基于博弈論的項(xiàng)目業(yè)主應(yīng)對索賠研究
發(fā)布時間:2019-04-03 13:33
【摘要】:建設(shè)工程具有規(guī)模大、投資高、工期長、施工節(jié)點(diǎn)多、未知風(fēng)險多、管理技巧強(qiáng)等特點(diǎn),在建設(shè)過程中,隨著社會環(huán)境和經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境動態(tài)變化的因素影響,工程建設(shè)項(xiàng)目的各個利益相關(guān)方隨時面臨著無法預(yù)見的不確定性風(fēng)險。隨著我國經(jīng)濟(jì)下行壓力加大、投資增長乏力的局面出現(xiàn),國內(nèi)工程建設(shè)承包與發(fā)包市場的競爭日益激烈,"低價中標(biāo),高額索賠"已經(jīng)成為項(xiàng)目施工方為贏取中標(biāo)而采取的措施,利用項(xiàng)目業(yè)主方應(yīng)對索賠管理水平較低、經(jīng)驗(yàn)不足的缺陷,達(dá)到最終盈取暴利的目的。因此,對于項(xiàng)目業(yè)主來說,應(yīng)對索賠工作經(jīng)驗(yàn)的總結(jié)與完善不僅僅只是一個思想意識是否重視的問題,更是一個能否把工程項(xiàng)目的結(jié)算價格控制在合理的計劃范圍之內(nèi)的重要事情,涉及到工程項(xiàng)目投資的成敗。本文從項(xiàng)目業(yè)主方的視角,通過對工程項(xiàng)目合同在履行的過程中就施工方與項(xiàng)目業(yè)主方圍繞干擾事件所帶來的損失而進(jìn)行的索賠與應(yīng)對索賠工作中出現(xiàn)的問題進(jìn)行了研究。首先,本文對工程項(xiàng)目的應(yīng)對索賠進(jìn)行了定義,并從應(yīng)對索賠的作用、分類和特點(diǎn)進(jìn)行了描述。然后詳細(xì)研究了項(xiàng)目業(yè)主應(yīng)對索賠的工作內(nèi)容、實(shí)施原則以及索賠爭端的解決方式,并對項(xiàng)目業(yè)主應(yīng)對索賠工作的常見問題進(jìn)行了分析。隨后,本文引入經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中"博弈論"理論,把業(yè)主應(yīng)對施工方索賠的博弈過程分成"維護(hù)自身利益"和"解決索賠爭端"兩個階段,建立起兩個階段博弈模型,既而得出了當(dāng)訴訟(含仲裁)的代價足夠小時,博弈雙方無論對手選擇什么樣的行動,自身的最優(yōu)行動為訴訟(含仲裁)等結(jié)論。最后,本文通過基于博弈推演的結(jié)論,從項(xiàng)目業(yè)主方的角度提出了三條"變防范為主動"的應(yīng)對索賠工作優(yōu)化措施,并通過案例進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證。
[Abstract]:The construction project has the characteristics of large scale, high investment, long construction period, many construction nodes, unknown risks, strong management skills and so on. In the construction process, along with the dynamic changes of social and economic environment, the factors influence, All stakeholders of construction projects are faced with unpredictable and uncertain risks at any time. With the increasing downward pressure on China's economy and the appearance of a situation of weak investment growth, the competition between domestic project construction contracting and contracting market is increasingly fierce. "the low price won the bid. The "high claim" has become the measure taken by the project construction party to win the bid, using the defects of the project owner in dealing with the low level of claim management and inexperience to achieve the ultimate goal of profiting profiteering. Therefore, for the project owners, to sum up and improve the experience of claim work is not only a question of whether or not the ideology attaches importance to it. It is also an important thing whether the settlement price of project can be controlled within the reasonable scope of the plan, which involves the success or failure of the project investment. From the point of view of the owner of the project, this paper studies the claims made by the construction party and the owner of the project about the losses caused by the interference events and the problems in the work of responding to the claims through the course of the performance of the contract of the project. First of all, this paper defines the claims for engineering projects, and describes the role, classification and characteristics of the claims. Then, the work contents, implementation principles and dispute settlement methods of project owners' claims are studied in detail, and the common problems of project owners' claims are analyzed. Subsequently, this paper introduces the "game theory" theory in economics, and divides the game process of owner's response to the construction party's claim into two stages: "safeguarding their own interests" and "resolving the claim dispute", and sets up two-stage game model. It is concluded that when the cost of litigation (including arbitration) is small enough, the optimal action of both sides of the game is litigation (including arbitration) no matter what action the opponent chooses. Finally, based on the conclusion of game deduction, this paper puts forward three optimization measures to deal with the claim from the point of view of the owner of the project, and validates it by a case.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:廣西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類號】:F426.92;F224.32
本文編號:2453253
[Abstract]:The construction project has the characteristics of large scale, high investment, long construction period, many construction nodes, unknown risks, strong management skills and so on. In the construction process, along with the dynamic changes of social and economic environment, the factors influence, All stakeholders of construction projects are faced with unpredictable and uncertain risks at any time. With the increasing downward pressure on China's economy and the appearance of a situation of weak investment growth, the competition between domestic project construction contracting and contracting market is increasingly fierce. "the low price won the bid. The "high claim" has become the measure taken by the project construction party to win the bid, using the defects of the project owner in dealing with the low level of claim management and inexperience to achieve the ultimate goal of profiting profiteering. Therefore, for the project owners, to sum up and improve the experience of claim work is not only a question of whether or not the ideology attaches importance to it. It is also an important thing whether the settlement price of project can be controlled within the reasonable scope of the plan, which involves the success or failure of the project investment. From the point of view of the owner of the project, this paper studies the claims made by the construction party and the owner of the project about the losses caused by the interference events and the problems in the work of responding to the claims through the course of the performance of the contract of the project. First of all, this paper defines the claims for engineering projects, and describes the role, classification and characteristics of the claims. Then, the work contents, implementation principles and dispute settlement methods of project owners' claims are studied in detail, and the common problems of project owners' claims are analyzed. Subsequently, this paper introduces the "game theory" theory in economics, and divides the game process of owner's response to the construction party's claim into two stages: "safeguarding their own interests" and "resolving the claim dispute", and sets up two-stage game model. It is concluded that when the cost of litigation (including arbitration) is small enough, the optimal action of both sides of the game is litigation (including arbitration) no matter what action the opponent chooses. Finally, based on the conclusion of game deduction, this paper puts forward three optimization measures to deal with the claim from the point of view of the owner of the project, and validates it by a case.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:廣西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類號】:F426.92;F224.32
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