【摘要】：根據(jù)美國工程新聞記錄(ENR)(1998)的一項調(diào)查顯示,欠發(fā)達國家和發(fā)展中國家的建筑業(yè)增加值占GDP的比重都要多于發(fā)達國家,而且其建筑業(yè)產(chǎn)值的增加速度也都分別超過了各自國家的GDP增長速度。作為發(fā)展中國家的中國,隨著其城市化進程的加快和城鄉(xiāng)人民生活水平的提高,國家在鐵路、公路、機場、水利、電力、住宅等基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)方面的投入正不斷加大,建筑業(yè)已成為我國現(xiàn)階段經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的四大支柱產(chǎn)業(yè)之一,也是國家實現(xiàn)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資的主要載體,建筑業(yè)在拉動內(nèi)需、增加就業(yè)、促進經(jīng)濟增長、改善人民生活水平、加快農(nóng)村勞動力轉(zhuǎn)移、實現(xiàn)城鄉(xiāng)統(tǒng)籌發(fā)展等方面都做出巨大貢獻。 然而,還應(yīng)看到,在我國建筑業(yè)快速推進的背后仍然存在著競爭無序、資源大量浪費、生產(chǎn)效率低下的事實。雖然我國建筑業(yè)的總產(chǎn)值和增加值早已達到萬億規(guī)模,且每年還在以較大增幅持續(xù)上升,但建筑業(yè)的利潤率水平卻不盡如人意,與制造業(yè)等其它行業(yè)相比始終處于一個較低水平。 傳統(tǒng)的發(fā)展經(jīng)濟學(xué)認為技術(shù)進步和資本積累可以促進經(jīng)濟發(fā)展,楊小凱教授卻認為從制度上的徹底改變才是推動經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的原動力。制度的改變可以有效節(jié)約生產(chǎn)成本,從而達到提高行業(yè)生產(chǎn)運行效率的目的。學(xué)者毛友權(quán)(2004)也指出：選擇正確的項目管理模式是決定建筑工程成功與否的關(guān)鍵性因素。 在我國傳統(tǒng)的建筑工程管理模式中,項目管理組織結(jié)構(gòu)層次過多,存在著大量的管理接口和監(jiān)管界面,致使管理過程中協(xié)調(diào)量增加,控制難度加大,決策過程緩慢。同時,傳統(tǒng)建筑工程管理模式的信息孤島現(xiàn)象也很嚴重,信息傳遞失真、扭曲、延誤、短缺。在這種組織模式下,只有命令和控制,而缺少協(xié)調(diào)與合作,項目各參與方都會只從自身經(jīng)濟利益出發(fā),而忽視甚至是損害項目中其它各方的利益,從而影響了項目總目標的實現(xiàn)。 在全球經(jīng)濟一體化和商業(yè)趨同化的大背景下,在合作中謀求發(fā)展是提升行業(yè)總體實力的有效手段,建筑業(yè)長期、穩(wěn)定的發(fā)展同樣不能偏離這一宏觀經(jīng)濟環(huán)境,Partnering模式就是在這種情況下應(yīng)運而生的。Partnering模式是一種可以將傳統(tǒng)的對抗型的建筑企業(yè)文化轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榛谛湃闻c共享的共贏型項目文化的管理方式,自1988年被美國軍方正式提出,在之后的幾十年間,已被成功應(yīng)用到歐洲、日本、韓國、澳大利亞、中國香港等地的大型民用建設(shè)項目中,Partnering模式在提高建筑業(yè)長期落后的生產(chǎn)效率及質(zhì)量,改善行業(yè)內(nèi)傳統(tǒng)的敵對關(guān)系等方面都發(fā)揮著巨大的推動作用。Wood和Ellis(2005)在文獻中曾盛贊Partnering模式是“迄今為止,在提高項目績效方面最具有價值的管理方式”。國外大量的實證研究也充分證明了在建筑工程中實施Partnering模式可以有效改善行業(yè)內(nèi)惡意競爭、效率低下、工期拖延、預(yù)算超支等諸多問題。 我國在建筑工程管理方面的研究起步較晚,其理論研究與實際應(yīng)用也尚處于探索階段,與其它發(fā)達國家成熟、系統(tǒng)的管理模式之間還存在著相當大的差距。以Partnering模式為例,從目前收集到的文獻和資料來看,尚沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)我國建筑工程在系統(tǒng)化、標準化應(yīng)用Partnering模式方面的成功案例,個別文獻中引用的“準Partnering模式”工程也只是借鑒了其合作理念及部分工作流程而已。