發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-03 20:15

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：中國(guó)上市公司政府補(bǔ)助的政策效應(yīng)研究　出處：《合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 政府補(bǔ)助 財(cái)政分權(quán) 資本投向 過(guò)度投資 經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)

【摘要】：政府補(bǔ)助作為政府宏觀調(diào)控的一種重要政策工具,對(duì)企業(yè)行為產(chǎn)生了重要的影響。2008年受金融危機(jī)沖擊,市場(chǎng)需求萎縮,企業(yè)效益下滑,投資支出下降,經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)下行壓力增大,中國(guó)政府出臺(tái)了四萬(wàn)億刺激政策促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng),在資本市場(chǎng)上,政府對(duì)上市公司補(bǔ)貼隨之顯著增加,據(jù)《上海證券報(bào)》報(bào)道,2012年逾九成的上市公司收到各種形式的政府補(bǔ)助,更有一百多家上市公司收到政府補(bǔ)助金額過(guò)億,政府補(bǔ)助的免費(fèi)“盛宴”引起輿論和公眾的關(guān)注。 學(xué)者們開展了一系列研究,現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)研究政府補(bǔ)助問(wèn)題多是關(guān)注政府補(bǔ)助的影響因素和關(guān)注政府補(bǔ)助對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效、創(chuàng)新等的影響以及就業(yè)、產(chǎn)業(yè)調(diào)整等社會(huì)效應(yīng)。已有研究多是關(guān)注政府補(bǔ)助對(duì)企業(yè)產(chǎn)出和研發(fā)投資的影響,但其對(duì)于企業(yè)投資方向的影響研究卻相對(duì)較少。眾所周知,企業(yè)投資行為不僅受到企業(yè)自身能力的影響,而且受到市場(chǎng)條件和政治經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境的制約,在一定的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)和市場(chǎng)環(huán)境中,企業(yè)行為必然受政府政策約束。改革開放后,我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)保持了三十年的持續(xù)高速增長(zhǎng),政府在經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展起主導(dǎo)作用,我國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)模式也呈現(xiàn)為典型的政府主導(dǎo)型經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)模式。當(dāng)前正處于市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型的過(guò)渡時(shí)期,政府直接參與經(jīng)濟(jì)的意愿強(qiáng)烈,因此,企業(yè)投資是政府外部控制基礎(chǔ)上的企業(yè)進(jìn)行自主決策結(jié)果,政府補(bǔ)助這一干預(yù)行為對(duì)企業(yè)投資行為可能產(chǎn)生重大影響。 研究中國(guó)問(wèn)題必須結(jié)合中國(guó)的制度環(huán)境,本文研究之問(wèn)題所隱含的制度邏輯在于財(cái)政分權(quán)和經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)增長(zhǎng)導(dǎo)向的政績(jī)觀決定了地方政府官員的利益導(dǎo)向和行為動(dòng)機(jī),政府補(bǔ)助可以成為地方政府干預(yù)以擴(kuò)大企業(yè)投資的重要政策手段,政府補(bǔ)助可能影響企業(yè)投資行為。鑒于四萬(wàn)億經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激政策出臺(tái)后,政府補(bǔ)助大幅度增長(zhǎng)的現(xiàn)象,本文將研究視角聚焦于政府補(bǔ)助的政策意圖是否意在推動(dòng)企業(yè)投資以推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng),因此,本文主要通過(guò)檢驗(yàn)政府補(bǔ)助與上市公司投資之間的內(nèi)在相關(guān)關(guān)系,從而研究政府補(bǔ)助的政策效應(yīng)。同時(shí),本文也研究了政府補(bǔ)助的其他相關(guān)問(wèn)題,諸如企業(yè)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)等影響對(duì)政府補(bǔ)助的影響,這些問(wèn)題的研究有助于從宏觀政策對(duì)微觀企業(yè)影響的角度審視現(xiàn)行政府補(bǔ)助的政策效應(yīng),也為研究宏觀政策對(duì)微觀企業(yè)行為影響機(jī)理提供了新的證據(jù)。 本文從我國(guó)財(cái)政分權(quán)的制度以及經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)導(dǎo)向的政績(jī)考評(píng)機(jī)制為依據(jù),以政府追求經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的利益動(dòng)機(jī)為主線,以投資激勵(lì)為視角,提出了政府補(bǔ)助的投資激勵(lì)假說(shuō)和資本投向激勵(lì)假說(shuō),以我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)A股上市公司為樣本,檢驗(yàn)政府補(bǔ)助的上述問(wèn)題,以衡量政府補(bǔ)助的政策效應(yīng),研究結(jié)論豐富了政府補(bǔ)助與企業(yè)投資關(guān)系研究的文獻(xiàn),有助于更準(zhǔn)確地理解和把握政府補(bǔ)助對(duì)于企業(yè)投資領(lǐng)域的微觀作用機(jī)制,可為政府政策優(yōu)化提供重要參考。 