向合作;存在一個(gè)最優(yōu)的超額利益分配系數(shù)時(shí),使得雙方實(shí)現(xiàn)共贏;業(yè)主采取合適的策略介入,可以促進(jìn)承包商之間的合作。
[Abstract]:Aiming at the innovation of cooperation between general contractors and subcontractors under the general contracting mode of major engineering design and construction, a game model is established based on the evolutionary perspective, and the cooperative mechanism between the two is studied under the limited rationality. At the same time, the effects of spillover effects, income distribution, incentives and subsidies on evolutionary stabilization strategies in cooperative innovation are discussed. The results show that, under certain circumstances, the spillover effect of cooperation on innovation subject, R & D revenue alone and excess income from cooperative innovation have positive effects on the cooperation between the two sides. The increase of the innovation cost and the subsidy coefficient of the general contractor is not conducive to the cooperation between the two sides; when there is an optimal excess benefit distribution coefficient, the two sides can achieve a win-win situation; the owner takes the appropriate strategy to intervene. Cooperation between contractors can be promoted.
【作者單位】： 南京大學(xué)工程管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金重大資助項(xiàng)目(71390520);國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71271107;71471077;71571098) “十一五”國(guó)家科技支撐計(jì)劃項(xiàng)目(2011BAG07B00) 交通運(yùn)輸部建設(shè)科技項(xiàng)目(2013318282310)
【分類號(hào)】：F416.92
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本文編號(hào)：1896691