本文選題：可再生能源　切入點：調(diào)度機制　出處：《華北電力大學(xué)(北京)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：大力發(fā)展可再生能源是中國實現(xiàn)能源供應(yīng)安全和緩解生態(tài)緩解壓力的關(guān)鍵。雖然中國現(xiàn)階段可再生能源電力處于蓬勃發(fā)展的時期,但是,隨著電力市場化的推進(jìn),競爭的引入,圍繞可再生能源發(fā)展的利益關(guān)系者之間的博弈成為影響可再生能源發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵因素。因此,在電力市場改革背景下,基于利益相關(guān)者博弈關(guān)系,研究建立完善的促進(jìn)可再生能源發(fā)展的激勵機制,是一個需要解決的重要課題。首先,本文從調(diào)度機制及配套激勵機制著手,通過文獻(xiàn)分析和資料收集,研究了現(xiàn)階段國內(nèi)外可再生能源發(fā)展情況和激勵政策的實踐經(jīng)驗。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)在世界范圍內(nèi),對可再生能源的激勵機制是保障可再生能源發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵因素,但不同國家采取的激勵機制不同,采取相同激勵機制的國家也會有不同的政策效果。其次,利用京津唐電網(wǎng)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行模擬,以風(fēng)電為例對可再生能源的激勵機制進(jìn)行了分析。對調(diào)度激勵機制進(jìn)行了重點的分析,基于運籌優(yōu)化方法和博弈論的方法建立模型,分別對計劃調(diào)度機制和競價上網(wǎng)調(diào)度機制進(jìn)行仿真模擬。其中垂直一體化調(diào)度機制下,又劃分為三個調(diào)度目標(biāo):經(jīng)濟成本最小為調(diào)度目標(biāo)、可再生能源優(yōu)先為調(diào)度目標(biāo)以及能源效率最高為調(diào)度目標(biāo);競價上網(wǎng)調(diào)度機制分別用古諾模型和SFE模型模擬了不同報價方式的情況,并得出電力系統(tǒng)納什均衡狀態(tài)。再次,對碳稅機制和價格補貼機制對可再生能源發(fā)展的影響進(jìn)行了仿真模擬計算,分析了不同激勵機制對可再生能源發(fā)電比例的影響以及對社會福利的影響。通過對比不同調(diào)度機制對可再生能源發(fā)電的影響情況,本文得出結(jié)論認(rèn)為調(diào)度激勵機制能夠從本質(zhì)上改變可再生能源發(fā)電情況,競價上網(wǎng)調(diào)度機制不僅有利于可再生能源的并網(wǎng)發(fā)電,而且可以大幅降低電力市場出清價格并提高社會福利水平;但是競價上網(wǎng)調(diào)度機制使成本偏高的可再生能源只能被動接受市場價格,以至于難以保證盈利。本文認(rèn)為在執(zhí)行競價上網(wǎng)機制時要進(jìn)一步加強配套激勵機制的執(zhí)行來保障可再生能源企業(yè)的盈利情況。研究結(jié)果還顯示:價格補貼機制的補償效果強于碳稅機制,但是碳稅機制的無謂損失比重較小。不同激勵機制之間的政策效果和對福利的影響都有所不同,不存在兼顧所有方面的完美的激勵機制,不同激勵機制的配合執(zhí)行才能做到優(yōu)勢互補。
[Abstract]:Vigorously developing renewable energy is the key to realize the security of energy supply and relieve the ecological pressure in China. Although China's renewable energy and electricity is in a period of vigorous development at present, with the development of electricity marketization and the introduction of competition, The game between stakeholders in the development of renewable energy has become a key factor affecting the development of renewable energy. Therefore, in the context of electricity market reform, based on the stakeholder game relationship, It is an important task to study and establish a perfect incentive mechanism to promote the development of renewable energy. Firstly, this paper starts from the dispatching mechanism and the supporting incentive mechanism, through the literature analysis and data collection, This paper studies the experience of renewable energy development and incentive policies at home and abroad at present. It is found that the incentive mechanism of renewable energy is the key factor to ensure the development of renewable energy in the world. However, different countries adopt different incentive mechanisms, and countries that adopt the same incentive mechanism will also have different policy effects. Secondly, using Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan power grid data to simulate, Taking wind power as an example, this paper analyzes the incentive mechanism of renewable energy, analyzes the incentive mechanism of dispatching, and establishes the model based on the optimization method of operational research and the method of game theory. Under the vertical integrated scheduling mechanism, it is divided into three scheduling objectives: the minimum economic cost is the scheduling target. Renewable energy priority is the scheduling target and the highest energy efficiency is the scheduling goal. Bidding and scheduling mechanism use Cournot model and SFE model to simulate the different bidding modes, and get the Nash equilibrium state of power system. The effects of carbon tax mechanism and price subsidy mechanism on the development of renewable energy are simulated and calculated. The effects of different incentive mechanisms on the proportion of renewable energy generation and on social welfare are analyzed, and the effects of different scheduling mechanisms on renewable energy generation are compared. In this paper, it is concluded that the scheduling incentive mechanism can change the situation of renewable energy generation in essence, and the bidding scheduling mechanism is not only beneficial to the grid power generation of renewable energy, but also beneficial to the grid generation of renewable energy. Moreover, it can greatly reduce the clearing price of the electricity market and raise the level of social welfare; but the bidding and dispatching mechanism can only passively accept the market price for the high cost renewable energy. Therefore, it is difficult to guarantee profit. This paper believes that the implementation of matching incentive mechanism should be further strengthened in order to protect the profitability of renewable energy enterprises. The research results also show that: price subsidy mechanism. The compensation effect is stronger than the carbon tax mechanism, However, the carbon tax mechanism has a relatively small proportion of unnecessary losses. The effects of policies and benefits are different among different incentive mechanisms, and there is no perfect incentive mechanism that takes all aspects into account. The cooperation and implementation of different incentive mechanisms can complement each other's advantages.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華北電力大學(xué)(北京)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F426.61;F224.32

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