產(chǎn)業(yè)共性技術(shù)聯(lián)盟構(gòu)建及運(yùn)行管理研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-09-18 07:02
【摘要】：共性技術(shù)能夠加快一個(gè)甚至多個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)的技術(shù)升級(jí)步伐,對(duì)產(chǎn)業(yè)的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新、產(chǎn)業(yè)質(zhì)量和生產(chǎn)效率具有重要的促進(jìn)作用。聯(lián)盟為共性技術(shù)的研發(fā)與應(yīng)用提供了組織保障,有利于協(xié)調(diào)各利益主體之間的關(guān)系,協(xié)同解決產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展多學(xué)科融合的共性技術(shù)研發(fā),形成新的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。為此,對(duì)共性技術(shù)聯(lián)盟構(gòu)建、運(yùn)行及績(jī)效等相關(guān)問(wèn)題進(jìn)行研究,對(duì)于更好地發(fā)揮集公權(quán)和私權(quán)性質(zhì)的共性技術(shù)研發(fā)、促進(jìn)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新、提高產(chǎn)業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力具有現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本論文在綜述分析國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀的基礎(chǔ)上,運(yùn)用價(jià)值鏈、社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)、博弈和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理理論等,綜合采用問(wèn)卷調(diào)研和模型分析方法,研究了共性技術(shù)聯(lián)盟構(gòu)建與運(yùn)行管理的相關(guān)問(wèn)題。在產(chǎn)業(yè)共性技術(shù)聯(lián)盟的構(gòu)建中,運(yùn)用價(jià)值鏈理論分析了與價(jià)值生產(chǎn)和增值環(huán)節(jié)相關(guān)的直接活動(dòng)和間接活動(dòng),構(gòu)建了共性技術(shù)聯(lián)盟價(jià)值鏈模型,結(jié)合影響合作伙伴選擇的主要因素,運(yùn)用蟻群算法和納什均衡理論提出了聯(lián)盟合作伙伴選擇模型及聯(lián)盟成員利益分配模型,構(gòu)成了聯(lián)盟契約的主要內(nèi)容。在產(chǎn)業(yè)共性技術(shù)聯(lián)盟運(yùn)行中,分析了聯(lián)盟運(yùn)行的機(jī)理機(jī)制,針對(duì)運(yùn)行中風(fēng)險(xiǎn)成因及風(fēng)險(xiǎn)類型,利用問(wèn)卷調(diào)研和主成分分析篩選形成風(fēng)險(xiǎn)清單,根據(jù)專家對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)發(fā)生的可能性及影響程度,提出基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承受能力下的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)應(yīng)對(duì)策略。在聯(lián)盟績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)中,研究了共性技術(shù)聯(lián)盟績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)方法,分析了績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)體系,運(yùn)用模糊綜合方法對(duì)聯(lián)盟績(jī)效進(jìn)行了模擬評(píng)價(jià),對(duì)聯(lián)盟績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)與構(gòu)建伙伴選擇、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了回饋性綜合分析。最后總結(jié)了論文的研究工作、創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)及研究建議。論文的創(chuàng)新之處主要體現(xiàn)在以下幾個(gè)方面：(1)基于共性技術(shù)聯(lián)盟價(jià)值鏈特征,運(yùn)用蟻群算法構(gòu)建了共性技術(shù)聯(lián)盟合作伙伴選擇模型。利用價(jià)值鏈理論,分析出共性技術(shù)聯(lián)盟建設(shè)中價(jià)值生產(chǎn)和增值環(huán)節(jié)相關(guān)的直接活動(dòng)和間接活動(dòng),闡述了共性技術(shù)聯(lián)盟伙伴在資金能力、研發(fā)能力、實(shí)驗(yàn)儀器工藝配套能力、技術(shù)產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)能力、、技術(shù)產(chǎn)品(服務(wù))銷售能力的綜合需求下,聯(lián)盟成員在研發(fā)成本、時(shí)間、質(zhì)量、技術(shù)替代性、預(yù)期經(jīng)濟(jì)收益方面的不同貢獻(xiàn),以及伙伴間的關(guān)聯(lián)成本,運(yùn)用蟻群算法建立了聯(lián)盟合作伙伴的選擇模型,進(jìn)而通過(guò)賦值與模型分析,形成對(duì)產(chǎn)業(yè)共性技術(shù)聯(lián)盟合作伙伴選擇的方法。(2)基于納什均衡理論構(gòu)建了聯(lián)盟成員在自身滿意與群體協(xié)商滿意下的利益分配模型。共性技術(shù)聯(lián)盟可以通過(guò)組建項(xiàng)目公司或收益分成等方式,回饋聯(lián)盟合作伙伴的投入。合作伙伴選擇加入聯(lián)盟,其對(duì)自身利益的滿足取決于其在聯(lián)盟中的貢獻(xiàn)度及合作過(guò)程中的成本付出,在聯(lián)盟尋求群體協(xié)商滿意的情況下,成員單位的利益分配不僅取決于自身的最差利益分配,還取決于投入較大、重要度較大的聯(lián)盟成員的滿意程度。為此,尋求自身與群體協(xié)商滿意下對(duì)利益分配的均衡性認(rèn)可,形成聯(lián)盟契約利益分配方案。(3)構(gòu)建了產(chǎn)業(yè)共性技術(shù)聯(lián)盟風(fēng)險(xiǎn)清單,提出了基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承受能力的應(yīng)對(duì)策略。針對(duì)聯(lián)盟運(yùn)行中存在的研發(fā)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、關(guān)系風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和績(jī)效風(fēng)險(xiǎn),運(yùn)用問(wèn)卷調(diào)查方法和主成分分析法,迭代篩選了影響聯(lián)盟運(yùn)行的十大風(fēng)險(xiǎn),梳理出聯(lián)盟運(yùn)行中的系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。依風(fēng)險(xiǎn)發(fā)生的可能性及破壞性程度,提出了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承受能力下的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)應(yīng)對(duì)策略。(4)基于自組織特征構(gòu)建了聯(lián)盟績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)方法和績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)體系,運(yùn)用模糊綜合法對(duì)聯(lián)盟績(jī)效進(jìn)行了評(píng)價(jià)。結(jié)合聯(lián)盟在聚集、非線性關(guān)系、聯(lián)盟知識(shí)流、多樣性融合、機(jī)制、內(nèi)部模型、構(gòu)建模塊方面的七個(gè)基本特征,運(yùn)用主成分分析法構(gòu)建了聯(lián)盟績(jī)效指標(biāo)體系,運(yùn)用模糊綜合分析法對(duì)聯(lián)盟運(yùn)行績(jī)效進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)和實(shí)證模擬。分析顯示出聯(lián)盟價(jià)值鏈構(gòu)成、學(xué)習(xí)型組織建設(shè)及聯(lián)盟的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之間存在的關(guān)聯(lián)性。
