本文關鍵詞： 獨裁 污染聯(lián)控 機制設計　出處：《中國管理科學》2016年S1期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：污染聯(lián)控問題的解決是區(qū)域間環(huán)境保護、經濟發(fā)展的關鍵問題,本文從中央政府角度出發(fā),設計了不完全信息下獨裁和非獨裁地方政府污染聯(lián)控機制。研究發(fā)現:若中央政府不監(jiān)管,地方政府不能實現污染聯(lián)控;獨裁地方政府存在的必要條件是,獨裁地方政府對社會福利的貢獻程度大于其他地方政府對社會福利貢獻程度的總和;非獨裁和獨裁地方政府污染聯(lián)控機制都是占優(yōu)策略可執(zhí)行的,且獨裁時的社會福利大于非獨裁時的社會福利。建議中央政府在區(qū)域污染聯(lián)控機制設計中,利用一些省市的區(qū)位優(yōu)勢,發(fā)揮具有獨裁特性的地方政府在污染聯(lián)控中的作用,實現區(qū)域社會福利最優(yōu)。
[Abstract]:The solution to the problem of pollution control is the key problem of regional environmental protection and economic development. This paper starts from the perspective of the central government. This paper designs the pollution control mechanism of autocratic and non-autocratic local governments under incomplete information. The study finds that if the central government does not regulate, local governments cannot achieve pollution control; the necessary conditions for authoritarian local governments to exist are, The contribution of autocratic local government to social welfare is greater than the sum of other local governments' contribution to social welfare. Moreover, the social welfare in dictatorship is greater than that in non-autocracy. It is suggested that the central government should make use of the geographical advantages of some provinces and cities in the design of regional pollution control mechanisms, and give play to the role of local governments with dictatorial characteristics in the joint control of pollution. The regional social welfare should be optimized.
【作者單位】： 北方工業(yè)大學經濟管理學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金資助項目(71301002) 北方工業(yè)大學優(yōu)勢建設學科資助項目(XN0081)
【分類號】：X321
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本文編號：1524193