我國建筑行業(yè)能否選擇合作策略?如何將Partnering模式成功移植到我國建筑業(yè)中?在我國建筑業(yè)中應(yīng)怎樣制定科學(xué)、有效的Partnering管理機制?通過對以上問題的研究和理解,可以對在我國建筑工程中成功實施Partnering模式具有非常重要的理論和實踐意義。 通過對相關(guān)文獻的研究和查閱可以看出,很多中、外文獻對Partnering模式的研究熱點都集中在管理機制、基本概念、工作流程和績效評價等方面,而對Partnering模式合作策略選擇的研究卻鮮有涉足；對Partnering模式的研究方法也多為概念性描述、定性分析和實證研究,而應(yīng)用數(shù)學(xué)模型及博弈理論對Partnering模式的研究方法則并不多見。建筑工程往往會涉及到眾多的建筑企業(yè)。作為理性的決策者,這些參與Partnering模式的建筑企業(yè)在做出的任何決策時都不僅要參考對方給出的策略,同時還應(yīng)考慮到我方做出的決策將會給對方造成的影響,這是一個典型的博弈過程。 鑒于以上原因,論文以交易成本、資源依賴、博弈論和演化博弈論等基本理論為基礎(chǔ),應(yīng)用理論分析與數(shù)學(xué)模型相結(jié)合的研究方法,對上文中提出的,在我國成功實施Partnering模式所需解決的諸多問題做出系統(tǒng)研究。論文的研究成果可以為有效提高我國建筑工程管理水平和工程運行效率、完善我國建筑工程管理領(lǐng)域的運行機制、促進工程管理的改革與創(chuàng)新提供一定的理論依據(jù)。 論文的創(chuàng)新點主要有： 一、論文試圖以重復(fù)博弈理論和演化穩(wěn)定策略的視角來解決我國建筑業(yè)的“囚徒困境”問題,并進而對企業(yè)實施Partnering模式的合作策略選擇問題進行探究。研究認為,可替代型企業(yè)只要滿足一定條件,同樣存在演化穩(wěn)定的合作行為,這為有競爭關(guān)系的建筑企業(yè)選擇合作策略提供了理論依據(jù)。論文還系統(tǒng)研究了在合作行為演化穩(wěn)定的狀態(tài)下,各類建筑企業(yè)的互補性、替代性、技術(shù)水平等內(nèi)部屬性與其合作意愿、努力程度、生產(chǎn)效率、合作利潤等外顯因素之間的相關(guān)性問題,為在實際工程中制定科學(xué)合理的Partnering模式管理機制提供理論指導(dǎo)。 二、通過對我國現(xiàn)有經(jīng)濟體制、法律體系和文化背景等外部環(huán)境因素對建筑企業(yè)實施Partnering模式的影響分析,并結(jié)合論文對影響Partnering模式合作策略選擇的因素分析及由此產(chǎn)生的對Partnering模式管理機制的探索,有針對性地對我國建筑業(yè)實施Partnering模式的具體管理措施提出對策和建議。論文還通過定量分析制定了相對公平合理、適合我國國情的Partnering模式收益分配原則和監(jiān)督管理對策,為我國建筑業(yè)更好地實施Partnering模式提供一定的理論支持。 論文的主要結(jié)論如下： 一、生產(chǎn)技術(shù)水平相同、不相同兩種情況下的資源互補和生產(chǎn)替代的建筑企業(yè)都存在演化穩(wěn)定的合作偏好,即合作行為都可以成為最佳的均衡策略選擇。對資源互補型企業(yè)而言,任何情況下,合作行為都要好于不合作行為,合作行為是演化穩(wěn)定的；但對生產(chǎn)替代型企業(yè)來說,只有雙方的可替代性足夠小(合作意愿足夠大)時,合作行為才能夠演化穩(wěn)定,雙方才更適合于合作。如果雙方可替代性較大,即相似程度較高,則兩建筑企業(yè)的合作行為不演化穩(wěn)定,背叛行為會時有發(fā)生。但在任何情況下,不合作行為都不會演化穩(wěn)定。從而解決了建筑業(yè)中的“囚徒困境”問題,并由此證明了合作行為可以成為建筑企業(yè)之間的最佳選擇策略,也可以為合作雙方贏得更多的合作收益。 二、當合作行為演化穩(wěn)定時,兩個技術(shù)水平相同或相近的建筑企業(yè),其生產(chǎn)技術(shù)水平越強,資源互補性越大,可替代性越小,那么企業(yè)的合作意愿越大,愿意為合作付出的努力越多,產(chǎn)生的生產(chǎn)效率越高,合作所得利潤也越多；而對于技術(shù)水平不相同的任何類型的建筑企業(yè)而言,技術(shù)水平高的建筑企業(yè)相比技術(shù)水平低的建筑企業(yè),其合作意愿更大,付出努力更多,工作效率更高,所得合作利潤也更多。 