本文選題：環(huán)境污染 + 績效評價��； 參考：《西北工業(yè)大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：鑒于日益嚴峻的環(huán)境污染現(xiàn)狀和基于行政、法律等外部途徑治理公司環(huán)境污染行為的局限性,本文提出轉(zhuǎn)變治理公司環(huán)境污染行為的思路,即從內(nèi)部治理和高管激勵角度出發(fā),探討如何有效地將相對績效考評體系與高管政治激勵和薪酬激勵方式相結(jié)合以治理公司環(huán)境污染行為。上市公司污染事件的不斷曝光為我們評價公司現(xiàn)行的績效考評和高管激勵方式在治理公司環(huán)境污染行為方面的有效性提供了良好的實證研究環(huán)境。本研究通過系統(tǒng)整理收集2004-2012年度我國重污染行業(yè)上市公司環(huán)境污染行為的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),融合前景理論,實證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)基于社會績效的評價體系能夠降低高管采取公司環(huán)境污染行為的動力,表現(xiàn)為高社會相對績效的公司不傾向于污染環(huán)境,尤其是高管還具有政治關(guān)聯(lián)的公司。然而,基于歷史績效的評價體系卻激勵高管采取公司環(huán)境污染行為,表現(xiàn)為:一方面高歷史相對績效的公司傾向于污染環(huán)境,但是給予高管高額的固定報酬可以起到削弱高歷史相對績效情況下高管采取公司環(huán)境污染行為的傾向;另一方面,低歷史相對績效與高管高額的固定報酬相結(jié)合又會促使高管采取公司環(huán)境污染行為。研究結(jié)果表明強化基于社會相對績效的績效評價體系,鼓勵基于高管政治激勵和在高的歷史相對績效情況下給予高管高額的固定薪酬能夠起到激勵高管規(guī)制公司污染環(huán)境行為的作用。本研究提出以下幾點建議:(1)上市公司特別強調(diào)基于歷史相對績效的考評體系,要求高管持續(xù)不斷地提高公司業(yè)績。這一績效評價方式會促使高管采取環(huán)境污染行為。我們應(yīng)該引入基于社會相對評價體系的以長期績效改善為目標的評價體系,促使公司向同行業(yè)優(yōu)秀公司學(xué)習,提高核心競爭力,提升行業(yè)地位,而不是采取短視的機會主義行為來謀求短期績效的提升,從而激勵高管限制公司環(huán)境污染行為。(2)如果我們引入對高管的政治激勵,通過給予社會相對績效好的公司的高管以政治身份,那么社會相對績效評價會產(chǎn)生更好的激勵效果。(3)從設(shè)計高管激勵契約來看,上市公司應(yīng)該扭轉(zhuǎn)過分看重將高管薪酬與業(yè)績掛鉤的固定模式,也應(yīng)該考慮給予高管高額的固定薪酬來限制公司環(huán)境污染行為。
[Abstract]:In view of the increasingly severe situation of environmental pollution and the limitation of external ways such as administration and law to control the environmental pollution behavior of companies, this paper puts forward the idea of changing the management of environmental pollution behavior of companies, that is, from the angle of internal governance and executive incentive. This paper discusses how to effectively combine the relative performance appraisal system with the executive's political incentive and salary incentive to deal with the environmental pollution behavior of the company. The continuous exposure of pollution incidents in listed companies provides a good empirical research environment for us to evaluate the effectiveness of the current performance appraisal and executive incentive methods in the management of corporate environmental pollution behavior. In this study, we collected the related data of environmental pollution behavior of listed companies in China's heavy pollution industry from 2004 to 2012, and fused the prospect theory. The empirical study found that the evaluation system based on social performance can reduce the incentive of executives to take environmental pollution behavior. Companies with high social relative performance do not tend to pollute the environment especially those with political connections. However, the evaluation system based on historical performance encourages executives to adopt corporate environmental pollution behavior. On the one hand, companies with high historical relative performance tend to pollute the environment. However, the high fixed pay can weaken the tendency of executives to adopt corporate environmental pollution behavior in the case of high historical relative performance; on the other hand, The combination of low historical relative performance and high fixed pay will promote executives to take environmental pollution behavior. The results show that the performance evaluation system based on social relative performance should be strengthened. Encouraging executives based on political incentives and in the case of high historical relative performance to give executives high fixed pay can play an incentive role in regulating corporate environmental pollution behavior. This study puts forward the following suggestions: 1) the listed company emphasizes the appraisal system based on historical relative performance, and requires executives to continuously improve the performance of the company. This performance evaluation method will encourage executives to take environmental pollution behavior. We should introduce a long-term performance improvement evaluation system based on the social relative evaluation system to promote the company to learn from the excellent companies of the same industry, improve the core competitiveness, and enhance the status of the industry. Instead of taking short-sighted opportunistic behavior to improve short-term performance, and thus motivating executives to limit corporate environmental pollution.) if we introduce political incentives for executives, By giving political status to the executives of companies with relatively good social performance, then social relative performance evaluation will produce better incentive effects.) from the perspective of designing executive incentive contracts, Listed companies should reverse a fixed model that places too much emphasis on linking executive pay to performance, and should consider imposing high levels of fixed pay to limit environmental pollution.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：X322;F272.5;F272.91

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