【摘要】：本文從中央政府的角度出發(fā),分析了污染治理的外部性會帶來市場的非效率,研究了地方政府污染聯(lián)控機(jī)制在占優(yōu)均衡與子博弈精煉納什均衡下的執(zhí)行問題。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):市場效率損失來源于私有信息與機(jī)制設(shè)計者的監(jiān)管力度不夠,得到了納什均衡下機(jī)制執(zhí)行的充分必要條件,并構(gòu)建了一個動態(tài)機(jī)制來實現(xiàn)污染聯(lián)控問題,同時通過非對稱信息的引入,給出了占優(yōu)均衡下機(jī)制實現(xiàn)目標(biāo)的方式。
[Abstract]:From the point of view of the central government, this paper analyzes the non-efficiency of the market caused by the externality of pollution control, and studies the implementation of the local government pollution control mechanism under the dominant equilibrium and the sub-game refined Nash equilibrium. It is found that the loss of market efficiency comes from the insufficient supervision of private information and mechanism designers, and obtains the necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementation of the mechanism under Nash equilibrium, and constructs a dynamic mechanism to realize the problem of joint pollution control. At the same time, through the introduction of asymmetric information, the mechanism to achieve the goal under dominant equilibrium is given.
【作者單位】： 北方工業(yè)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：北京市優(yōu)秀人才青年骨干資助項目(2016000020124G021)
【分類號】：X321

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