三、Partnering模式中的建筑企業(yè)的合作收益分配應(yīng)遵循以下七條原則：合作增加收益原則、最優(yōu)化分配原則、成本影響收益原則、收益與風(fēng)險、付出、實力、工程復(fù)雜度相匹配原則等,即在合作項目中作用相對重要、承擔風(fēng)險較大、付出較多、實力較強的企業(yè)應(yīng)適當增加合作收益的分配比例；但兩個實力相差不多企業(yè)的收益分配比例不宜有太大差距,否則就會影響到合作雙方的信任、溝通與共享程度,導(dǎo)致合作失敗。研究還顯示：實力較強一方的收益納什均衡值與利潤率是負相關(guān)的,而實力較弱一方的均衡收益與利潤率是正相關(guān)的。這種現(xiàn)象可以用“智豬博弈”模型解釋為：對于技術(shù)難度較大、不確定性風(fēng)險較高的工程,由于強勢方可以從該工程中獲取較多利潤,因此其合作意愿較高,為激發(fā)弱勢方的合作積極性,強勢方應(yīng)減少收益比例。相反,對于技術(shù)難度較小的工程,強勢方對合作伙伴的選擇空間很大,這時弱勢方具有很強的的合作意愿,為了取得合作機會,弱勢企業(yè)則要降低收益要求。 四、Partnering模式中的業(yè)主單位通過提高其監(jiān)督檢查力度和發(fā)現(xiàn)問題的能力,并加大對承包、承建單位投機行為的處罰力度,可以在一定程度上有效提高承包單位的盡職程度,降低承包單位和承建單位串通作假行為發(fā)生的可能性；而且,業(yè)主監(jiān)督檢查和發(fā)現(xiàn)問題的成本越高、承包單位和承建單位串通作假所得越多,則它們串通作假的可能性就越大；但研究同時發(fā)現(xiàn),隨著對承建單位投機行為處罰力度的增加,反而會降低承包單位的敬業(yè)程度。這種現(xiàn)象可以解釋為,承包單位利潤所得的主要來源是承建單位,實際工程中,承包單位與承建單位之間比與業(yè)主擁有更多的共同利益。
[Abstract]:According to a survey by the American Engineering News Record (ENR) (ENR) (1998), the proportion of the construction industry in the underdeveloped countries and the developing countries is more than the developed countries, and the increase in the output value of the construction industry is more than the growth rate of the GDP in their respective countries. As a developing country, China, with its urbanization. The acceleration of the process and the improvement of the living standard of urban and rural people, the investment of the state in the construction of railway, highway, airport, water conservancy, electricity, housing and other basic facilities is increasing. The construction industry has become one of the four pillar industries in the current economic development of our country, and is also the main carrier for the state to realize the investment in infrastructure, and the construction industry is pulling Domestic demand, increasing employment, promoting economic growth, improving people's living standards, speeding up the transfer of rural labor, and achieving coordinated urban and rural development have made tremendous contributions.
