對(duì)SHACAL-2算法和MD5加密模式的差分故障攻擊
[Abstract]:Differential fault attack is an indirect attack method, which has a good effect on block cipher and stream cipher. Since Biham put forward the concept of differential fault attack in 1997, this method can be used to attack many cryptographic algorithms such as DES algorithm, elliptic curve cryptosystem / 3DES algorithm, SMS4 algorithm and CLEFIA algorithm. In this paper, the differential characteristics of nonlinear components in SHACAL-2 algorithm and MD5 encryption mode are studied by solving mixed equations. The differential characteristic is used to attack the differential fault. The main results are as follows: (1) it is proved that the solution of the difference equation is obtained when the input difference of the first position of the SHACAL-2 algorithm is nonzero or the first two positions of the selection function are not 00:00 (all the other positions are zero). The number of the input difference is only related to the weight of the input difference. Applying this result to the differential fault attack of SHACAL-2 algorithm, the effective differential fault location is explained as E, and it is proved that at least 160 random faults are needed to recover the 512-bit seed key with more than 60% success probability. At least 240 random faults are needed to recover the 512-bit seed key with a success probability of more than 98%. (2) by studying the differential characteristics of the wheel function in the MD5 encryption mode, a fast algorithm for solving the difference equation bit by bit is presented. Using this algorithm, the differential fault attack on MD5 encryption mode can be realized from the reciprocal third round. The results show that if the fault is imported from the penultimate third round, only 56 faults on average, the 512-bit seed key can be successfully recovered, and if the fault is imported from the penultimate round, An average of 112 faults are required to successfully recover the 512 bit seed key. Therefore, compared with importing faults from the reciprocal second round, the imported faults from the reciprocal round can not only reduce the number of rounds of fault attack ahead of schedule, but also reduce the number of faults needed to restore the seed key by half.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:國(guó)防科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號(hào)】:TN918.1
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