[Abstract]:Common technology can accelerate the technological upgrading of one or even more industries, and play an important role in promoting the technological innovation, industrial quality and production efficiency of industries. Therefore, the research on the construction, operation and performance of the common technology alliance is of practical significance for better exerting the common technology research and development of the nature of centralized public and private rights, promoting technological innovation and improving industrial competitiveness. Based on the theory of value chain, social network, game theory and risk management, this paper studies the related problems of the construction and operation management of the common technology alliance by using the methods of questionnaire survey and model analysis. And indirect activities, the value chain model of common technology alliance is constructed. Combining with the main factors affecting the choice of partners, the model of alliance partner selection and the profit distribution model of alliance members are put forward by using ant colony algorithm and Nash equilibrium theory, which constitute the main content of alliance contract. Aiming at the causes and types of risks in the operation of the alliance, the paper uses questionnaire survey and principal component analysis to screen out the risk list, and puts forward the risk coping strategies based on the risk tolerance according to the possibility and influence degree of the experts to the risks. Performance evaluation method, analysis of the performance evaluation index system, the use of fuzzy comprehensive method for the simulation of alliance performance evaluation, performance evaluation index and building partner selection, risk management of the relationship between feedback comprehensive analysis. The main points are as follows: (1) Based on the characteristics of the value chain of the common technology alliance, this paper constructs the partner selection model of the common technology alliance by using ant colony algorithm. Under the comprehensive demand of capital ability, R&D ability, experimental instrument and process supporting ability, technical product production capacity, technical product (service) sales ability, alliance members make different contributions in R&D cost, time, quality, technical substitution, expected economic benefits, and associated costs between partners. Ant colony algorithm is used to establish the alliance. The selection model of alliance partners is established, and then the method of selecting industrial common technology alliance partners is formed by assignment and model analysis. (2) Based on Nash equilibrium theory, the profit distribution model of alliance members under self-satisfaction and group negotiation satisfaction is constructed. Partners choose to join the alliance, and their satisfaction to their own interests depends on their contribution in the alliance and the cost in the process of cooperation. When the alliance seeks group negotiation satisfaction, the benefit distribution of the member units not only depends on their own worst benefit distribution, but also depends on their own worst benefit distribution. It depends on the degree of satisfaction of the members of the alliance with large input and importance. Therefore, it seeks for the balanced acceptance of the benefit distribution under the satisfaction of negotiation between itself and the group, and forms the benefit distribution scheme of the alliance contract. (3) It constructs the risk list of the industrial common technology alliance, and puts forward the countermeasures based on the risk bearing capacity. By using the method of questionnaire and principal component analysis, the paper iteratively sifted out the ten major risks affecting the operation of the alliance and sorted out the systematic and non-systematic risks in the operation of the alliance. Strategies. (4) Based on self-organizing characteristics, the performance evaluation method and performance evaluation index system of alliance are constructed, and the performance of alliance is evaluated by fuzzy comprehensive method. The paper constructs the performance index system of alliance, evaluates and simulates the performance of alliance operation by using fuzzy comprehensive analysis method, and shows the correlation among the alliance value chain, the construction of learning organization and the systemic risk of alliance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F124.3