However, it should also be seen that behind the rapid development of China's construction industry, there is still a fact that competition is disorderly, resources are wasted, and production efficiency is low. Although the total output value and added value of the construction industry in China have already reached trillions of scale, and it is still rising with a large increase every year, the profit rate of the construction industry is not satisfactory. Manufacturing and other industries are at a low level.
The traditional development economics believes that technological progress and capital accumulation can promote economic development. Professor Yang Xiaokai believes that the radical change in the system is the driving force for economic development. The change of the system can effectively save the cost of production and thus achieve the purpose of improving the production and transportation efficiency of the industry. Scholar Mao Youquan (2004) also points out that Choosing the correct project management mode is the key factor to decide whether the construction project is successful or not.
In the traditional construction management model of China, the structure of the project management organization is too much, there are a large number of management interfaces and supervision interface, which leads to the increase of the coordination quantity, the difficulty of control and the slow decision process. At the same time, the information isolation of the traditional construction management mode is very serious, the information transmission is distorted and the process is twisted. In this organization mode, only command and control, but lack of coordination and cooperation, all the participants of the project will only start from their own economic interests, but ignore even the interests of other parties in the project, thus affecting the realization of the total project goal.
Under the background of global economic integration and commercial assimilation, seeking development in cooperation is an effective means to improve the overall strength of the industry. The long-term and stable development of the construction industry can not deviate from this macro economic environment. The Partnering model is a kind of.Partnering model which can be shipped in this case. The antagonistic construction enterprise culture is transformed into a win-win project culture based on trust and sharing. Since 1988, it was formally proposed by the US military. In the following decades, it has been successfully applied to large civil construction projects in Europe, Japan, Korea, Australia and Hongkong, China and other places. The Partnering model is improving the architecture. The long-term backward production efficiency and quality, and the improvement of the traditional hostility in the industry have played a great role in promoting.Wood and Ellis (2005) in the literature that the Partnering model has been praised as "the most valuable management formula for improving the performance of the project so far". Partnering model in construction projects can effectively improve the industry malicious competition, inefficiency, project delay, budget overruns and many other issues.
The research on Construction Engineering Management in China started relatively late, its theoretical research and practical application are still in the exploration stage. There is still a considerable gap between the mature and systematic management models of other developed countries. Taking the Partnering model as an example, from the present collection of literature and data, there has not yet been found in China's architectural engineering. In systematized and standardized application of the successful case of Partnering model, the "quasi Partnering model" project cited in some literature is only a reference to its cooperation concept and part of the work process. Can China's construction industry choose cooperation strategy? How to successfully transplant the Partnering model to China's architecture industry? In our country How to make a scientific and effective Partnering management mechanism in the industry? Through the research and understanding of the above problems, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to the successful implementation of the Partnering model in China's architectural engineering.
Through the research and inspection of relevant literature, we can see that many of the hot spots in the Partnering model are focused on the management mechanism, basic concepts, work flow and performance evaluation, but the research on the selection of Partnering mode cooperation strategy is rarely involved, and the research methods of Partnering model are mostly conceptual. Description, qualitative analysis and empirical research, while the application of mathematical model and game theory to the research method of Partnering model is not common. Architectural engineering often involves many construction enterprises. As a rational decision maker, the construction enterprises participating in the Partnering model should not only refer to each other when they make any decision. At the same time, we should also take into account the impact of the decisions we make on the other side. This is a typical game process.
In view of the above reasons, the paper, based on the basic theories of transaction cost, resource dependence, game theory and evolutionary game theory, applies the research method of combining theoretical analysis and mathematical model, and makes a systematic study on the many problems that need to be solved in the successful implementation of Partnering model in our country. It provides a certain theoretical basis for improving the management level and efficiency of construction engineering, improving the operation mechanism of Construction Engineering Management in our country, and promoting the reform and innovation of engineering management.
The main innovations of this paper are as follows:
First, the thesis tries to solve the "prisoner's dilemma" problem in China's construction industry with the perspective of repeated game theory and evolutionary stabilization strategy, and then explores the choice of cooperative strategy in the implementation of Partnering model by enterprises. The research holds that alternative enterprises have the same evolutionary and stable cooperative behavior as long as they meet certain conditions. This paper provides a theoretical basis for the selection of cooperative strategies for competitive construction enterprises. The thesis also systematically studies the correlation between the complementarity, substitution, technology level and other internal attributes of construction enterprises, such as the willingness to cooperate, the degree of effort, production efficiency, and cooperation profit, in the state of stable cooperative behavior. It provides theoretical guidance for formulating scientific and reasonable Partnering mode management mechanism in actual projects.
