本文選題：競(jìng)爭(zhēng)機(jī)制 + 網(wǎng)絡(luò)最優(yōu)化��； 參考：《南京大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：為了應(yīng)對(duì)蜂窩網(wǎng)絡(luò)服務(wù)提供商(CSP)面臨的嚴(yán)重的蜂窩網(wǎng)絡(luò)流量不足的問(wèn)題,將部分蜂窩網(wǎng)絡(luò)流量通過(guò)已有的代替無(wú)線(xiàn)網(wǎng)絡(luò),例如微蜂窩和WiFi網(wǎng)絡(luò),是一種很有前景的方案�，F(xiàn)有的大多數(shù)蜂窩網(wǎng)絡(luò)流量卸載方案都假設(shè)CSP預(yù)先知道需要卸載的流量信息,從而具體分配對(duì)應(yīng)的流量。然而,在實(shí)際應(yīng)用場(chǎng)景中,伴隨著移動(dòng)設(shè)備流量的爆發(fā)性增長(zhǎng),需要卸載的蜂窩流量往往會(huì)超過(guò)區(qū)域中可卸載無(wú)線(xiàn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)資源的總和。因此,在一定的預(yù)算限制下,為CSP提供最優(yōu)化的流量卸載容量是非常關(guān)鍵的。本篇論文考慮了 CSP不依賴(lài)于具體的需要卸載流量的需求的情況,并針對(duì)性地提出了 2種高效的移動(dòng)流量卸載競(jìng)爭(zhēng)拍賣(mài)機(jī)制,CAMEO-min和CAMEO-ws。這2種機(jī)制均被證明了滿(mǎn)足無(wú)預(yù)算赤字(non-budget-deficit),獨(dú)立理性(individually rational)和誠(chéng)實(shí)性(incentive-compatible),并且保證 了最壞情況下CSP的容量收益不低于其在理想拍賣(mài)模型下(即CSP擁有第三方資源擁有者的真實(shí)價(jià)格與資源信息時(shí))收益的一定比例。最后,本文進(jìn)行了大量的實(shí)驗(yàn),實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果顯示CAMEO-min和CAMEO-ws機(jī)制均保證了較好且穩(wěn)定的CSP容量收益,特別是當(dāng)全局報(bào)價(jià)主導(dǎo)參數(shù)(global bidder dominance)或者區(qū)域主導(dǎo)參數(shù)(region dominance)較大的情況下。
[Abstract]:In order to deal with the serious problem of insufficient cellular network traffic faced by cellular network service provider (CSP), it is a promising solution to use some cellular network traffic to replace the existing wireless networks, such as microcellular and WiFi networks. Most of the existing traffic unload schemes in cellular networks assume that CSP knows the traffic information to be unloaded in advance, so that the corresponding traffic is allocated concretely. However, in practical applications, with the explosive growth of mobile device traffic, the amount of cellular traffic that needs to be unloaded is often greater than the sum of unloadable wireless network resources in the region. Therefore, under certain budget constraints, it is critical to provide optimal flow unload capacity for CSP. In this paper, we consider that CSP does not depend on the specific need to unload traffic, and propose two efficient mobile traffic unload competitive auction mechanisms, CAMEO-min and CAMEO-ws. Both mechanisms have been proved to satisfy non-budget deficit, independent rational and honest incentive-compatible, and to ensure that in the worst case, CSP's capacity gains are not lower than those in the ideal auction model (that is, CSP has third-party resource ownership). The true price of the person and the resource information when) a certain proportion of the benefit. Finally, a large number of experiments are carried out in this paper. The experimental results show that both the CAMEO-min and CAMEO-ws mechanisms guarantee a good and stable CSP capacity return, especially when the global bidder dominance (global bidder dominance) or the region dominance (a region dominance) is larger.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：TN929.5

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本文編號(hào)：1775214