基于產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的會計信息與高管薪酬相關(guān)性的實證研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-09-19 06:00
【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度出現(xiàn)以后，實現(xiàn)了所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離。兩權(quán)分離導(dǎo)致了委托代理關(guān)系的產(chǎn)生。但是由于“理性經(jīng)濟(jì)人”以及信息不對稱，代理人會出現(xiàn)“道德風(fēng)險”和“逆向選擇”問題。委托人期望通過簽訂薪酬——業(yè)績契約來約束代理人的行為，降低代理成本。企業(yè)的會計信息以其優(yōu)于市場信息的內(nèi)在科學(xué)性、準(zhǔn)確性，外在監(jiān)督性和權(quán)威性以及對外部資本市場的依賴程度小等優(yōu)點，使得企業(yè)在制定薪酬契約時更多的倚重會計信息而不是市場信息。2007年開始實施的新會計準(zhǔn)則，引入了公允價值計量模式。公允價值變動損益作為凈利潤的重要組成部分，必然會影響到企業(yè)的會計業(yè)績，進(jìn)而對高管薪酬的制定產(chǎn)生影響。因此，本文從契約角度，具體來說就是高管薪酬契約角度檢驗公允價值變動損益與高管薪酬之間的相關(guān)性。 我國特殊的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)制度和特殊的國情，注定了我國還存在著大量的國有企業(yè)，這些國有企業(yè)具有特殊的身份地位和歷史原因，造成其委托代理關(guān)系存在著諸多弊病，這些弊病導(dǎo)致國有企業(yè)的經(jīng)營效率低下，影響了薪酬業(yè)績契約的有效性。因此在研究高管薪酬契約時有必要將產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的因素考慮在內(nèi)。 基于以上分析，本文首先從上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)的會計業(yè)績之間的相關(guān)性、高管薪酬與公允價值變動損益之間的相關(guān)性以及產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)對高管薪酬與會計信息之間的相關(guān)性的影響三個方面，，分國內(nèi)和國外兩個部分分別對現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了分類綜述以及述評。其次，基于研究現(xiàn)狀以及相關(guān)的理論分析，提出了本文的研究假設(shè)。再次，本文以我國2008-2012滬深兩市的A股上市公司作為研究樣本，選取總資產(chǎn)收益率（ROA）和公允價值變動損益（Fair_Value）兩個指標(biāo)來反映會計信息，以上市公司年報中披露的前三名高管薪酬總額的自然對數(shù)來衡量高管薪酬，按最終控制人的性質(zhì)將樣本劃分為國有控股上市公司和非國有控股上市公司，研究了基于產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的會計信息與高管薪酬之間的關(guān)系。最后，得出了本文的主要研究結(jié)論：（1）我國上市公司的高管薪酬與企業(yè)的會計業(yè)績之間存在顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。（2）當(dāng)公允價值變動損益大于0時，高管薪酬與公允價值變動損益兩者具有顯著的正相關(guān)性，而當(dāng)公允價值變動損益小于0時，高管薪酬與公允價值變動損益兩者之間并沒有顯著的相關(guān)性。這說明，引入公允價值計量模式后，我國高管薪酬的粘性特征依然存在。（3）與最終控制權(quán)為國有的上市公司相比，非國有控股上市公司其高管薪酬與會計業(yè)績之間的敏感性更強(qiáng)。（4）當(dāng)公允價值變動損益大于0時，與最終控制權(quán)為國有的上市公司相比，非國有控股上市公司其高管薪酬與公允價值變動損益之間的敏感性更強(qiáng)。 本文不僅研究了高管薪酬與企業(yè)會計業(yè)績之間的相關(guān)性，更進(jìn)一步研究了影響企業(yè)會計業(yè)績的因素——公允價值變動損益對高管薪酬的影響。在此基礎(chǔ)上基于我國的國情將產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的因素考慮在內(nèi)，進(jìn)一步分析了不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)下高管薪酬與企業(yè)會計信息之間的敏感性。 通過以上研究分析可以看出，我國國有控股的上市公司存在著一系列的委托代理問題，同時薪酬粘性也依然存在。因此，建立有效的高管薪酬激勵機(jī)制需要根據(jù)我國的實際情況，并針對上市公司所處的內(nèi)外部環(huán)境采取相應(yīng)的措施，包括完善對國有企業(yè)管理者的激勵約束機(jī)制、減少國家的干預(yù)以及完善有關(guān)的計量準(zhǔn)則等方面。
[Abstract]:After the emergence of modern enterprise system, the separation of ownership and management rights has been realized. The separation of ownership and management rights has led to the emergence of principal-agent relationship. Accounting information of enterprises is superior to market information because of its inherent scientificity, accuracy, external supervision and authority and less dependence on external capital market. It makes enterprises rely more on accounting information than market information when making compensation contracts. The new accounting standards introduce the fair value measurement model. As an important part of net profit, fair value change profit and loss will inevitably affect the accounting performance of enterprises, and then affect the formulation of executive compensation. Correlation with executive pay.
