本文選題：擁擠收費　切入點：可交易電子路票　出處：《西南交通大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：交通擁擠問題一直以來都是國內(nèi)各大城市面臨的巨大問題,而交通是城市經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的命脈,解決交通擁擠問題則成為各大城市迫在眉睫需要解決的關(guān)鍵問題。而解決交通擁擠問題從根源上還是解決交通供需矛盾,擁擠收費則是解決供需矛盾最常用的方法。目前,國內(nèi)外研究學(xué)者提出一系列擁擠收費策略來緩解這一問題。然而,以往關(guān)于擁擠收費策略的研究都或多或少的存在一些問題,例如出行者成本增加、不公平、交易透明度差以及公眾難以接受等等問題,本文則主要針對上述問題,提出一種新的基于可交易電子路票的獎懲收費策略,并進行理論和算例分析。本文首先對擁擠收費國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀進行文獻綜述,通過現(xiàn)狀的總結(jié)提出新的收費策略。針對此收費策略論文主要按照以下三個部分進行：首先,對新獎懲收費策略所涉及到的擁擠定價理論、可交易電子路票理論以及帕雷托改善理論進行梳理和總結(jié),為后文模型建立證明等奠定理論基礎(chǔ)。其次,在用戶平衡下從固定需求和彈性需求兩個方面針對新的獎懲收費策略建立模型,通過對模型的求解得出兩種情況下用戶平衡新獎懲收費策略的可交易電子路票市場價格的存在且唯一性,最后通過簡單路網(wǎng)的算例對理論進行驗證。最后,在系統(tǒng)最優(yōu)條件下首先從固定需求方面針對新的獎懲收費策略建立模型,通過對模型的求解得出系統(tǒng)最優(yōu)下新獎懲收費策略的可交易電子路票市場價格的存在性；然后,先分別在單個OD對的路網(wǎng)和單個起點或終點的路網(wǎng)中建立模型,并證明該獎懲收費策略是對應(yīng)路網(wǎng)達到系統(tǒng)最優(yōu)的同時,實現(xiàn)交通網(wǎng)絡(luò)的帕雷托改善和收支平衡的目標；再對多OD對復(fù)雜路網(wǎng)建立模型,分析得到在這種路網(wǎng)中新的收費策略不一定可行。同時,為了對理論進行驗證,分別在三種路網(wǎng)中給出對應(yīng)的算例,驗證模型的可行性。而后從彈性需求方面針對新的獎懲收費策略建立模型,通過對模型的求解得出系統(tǒng)最優(yōu)下新獎懲收費策略在彈性需求情況下不可行。
[Abstract]:Traffic congestion has always been a huge problem facing major cities in China, and transportation is the lifeblood of urban economic development. Solving the problem of traffic congestion has become the key problem that needs to be solved urgently in the major cities. At present, the solution to the problem of traffic congestion is to solve the contradiction between supply and demand from the root of the problem, and congestion charge is the most commonly used method to solve the contradiction between supply and demand. Researchers at home and abroad have proposed a series of congestion pricing strategies to alleviate this problem. However, previous researches on congestion pricing strategies have more or less some problems, such as increased cost of travelers, unfair. The transparency of the transaction is poor and the public is difficult to accept. This paper mainly aims at the above problems, proposes a new incentive and punishment charging strategy based on tradable electronic ticket. Firstly, this paper summarizes the current situation of congestion pricing at home and abroad, and puts forward a new charging strategy through the summary of the current situation. This paper mainly according to the following three parts: first, The congestion pricing theory, the tradable electronic ticket theory and the Pareto improvement theory, which are involved in the new reward and punishment pricing strategy, are summarized and summarized to lay a theoretical foundation for the establishment of the following models. Under the user balance, the model of the new reward and punishment charging strategy is established from two aspects of fixed demand and flexible demand. By solving the model, the existence and uniqueness of the tradable electronic ticket market price of the new incentive and punishment charging strategy are obtained in two cases. Finally, the theory is verified by a simple road network example. Under the optimal condition of the system, firstly, the model of the new reward and punishment charging strategy is established from the fixed demand aspect, and the existence of the tradable electronic ticket market price of the new reward and penalty charging strategy under the system optimal condition is obtained by solving the model. First, the model is established in the road network of single OD pair and the road network of single starting point or end point, and it is proved that the reward and penalty charging strategy is the goal of improving Pareto and balancing the revenue and expenditure of the traffic network while corresponding to the road network to achieve the optimal system. Based on the model of multiple OD pairs of complex road networks, it is concluded that the new charging strategy is not necessarily feasible. At the same time, in order to verify the theory, corresponding examples are given in three kinds of road networks. The feasibility of the model is verified. Then a model is established for the new reward and punishment charging strategy from the aspect of flexible demand. Through the solution of the model, it is concluded that the new reward and punishment charging strategy under the optimal system is not feasible in the case of elastic demand.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：U495

【引證文獻】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 褚昭明;考慮公平性的多方式交通擁擠收費方法研究[D];東南大學(xué);2016年

，

本文編號：1607199