本文關(guān)鍵詞： 無線傳感器網(wǎng)絡(luò) 演化博弈論 信任管理 防御機(jī)制 差額獎(jiǎng)懲機(jī)制　出處：《昆明理工大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：伴隨科技的不斷發(fā)展與進(jìn)步,無線傳感器網(wǎng)絡(luò)在生活中的各個(gè)領(lǐng)域都得到了大規(guī)模的應(yīng)用,其中無線傳感器網(wǎng)絡(luò)的安全問題隨著應(yīng)用地不斷擴(kuò)展逐漸暴露出來。除了傳統(tǒng)意義上的安全問題,越來越多的研究人員將重點(diǎn)集中在了無線傳感器網(wǎng)絡(luò)(Wireless Sensor Networks,簡稱WSNs)信任管理問題。由于微型傳感器節(jié)點(diǎn)自身體積和結(jié)構(gòu)的特點(diǎn),導(dǎo)致其能量非常有限,在通信過程中,往往出于自私性的考慮會(huì)拒絕為其他節(jié)點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)數(shù)據(jù)包。并且一些正常的節(jié)點(diǎn)會(huì)被攻擊者利用轉(zhuǎn)化為惡意節(jié)點(diǎn),進(jìn)而惡意轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)數(shù)據(jù)包,影響網(wǎng)絡(luò)正常使用,縮短網(wǎng)絡(luò)整體壽命。信任管理就是要在節(jié)點(diǎn)之間互相建立信任模型,使得正常節(jié)點(diǎn)之間能夠正常通信,拒絕自私節(jié)點(diǎn)和惡意節(jié)點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)數(shù)據(jù)包的請(qǐng)求,使得整個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)正常使用。對(duì)于每一個(gè)節(jié)點(diǎn)而言,采用信任合作策略,能夠增加信任值,獲得信任收益,但是也會(huì)付出對(duì)應(yīng)的代價(jià),比如被惡意節(jié)點(diǎn)利用、自身的能量消耗等。由于節(jié)點(diǎn)出于自私性的考慮而拒絕為其他節(jié)點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)數(shù)據(jù)包采用不信任策略拒絕合作,這種行為將會(huì)降低信任值,導(dǎo)致相對(duì)應(yīng)的收益降低。本文針對(duì)這種矛盾狀態(tài),通過演化博弈論構(gòu)建信任管理模型,引導(dǎo)整個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)的大部分節(jié)點(diǎn)采用信任合作策略,使得整個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)最終能夠正常提供服務(wù)。具體來說,本文的研究工作如下:1.本文針對(duì)存在惡意節(jié)點(diǎn)的無線傳感器網(wǎng)絡(luò)中進(jìn)行了演化仿真,當(dāng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中的正常節(jié)點(diǎn)沒有采用防御策略時(shí),該網(wǎng)絡(luò)由于受到惡意節(jié)點(diǎn)的攻擊,整個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)很快就癱瘓,不能繼續(xù)提供正常服務(wù)。為了避免這種情況發(fā)生,本文引入了防御策略機(jī)制,在該機(jī)制下,正常節(jié)點(diǎn)針對(duì)惡意節(jié)點(diǎn)的攻擊可以采用防御策略以此避免被惡意消耗,使得整個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)不至于癱瘓,即使網(wǎng)絡(luò)在被攻擊的時(shí)候,也可以提供服務(wù)。2.本文針對(duì)節(jié)點(diǎn)出于自私性的考慮進(jìn)而成為自私節(jié)點(diǎn),拒絕為其他正常節(jié)點(diǎn)進(jìn)行數(shù)據(jù)包的轉(zhuǎn)發(fā),引入了差額獎(jiǎng)懲機(jī)制。這種差額獎(jiǎng)懲機(jī)制相對(duì)于傳統(tǒng)的激勵(lì)機(jī)制可以更快的使雙方節(jié)點(diǎn)全部采用信任合作策略。在該機(jī)制作用下,可以有效降低初始采用信任策略正常節(jié)點(diǎn)比例數(shù)的要求。這種機(jī)制的引入使得整個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)更快地趨于穩(wěn)定。3.本文針對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中存在很多不可靠因素,在信任演化過程中加入了網(wǎng)絡(luò)不可靠因素,針對(duì)發(fā)包成功率和收益延時(shí)進(jìn)行了仿真分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)發(fā)包成功率越高越不利于網(wǎng)絡(luò)最終的穩(wěn)定,降低發(fā)包成功率和收益延時(shí)還可以降低初始采用信任策略正常節(jié)點(diǎn)比例數(shù)。面對(duì)以后實(shí)際的網(wǎng)絡(luò)狀況,具有一定的指導(dǎo)意義。本文通過演化博弈論研究了 WSNs的信任管理模型,揭示了 WSNs節(jié)點(diǎn)信任演化的條件規(guī)律,為后續(xù)的實(shí)際網(wǎng)絡(luò)提供了理論基礎(chǔ)。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development and progress of science and technology, the wireless sensor network in each field of life are widely used, the security problem of wireless sensor network with the application of expansion gradually exposed. In addition to the safety problems in the traditional sense, more and more researchers focus on the wireless sensor network (Wireless Sensor Networks, referred to as WSNs) the trust management problem. Because of the characteristics of micro sensor nodes their size and structure, due to the limited energy in the process of communication, often for selfish considerations will refuse to forward packets for other nodes. And some normal nodes will be exploited by attackers into malicious nodes and malicious data forwarding the influence of network packets, the normal use, shorten the overall network lifetime. Trust management is to establish mutual trust model between nodes So, can the normal communication between normal nodes, denial of selfish and malicious nodes forwarding the request packet, the normal use of the Internet. For each node, the trust cooperation strategy, can increase the trust value, gain trust benefits, but will also pay the corresponding price, such as by malicious nodes using their own. Energy consumption. Due to the consideration of the selfish nodes and forwarding packets by refused to distrust strategy refused to cooperate for other nodes, this behavior will reduce the trust value, resulting in the corresponding income lower. Aiming at this contradiction, through evolutionary game theory to construct the trust management model, most of the nodes of the whole network to guide the trust the cooperation strategy, the whole network can provide normal services. Specifically, the research work of this paper are as follows: 1. based on the presence of malicious nodes The wireless sensor network in the simulation, when the normal nodes in the network does not use the defense strategy, the network due to attacks by malicious nodes, the network quickly paralyzed, unable to provide normal services. In order to avoid this situation, this paper introduces the defense mechanism, in this mechanism, attacks against malicious nodes can be used as normal node defense strategy to prevent malicious consumption, making the entire network not paralyzed, even when the network is attacked, can also provide.2. services based on the consideration of the selfish nodes and become selfish nodes, to other normal nodes forwarding packets, the difference between the reward and punishment mechanism this kind of difference. The incentive mechanism with respect to the traditional incentive mechanism can be used in all trust cooperation strategy so that both nodes in the machine making faster. Use, can effectively reduce the requirements of the initial trust strategy node proportion number. The introduction of this mechanism makes the whole network quickly stabilized.3. this paper according to the reality of the network there are many uncertain factors in the evolution of trust in the process of accession to the network unreliable factor, for the success rate and return delay are analyzed the success rate is higher, that is not conducive to the stability of network, reduce the success rate and the return delay can also reduce the initial trust strategy normal nodes ratio. In the face of network situation, which has a certain guiding significance. The trust management model of WSNs is studied by evolutionary game theory, reveals the condition of WSNs the node trust evolution, provides a theoretical basis for the actual network in the future.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：昆明理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：TP212.9;TN929.5

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