本文關(guān)鍵詞：國(guó)際合作框架下的碳博弈研究　出處：《西南交通大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 國(guó)際合作 技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移 碳權(quán)分配 Shapley值

【摘要】：由大量的溫室氣體排放所導(dǎo)致的全球極端氣候變化問題日益嚴(yán)峻,實(shí)現(xiàn)全球性碳減排是國(guó)際社會(huì)共同關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)作為一種公共物品,典型的經(jīng)濟(jì)負(fù)外部性決定了國(guó)際合作將是實(shí)現(xiàn)世界性碳減排的必然選擇。各國(guó)雖達(dá)成了碳減排的共識(shí),但基于差異性的環(huán)境效用和碳減排技術(shù),碳權(quán)分配及減排利益始終難以協(xié)調(diào),使得碳博弈陷入困局,成為實(shí)現(xiàn)合作共贏的最大阻力。 在國(guó)際環(huán)境合作的框架下,發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家同發(fā)展中國(guó)家之間的博弈主要集中于低碳技術(shù)的轉(zhuǎn)讓以及初始碳權(quán)的分配這兩個(gè)方面,所以本文主要針對(duì)上述問題展開分析。首先從兩國(guó)博弈的角度建立了低碳技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移模型,通過對(duì)成功轉(zhuǎn)移的必要條件及交易均衡解的分析,得知要實(shí)現(xiàn)國(guó)際間的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移,各國(guó)需要在降低交易成本、完善價(jià)格機(jī)制、增強(qiáng)政府驅(qū)動(dòng)力等方面做出努力；其次,國(guó)際環(huán)境合作不僅僅基于兩國(guó)之間,最終要解決的是全球碳權(quán)分配問題,所以在兩國(guó)模型的基礎(chǔ)上,本文將碳博弈進(jìn)一步拓展到多維博弈的角度,通過對(duì)碳權(quán)分配的模擬及均衡解的分析,推斷多標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的分配原則更能全面考慮全球所有國(guó)家的利益,而分配標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的制定在一定程度上又取決于談判國(guó)話語權(quán)大小,即國(guó)家綜合實(shí)力。為此,本文又引入了Shapley值方法對(duì)談判話語權(quán)進(jìn)行定量分析,從分析結(jié)果可以看出,歐盟及以美國(guó)為首的傘形集團(tuán)將成為話語權(quán)比重最大的國(guó)家。 顯而易見,先進(jìn)的低碳技術(shù)、強(qiáng)大的國(guó)家綜合實(shí)力是贏得話語權(quán)最關(guān)鍵的要素。因此,為實(shí)現(xiàn)世界性的碳減排,各國(guó)必須加強(qiáng)國(guó)內(nèi)技術(shù)研發(fā)、完善碳減排機(jī)制、提升國(guó)家綜合實(shí)力,為進(jìn)軍低碳市場(chǎng)創(chuàng)造更多的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。而中國(guó)作為發(fā)展中大國(guó),更應(yīng)該加大減排技術(shù)的研發(fā)力度、增強(qiáng)碳交易市場(chǎng)管制、拓寬碳金融衍生品市場(chǎng),加快向低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型,最終實(shí)現(xiàn)全球合作共贏。
[Abstract]:The global extreme climate change problem caused by a large amount of greenhouse gas emissions is becoming more and more serious. The realization of global carbon emission reduction is the common focus of the international community. Low-carbon economy as a public good. The typical negative externality of economy determines that international cooperation will be the inevitable choice to achieve worldwide carbon emission reduction. Although countries have reached a consensus on carbon emission reduction, but based on the difference of environmental utility and carbon emission reduction technology. The distribution of carbon rights and the benefits of emission reduction are always difficult to coordinate, which makes the carbon game difficult and becomes the biggest resistance to win-win cooperation. In the framework of international environmental cooperation, the game between developed and developing countries mainly focuses on the transfer of low-carbon technology and the allocation of initial carbon rights. So this paper mainly focuses on the above problems. Firstly, a low-carbon technology transfer model is established from the point of view of the game between the two countries, through the analysis of the necessary conditions for successful transfer and the transaction equilibrium solution. Know that to realize the international technology transfer, countries need to reduce transaction costs, improve the price mechanism, strengthen the government driving force and other aspects of efforts; Secondly, international environmental cooperation is not only based on the two countries, the ultimate solution is the global carbon distribution, so on the basis of the two countries model, this paper further expand the perspective of multi-dimensional game. Through the simulation of carbon right allocation and the analysis of equilibrium solution, it is concluded that the multi-criteria allocation principle can consider the interests of all countries in the world more comprehensively. To a certain extent, the formulation of allocation criteria depends on the power of the negotiator, that is, the comprehensive strength of the country. Therefore, this paper introduces the Shapley value method to carry out quantitative analysis. According to the analysis, the EU and the Umbrella Group led by the United States will become the most influential countries. It is obvious that advanced low-carbon technology and strong national comprehensive strength are the most important factors to win the right to speak. Therefore, in order to achieve global carbon emission reduction, countries must strengthen domestic technology research and development. Improve the carbon emission reduction mechanism, improve the comprehensive strength of the country, to enter the low-carbon market to create more competitive advantage. As a developing country, China should increase the intensity of research and development of emission reduction technology, and strengthen the regulation of carbon trading market. Broaden the carbon derivatives market, accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy, and ultimately achieve global win-win cooperation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F113.3;F224.32

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