政府不同策略下報廢汽車正規(guī)與非正規(guī)回收渠道博弈模型
發(fā)布時間:2018-12-09 19:01
【摘要】:為了分析政府不同政策對報廢汽車回收渠道的影響,建立了正規(guī)回收渠道與非正規(guī)回收渠道博弈模型;诖四P,考慮政府不采取政策、采取對正規(guī)回收渠道進(jìn)行補(bǔ)貼政策及采取對非正規(guī)渠道進(jìn)行監(jiān)管政策的3種情況。對比分析了3種情況下,政府補(bǔ)貼及監(jiān)管努力程度對單位回收價格、回收量、利潤及環(huán)境的影響。研究表明:(1)政府采取補(bǔ)貼政策時,正規(guī)渠道與非正規(guī)渠道都會提高單位回收價格;政府采取監(jiān)管政策時,正規(guī)渠道降低單位回收價格,非正規(guī)渠道提高單位回收價格;(2)政府不同政策對單位回收價格、回收量、利潤及環(huán)境的影響與政府補(bǔ)貼額、監(jiān)管努力程度、單位回收價格敏感度系數(shù)及監(jiān)管努力程度系數(shù)有關(guān)。
[Abstract]:In order to analyze the influence of different government policies on the recycling channels of end-of-life vehicles, a game model between formal and informal recovery channels is established. Based on this model, we consider three situations of government not adopting policy, adopting subsidy policy on formal recovery channel and adopting supervision policy on informal channel. The effects of government subsidy and regulatory efforts on unit recovery price, recovery amount, profit and environment are analyzed. The results show that: (1) when the government adopts subsidy policy, both the formal channel and the informal channel will increase the unit recovery price, and when the government adopts the regulatory policy, the formal channel will reduce the unit recovery price, and the informal channel will increase the unit recovery price; (2) the effects of different government policies on unit recovery price, recovery amount, profit and environment are related to the amount of government subsidy, the degree of regulatory effort, the sensitivity coefficient of unit recovery price and the coefficient of regulatory effort.
【作者單位】: 鄭州大學(xué)商學(xué)院;上海交通大學(xué)安泰經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;中國大連高級經(jīng)理學(xué)院;
【基金】:國家杰出青年科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71025002) 國家重點(diǎn)基礎(chǔ)研究發(fā)展計劃資助項(xiàng)目(2011CB013406) 國家社會科學(xué)基金重大項(xiàng)目(13&ZD147) 國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71301150,71472021)
【分類號】:F224.32;F426.471;F713.2
本文編號:2369878
[Abstract]:In order to analyze the influence of different government policies on the recycling channels of end-of-life vehicles, a game model between formal and informal recovery channels is established. Based on this model, we consider three situations of government not adopting policy, adopting subsidy policy on formal recovery channel and adopting supervision policy on informal channel. The effects of government subsidy and regulatory efforts on unit recovery price, recovery amount, profit and environment are analyzed. The results show that: (1) when the government adopts subsidy policy, both the formal channel and the informal channel will increase the unit recovery price, and when the government adopts the regulatory policy, the formal channel will reduce the unit recovery price, and the informal channel will increase the unit recovery price; (2) the effects of different government policies on unit recovery price, recovery amount, profit and environment are related to the amount of government subsidy, the degree of regulatory effort, the sensitivity coefficient of unit recovery price and the coefficient of regulatory effort.
【作者單位】: 鄭州大學(xué)商學(xué)院;上海交通大學(xué)安泰經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;中國大連高級經(jīng)理學(xué)院;
【基金】:國家杰出青年科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71025002) 國家重點(diǎn)基礎(chǔ)研究發(fā)展計劃資助項(xiàng)目(2011CB013406) 國家社會科學(xué)基金重大項(xiàng)目(13&ZD147) 國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71301150,71472021)
【分類號】:F224.32;F426.471;F713.2
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