[Abstract]:Common technology can accelerate the technological upgrading of one or even more industries, and play an important role in promoting the technological innovation, industrial quality and production efficiency of industries. Therefore, the research on the construction, operation and performance of the common technology alliance is of practical significance for better exerting the common technology research and development of the nature of centralized public and private rights, promoting technological innovation and improving industrial competitiveness. Based on the theory of value chain, social network, game theory and risk management, this paper studies the related problems of the construction and operation management of the common technology alliance by using the methods of questionnaire survey and model analysis. And indirect activities, the value chain model of common technology alliance is constructed. Combining with the main factors affecting the choice of partners, the model of alliance partner selection and the profit distribution model of alliance members are put forward by using ant colony algorithm and Nash equilibrium theory, which constitute the main content of alliance contract. Aiming at the causes and types of risks in the operation of the alliance, the paper uses questionnaire survey and principal component analysis to screen out the risk list, and puts forward the risk coping strategies based on the risk tolerance according to the possibility and influence degree of the experts to the risks. Performance evaluation method, analysis of the performance evaluation index system, the use of fuzzy comprehensive method for the simulation of alliance performance evaluation, performance evaluation index and building partner selection, risk management of the relationship between feedback comprehensive analysis. The main points are as follows: (1) Based on the characteristics of the value chain of the common technology alliance, this paper constructs the partner selection model of the common technology alliance by using ant colony algorithm. Under the comprehensive demand of capital ability, R&D ability, experimental instrument and process supporting ability, technical product production capacity, technical product (service) sales ability, alliance members make different contributions in R&D cost, time, quality, technical substitution, expected economic benefits, and associated costs between partners. Ant colony algorithm is used to establish the alliance. The selection model of alliance partners is established, and then the method of selecting industrial common technology alliance partners is formed by assignment and model analysis. (2) Based on Nash equilibrium theory, the profit distribution model of alliance members under self-satisfaction and group negotiation satisfaction is constructed. Partners choose to join the alliance, and their satisfaction to their own interests depends on their contribution in the alliance and the cost in the process of cooperation. When the alliance seeks group negotiation satisfaction, the benefit distribution of the member units not only depends on their own worst benefit distribution, but also depends on their own worst benefit distribution. It depends on the degree of satisfaction of the members of the alliance with large input and importance. Therefore, it seeks for the balanced acceptance of the benefit distribution under the satisfaction of negotiation between itself and the group, and forms the benefit distribution scheme of the alliance contract. (3) It constructs the risk list of the industrial common technology alliance, and puts forward the countermeasures based on the risk bearing capacity. By using the method of questionnaire and principal component analysis, the paper iteratively sifted out the ten major risks affecting the operation of the alliance and sorted out the systematic and non-systematic risks in the operation of the alliance. Strategies. (4) Based on self-organizing characteristics, the performance evaluation method and performance evaluation index system of alliance are constructed, and the performance of alliance is evaluated by fuzzy comprehensive method. The paper constructs the performance index system of alliance, evaluates and simulates the performance of alliance operation by using fuzzy comprehensive analysis method, and shows the correlation among the alliance value chain, the construction of learning organization and the systemic risk of alliance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F124.3
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