本文關(guān)鍵詞： 大型煤炭企業(yè) 規(guī)模擴(kuò)張 規(guī)模適度性 經(jīng)濟(jì)約束 行政約束　出處：《中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：近幾年我國煤炭產(chǎn)業(yè)集中度不斷提高,大型煤炭企業(yè)集團(tuán)的企業(yè)規(guī)模不斷擴(kuò)大。在此過程中,我國大型煤炭企業(yè)規(guī)模擴(kuò)張與國內(nèi)煤炭需求趨緩之間的矛盾不斷加劇,目前我國大型煤炭企業(yè)乃至整個(gè)煤炭行業(yè)已處于一個(gè)相當(dāng)困難的時(shí)期。經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行“新常態(tài)”下,調(diào)控大型煤炭企業(yè)規(guī)模,提高企業(yè)的規(guī)模效率,幫助煤炭企業(yè)脫困是勢在必行的。本文旨在使大型煤炭企業(yè)認(rèn)識到自身規(guī)模擴(kuò)張中存在的問題,在此基礎(chǔ)上尋找調(diào)控其企業(yè)規(guī)模的有效對策。調(diào)控措施主要基于本文對大型煤炭企業(yè)規(guī)模的經(jīng)濟(jì)及行政兩種約束要素提出的。對于大型煤炭企業(yè)規(guī)模的經(jīng)濟(jì)約束要素以及行政約束要素的研究也是本文的重點(diǎn)內(nèi)容。本文對于大型煤炭企業(yè)規(guī)模的研究主要從營業(yè)收入以及煤炭產(chǎn)量兩個(gè)角度展開。在進(jìn)行規(guī)�，F(xiàn)狀研究時(shí),本文運(yùn)用數(shù)據(jù)包絡(luò)分析法(DEA)對其進(jìn)行了評價(jià),認(rèn)為當(dāng)前大型煤炭企業(yè)幾乎全部處于規(guī)模無效狀態(tài)。在對大型煤炭企業(yè)規(guī)模適度性研究的過程中,文章以固定資產(chǎn)凈額為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)將企業(yè)現(xiàn)有規(guī)模進(jìn)行分組,并繼續(xù)運(yùn)用DEA模型對其進(jìn)行分析。通過各組綜合效率平均值的比較,本文將現(xiàn)有規(guī)模分為三個(gè)階段,并對每個(gè)階段不同分組下,大型煤炭企業(yè)的規(guī)模適度性進(jìn)行分析。繼而本文對大型煤炭企業(yè)規(guī)模的經(jīng)濟(jì)約束要素以及行政約束要素進(jìn)行研究。文章從宏觀及微觀兩個(gè)角度分析了大型煤炭企業(yè)規(guī)模的經(jīng)濟(jì)約束因素,并針對每一約束要素與大型煤炭企業(yè)規(guī)模之間的約束關(guān)系提出假設(shè),構(gòu)造出相應(yīng)的面板數(shù)據(jù)模型,模型的求解結(jié)果顯示,交易費(fèi)用、總資產(chǎn)投入、市場競爭力以及地區(qū)GDP水平對大型煤炭企業(yè)規(guī)模有正向約束作用,而勞動力投入對大型煤炭企業(yè)規(guī)模具有負(fù)向約束作用。本文將行政約束要素定義為政府對大型煤炭企業(yè)規(guī)模監(jiān)管過程中對于兩者決策產(chǎn)生約束的因素,通過政府與大型煤炭企業(yè)之間混合策略靜態(tài)以及動態(tài)博弈模型的構(gòu)建及分析,最終認(rèn)為大型煤炭企業(yè)是否選擇超限生產(chǎn)即擴(kuò)張規(guī)模受到政府的監(jiān)管成本、政府對大型煤炭企業(yè)超限懲罰以及政府監(jiān)管過程中接受的企業(yè)賄賂等因素約束。文章最后在前文研究的基礎(chǔ)上提出有效調(diào)控大型煤炭企業(yè)規(guī)模的建議。認(rèn)為大型煤炭企業(yè)在規(guī)模決策時(shí)應(yīng)該注重經(jīng)濟(jì)效益,建設(shè)有效規(guī)模,將原煤產(chǎn)出與煤炭需求掛鉤,優(yōu)化結(jié)構(gòu),規(guī)劃戰(zhàn)略布局,優(yōu)化生產(chǎn)過程,控制生產(chǎn)成本,提高生產(chǎn)質(zhì)量。同時(shí),政府應(yīng)正確認(rèn)識煤炭行業(yè)及煤炭企業(yè)的重要地位,在煤炭行業(yè)困難時(shí)期給予各地方煤炭企業(yè)關(guān)懷與鼓舞,幫助大型煤炭企業(yè)持續(xù)健康發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the concentration degree of China's coal industry has been increasing, and the scale of large coal enterprise groups has been expanding. In the process, the contradiction between the scale expansion of large coal enterprises in China and the slowing down of domestic coal demand is becoming more and more serious. At present, China's large coal enterprises and even the whole coal industry have been in a very difficult period. Under the "new normal" of economic operation, the scale of large coal enterprises is regulated and the efficiency of enterprises is improved. It is imperative to help coal enterprises to extricate themselves from difficulties. The purpose of this paper is to make large coal enterprises realize the problems existing in their scale expansion. On the basis of this, we seek effective countermeasures to control the scale of coal enterprises. The control measures are mainly based on the economic and administrative constraints on the scale of large coal enterprises. The economic constraints on the scale of large coal enterprises. The research on the factors and administrative constraints is also the focus of this paper. The research on the scale of large coal enterprises is mainly carried out from the perspective of operating income and coal production. In this paper, data Envelopment Analysis (DEAA) is used to evaluate the large coal enterprises, and it is concluded that most of the large coal enterprises are in a state of invalid scale at present. In the process of studying the appropriateness of the scale of large coal enterprises, Based on the net fixed assets as the standard, the paper classifies the existing scale of enterprises, and continues to use DEA model to analyze it. Through the comparison of the average comprehensive efficiency of each group, this paper divides the existing scale into three stages. And in different groups for each stage, In this paper, the economic constraints and administrative constraints of the scale of large coal enterprises are studied. From the macro and micro perspectives, the paper analyzes the large coal enterprises. The economic constraints of industrial scale, According to the constraint relationship between each constraint factor and the scale of large coal enterprise, the corresponding panel data model is constructed. The result of the model shows that the transaction cost, total asset investment, Market competitiveness and regional GDP level have a positive constraint on the scale of large coal enterprises. However, labor input has a negative effect on the scale of large coal enterprises. In this paper, the administrative constraint elements are defined as the factors that constrain the decision of the two decisions in the process of government supervision on the scale of large coal enterprises. Through the construction and analysis of the static and dynamic game model between the government and the large coal enterprises, it is concluded that whether the large-scale coal enterprises choose the over-limited production, that is, expand the scale is subject to the government's regulatory costs. The government restricts the punishment of large coal enterprises and the bribery of enterprises in the process of government supervision. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions to control the scale of large coal enterprises on the basis of the previous research. Coal enterprises should pay attention to economic benefits when making decisions on scale. Build effective scale, link raw coal output with coal demand, optimize structure, plan strategic layout, optimize production process, control production cost and improve production quality. The government should correctly understand the important position of the coal industry and coal enterprises, give the local coal enterprises care and encouragement in the difficult period of the coal industry, and help the large coal enterprises to develop continuously and healthily.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F426.21

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