Two, through the analysis of the impact of external environmental factors such as the existing economic system, legal system and cultural background on the implementation of the Partnering model in the construction enterprises, and the analysis of the factors affecting the selection of the Partnering mode cooperation strategy and the resulting exploration of the Partnering model management mechanism, the construction of our country is targeted to the construction of China. The concrete management measures of the Partnering model are put forward and suggestions are put forward in the paper. The paper also establishes a reasonable and reasonable Partnering model, which is relatively fair and reasonable, suitable for the national conditions of our country and the Countermeasures of supervision and management, and provides some theoretical support for the better implementation of Partnering model in China's construction industry.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
First, the production technology level is the same, the construction enterprises with different resources complementation and production substitution in the two different situations have a stable cooperative preference. That is, the cooperative behavior can be the best choice of equilibrium strategy. For the complementary enterprise, in any case, the cooperation behavior is better than the non cooperative behavior, and the cooperative behavior is the performance of the cooperative behavior. But for the production alternative enterprises, only when the substitution of the two sides is small enough (the willingness of cooperation is big enough), the cooperative behavior can evolve steadily, and the two parties are more suitable for cooperation. If the two sides can have a larger substitution and a higher similarity, the cooperation behavior of the two construction enterprises is not stable, and the betrayal will have time. But in any case, the uncooperative behavior will not evolve steadily. Thus, the "prisoner's dilemma" in the construction industry is solved, which proves that the cooperative behavior can be the best choice between the construction enterprises, and can also win more cooperative benefits for the partners.
Two, when the cooperative behavior is stable, two construction enterprises with the same or similar technical level are the more productive technology, the greater the complementarity of the resources, the smaller the substitutability, the greater the willingness of the enterprises to cooperate with, the more efforts they are willing to pay for the cooperation, the higher the production efficiency and the more profit of the cooperation. As for any type of construction enterprises with different levels of construction, high technical level construction enterprises have greater cooperation will, more effort, higher work efficiency and more profit of cooperation than those with low technical level.
Three, the distribution of cooperative income of construction enterprises in Partnering model should follow the following seven principles: cooperative income principle, optimal allocation principle, cost impact income principle, income and risk, pay, strength, engineering complexity matching principle, that is, the role of the cooperative project is relatively important, bear greater risk and pay more. The enterprises with strong strength should appropriately increase the proportion of the distribution of the cooperative income; but the proportion of the income distribution of the two similar enterprises should not have too big gap, otherwise it will affect the trust of the two parties, the degree of communication and sharing, and the failure of the cooperation. The study also shows that the profit Nash equilibrium value and the profit rate of the stronger party are also shown. There is a negative correlation, and the equilibrium income of the weaker side is positively related to the profit margin. This phenomenon can be explained by the "smart pig game" model: for the engineering with higher technical difficulty and higher uncertainty risk, the strong party can get more profit from the project, so its willingness to cooperate is higher, in order to stimulate the disadvantaged side. On the contrary, for a project with less technical difficulty, the strong side has a large choice of partners, and the weak side has a strong willingness to cooperate. In order to obtain cooperation opportunities, the disadvantaged enterprises should reduce the demand for profits.
Four, the owner units in the Partnering model, by improving their ability to supervise and inspect the problems, and increase the penalties for the speculation of contracting and construction units, can effectively improve the degree of duty of contractors and reduce the possibility of collusion between contractors and contractors; and The higher the cost of the owner's supervision and inspection and the discovery of the problem, the more the contractors and the contractors collude with the fraud, the greater the possibility of collusion, but the study also finds that with the increase in the punishment of the speculative behavior of the construction units, it will reduce the degree of respect for the single position of the contractor. The main source of profit of the contractor is the contractor. In the actual project, the contractor and the contractor have more common interests than the owner.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F426.92

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