【摘要】：隨著城市發(fā)展速度的加快，于上個世紀80年代末首次出現(xiàn)的城中村現(xiàn)象至90年代中后期已經(jīng)成為一種普遍現(xiàn)象。城中村問題關(guān)乎政治、經(jīng)濟、環(huán)境等諸多方面，其存在與城市的歷史發(fā)展和產(chǎn)生機制密不可分，因此合理改造城中村是構(gòu)建和諧社會的有效途徑。改造城中村過程是一個涉及利益相關(guān)者多重博弈的過程，通過適當?shù)姆椒ê屯緩秸业揭粋�恰當?shù)母脑炻窂绞亲罱K解決城中村問題的關(guān)鍵。 本研究共分為五個部分，第一部分簡單介紹本文的研究背景、意義和研究內(nèi)容，并對城中村相關(guān)文獻進行綜述。第二部分主要介紹本文的理論基礎(chǔ)，即演化博弈理論和系統(tǒng)動力學，并闡述其適用性。第三部分定性分析博弈主體之間的博弈焦點，提出博弈假設(shè)并設(shè)置研究參數(shù)，在簡單分析各博弈主體策略收益的基礎(chǔ)上對城中村改造過程中的三方博弈系統(tǒng)進行演化博弈理論分析。第四部分運用系統(tǒng)動力學的理論方法對城中村改造過程中涉及到的三方利益主體的演化博弈系統(tǒng)進行仿真分析，找出演化博弈的均衡狀態(tài)以及相關(guān)因素對均衡狀態(tài)的敏感性。第五部分主要概括了本文的研究結(jié)論，對城中村改造提出針對性建議，并指出本研究的不足和未來研究方向。
[Abstract]:With the acceleration of urban development, the phenomenon of village in the city, which first appeared in the late 1980s, has become a common phenomenon since the middle and late 1990s. The problem of village in city is related to politics, economy, environment and many other aspects. Its existence is closely related to the historical development and production mechanism of the city, so it is an effective way to construct a harmonious society to reform the village in city reasonably. The process of rebuilding the village in the city is a multi-game process involving the stakeholders. Finding a proper transformation path is the key to solve the problem of the village in the city through appropriate methods and approaches. This research is divided into five parts. The first part briefly introduces the research background, significance and research content. The second part mainly introduces the theoretical basis of this paper, namely evolutionary game theory and system dynamics, and expounds its applicability. The third part qualitatively analyzes the game focus between the main players of the game, puts forward the hypothesis of the game and sets up the research parameters. On the basis of simply analyzing the benefits of game agents' strategies, the evolutionary game theory of the three-party game system in the process of village transformation in city is analyzed. The fourth part uses the theory method of system dynamics to simulate and analyze the evolution game system of the three-party stakeholders involved in the transformation of the village in the city, and find out the equilibrium state of the evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the relevant factors to the equilibrium state. The fifth part mainly summarizes the research conclusion of this paper, puts forward the targeted suggestions to the village transformation in the city, and points out the deficiency of this study and the future research direction.
【學位授予單位】：暨南大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：N941.3;TU984.114

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