China's special political and economic system and special national conditions have doomed that there are still a large number of state-owned enterprises in China. These state-owned enterprises have special status and historical reasons, resulting in many shortcomings in their principal-agent relationship. These shortcomings lead to low operating efficiency of state-owned enterprises, affecting the effectiveness of the pay performance contract. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the nature of property right when studying executive compensation contracts.
Based on the above analysis, this paper firstly analyzes the correlation between executive compensation and accounting performance of listed companies, the correlation between executive compensation and changes in fair value, and the impact of property rights on the correlation between executive compensation and accounting information. It is divided into two parts: domestic and foreign. Secondly, based on the current research situation and related theoretical analysis, this paper puts forward the hypothesis of this study. Thirdly, this paper chooses the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2012 as the research sample, and chooses ROA and Fair_Value as two indicators to reflect the accounting credit. Interest is measured by the natural logarithm of the total compensation of the top three executives disclosed in the annual reports of listed companies. The samples are divided into state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies according to the nature of the ultimate controller. The relationship between accounting information based on property rights and executive compensation is studied. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) There is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and accounting performance of Listed Companies in China. (2) When the change of fair value is greater than 0, there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and the change of fair value. There is no significant correlation between the profit and loss of value change. This shows that the stickiness of executive compensation still exists after the introduction of fair value measurement model. (3) Compared with the ultimate control of state-owned listed companies, non-state-controlled listed companies have stronger sensitivity between executive compensation and accounting performance. (4) When fair value is introduced, the relationship between executive compensation and accounting performance is stronger. When the change profit or loss is greater than 0, the non-state-controlled listed companies are more sensitive to the change of executive compensation and fair value than the state-owned listed companies.
This paper not only studies the correlation between executive compensation and corporate accounting performance, but also further studies the factors that affect corporate accounting Performance-The impact of changes in fair value on executive compensation. The sensitivity between salary and enterprise accounting information.
Through the above research and analysis, we can see that there are a series of principal-agent problems in listed companies with state-owned shares in China, and the salary stickiness still exists. Therefore, the establishment of an effective executive compensation incentive mechanism needs to be based on the actual situation in China, and to take appropriate measures against the internal and external environment of listed companies, including We should improve incentive and restraint mechanisms for state-owned enterprise managers, reduce state intervention and improve relevant measurement standards.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國海洋大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.92;F275
本文編號：2249252
[Abstract]:After the emergence of modern enterprise system, the separation of ownership and management rights has been realized. The separation of ownership and management rights has led to the emergence of principal-agent relationship. Accounting information of enterprises is superior to market information because of its inherent scientificity, accuracy, external supervision and authority and less dependence on external capital market. It makes enterprises rely more on accounting information than market information when making compensation contracts. The new accounting standards introduce the fair value measurement model. As an important part of net profit, fair value change profit and loss will inevitably affect the accounting performance of enterprises, and then affect the formulation of executive compensation. Correlation with executive pay.
China's special political and economic system and special national conditions have doomed that there are still a large number of state-owned enterprises in China. These state-owned enterprises have special status and historical reasons, resulting in many shortcomings in their principal-agent relationship. These shortcomings lead to low operating efficiency of state-owned enterprises, affecting the effectiveness of the pay performance contract. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the nature of property right when studying executive compensation contracts.
Based on the above analysis, this paper firstly analyzes the correlation between executive compensation and accounting performance of listed companies, the correlation between executive compensation and changes in fair value, and the impact of property rights on the correlation between executive compensation and accounting information. It is divided into two parts: domestic and foreign. Secondly, based on the current research situation and related theoretical analysis, this paper puts forward the hypothesis of this study. Thirdly, this paper chooses the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2012 as the research sample, and chooses ROA and Fair_Value as two indicators to reflect the accounting credit. Interest is measured by the natural logarithm of the total compensation of the top three executives disclosed in the annual reports of listed companies. The samples are divided into state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies according to the nature of the ultimate controller. The relationship between accounting information based on property rights and executive compensation is studied. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) There is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and accounting performance of Listed Companies in China. (2) When the change of fair value is greater than 0, there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and the change of fair value. There is no significant correlation between the profit and loss of value change. This shows that the stickiness of executive compensation still exists after the introduction of fair value measurement model. (3) Compared with the ultimate control of state-owned listed companies, non-state-controlled listed companies have stronger sensitivity between executive compensation and accounting performance. (4) When fair value is introduced, the relationship between executive compensation and accounting performance is stronger. When the change profit or loss is greater than 0, the non-state-controlled listed companies are more sensitive to the change of executive compensation and fair value than the state-owned listed companies.
This paper not only studies the correlation between executive compensation and corporate accounting performance, but also further studies the factors that affect corporate accounting Performance-The impact of changes in fair value on executive compensation. The sensitivity between salary and enterprise accounting information.
Through the above research and analysis, we can see that there are a series of principal-agent problems in listed companies with state-owned shares in China, and the salary stickiness still exists. Therefore, the establishment of an effective executive compensation incentive mechanism needs to be based on the actual situation in China, and to take appropriate measures against the internal and external environment of listed companies, including We should improve incentive and restraint mechanisms for state-owned enterprise managers, reduce state intervention and improve relevant measurement standards.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國海洋大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.92;F275
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