本文的主要內(nèi)容和研究結(jié)論如下： (1)經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)爆發(fā)后,中國(guó)政府啟動(dòng)四萬(wàn)億經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激政策,上市公司收到政府補(bǔ)助情況大幅增長(zhǎng),本文對(duì)近幾年上市公司政府補(bǔ)助狀況進(jìn)行統(tǒng)計(jì)分析,主要從行業(yè)分布、區(qū)域分布以及等方面來(lái)分析。從獲得政府補(bǔ)助的行業(yè)看,在政府補(bǔ)助總額最多的前五大行業(yè)中,政府更傾向于補(bǔ)貼公共服務(wù)類行業(yè)和高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)兩類上市公司,反映了各級(jí)政府一方面偏好對(duì)所屬地區(qū)高新技術(shù)上市公司扶持和資助,說(shuō)明政府對(duì)創(chuàng)新的重視,另一方面,又對(duì)一些提供公共服務(wù)的上市公司可能因?yàn)槌袚?dān)的社會(huì)目標(biāo)予以補(bǔ)償；從政府補(bǔ)助的地區(qū)分布看,政府補(bǔ)助明顯取決于地方政府的財(cái)政狀況和經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平,雖然西部地區(qū)政府對(duì)上市公司的扶持力度在逐步加大,但是增長(zhǎng)幅度并不明顯,且低于東部地區(qū),原因在于西部地區(qū)總體上財(cái)政實(shí)力有限,地方政府無(wú)更多的財(cái)政補(bǔ)貼當(dāng)?shù)仄髽I(yè),這無(wú)疑會(huì)進(jìn)一步加劇區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的不平衡,造成貧者愈貧富者愈富；從產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)方面看,政府對(duì)非國(guó)有上市公司的補(bǔ)助力度呈現(xiàn)上升態(tài)勢(shì),但是和國(guó)有公司相比較,補(bǔ)助強(qiáng)度還是偏低；從政府補(bǔ)助總額以及強(qiáng)度來(lái)看,和其他公司相比,ST公司獲得的政府補(bǔ)助也相對(duì)較低,可見,通過(guò)補(bǔ)助方式來(lái)改變ST公司的境遇幫助其保殼等可能已經(jīng)不是政府補(bǔ)助的主要目的。 (2)從我國(guó)制度環(huán)境出發(fā)分析了財(cái)政分權(quán)制度安排下的政府利益動(dòng)機(jī)和行為邏輯,以及由此帶來(lái)的政企關(guān)系變化,進(jìn)而研究財(cái)政分權(quán)和企業(yè)尋租行為對(duì)政府補(bǔ)助的作用機(jī)制。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),財(cái)政分權(quán)對(duì)政府補(bǔ)助影響顯著,具體說(shuō),財(cái)政分權(quán)度越高,地方政府給予屬地國(guó)有企業(yè)的補(bǔ)助越多,地方政府給予民營(yíng)企業(yè)的補(bǔ)助越少,表明政府補(bǔ)助存在明顯的分配不公平現(xiàn)象,地方政府仍然存在明顯的所有制歧視；研究還發(fā)現(xiàn),公司與政府建立的政治關(guān)系有助于公司獲得政府補(bǔ)助,這意味著政府補(bǔ)助決策中要充分考慮公司的尋租行為,避免由此帶來(lái)的政府補(bǔ)助顯失公平。本章研究表明財(cái)政分權(quán)成為政府追求經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的制度邏輯,下文以此為理論依據(jù),研究政府補(bǔ)助激勵(lì)投資以追求經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的政策意圖,及由此對(duì)公司投資行為的影響。 (3)文章主要檢驗(yàn)了政府補(bǔ)助對(duì)公司資本投資方向的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),政府補(bǔ)助顯著影響了公司的資本投資方向,具體說(shuō),政府補(bǔ)助一方面刺激了公司擴(kuò)大的固定資產(chǎn)投資水平,另一方面,公司削減了對(duì)外投資水平,表明公司為擴(kuò)大對(duì)內(nèi)投資而擠占了對(duì)外投資；經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)增長(zhǎng)的相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)顯著影響了政府補(bǔ)助和固定資產(chǎn)投資的正向關(guān)系,經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)增長(zhǎng)速度越高的地區(qū),上述正相關(guān)關(guān)系顯著減弱；政府補(bǔ)助積極作用在于促進(jìn)了企業(yè)的研發(fā)投入；相比于中央企業(yè),補(bǔ)貼對(duì)地方政府控制企業(yè)的投資激勵(lì)效應(yīng)更顯著。研究表明,經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)增長(zhǎng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)動(dòng)機(jī)促使地方政府采用政府補(bǔ)助的方式來(lái)引導(dǎo)公司的投資,鼓勵(lì)公司擴(kuò)大規(guī)模以實(shí)現(xiàn)帶動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的意圖明顯；政府補(bǔ)助對(duì)造成固定資產(chǎn)投資過(guò)度有一定影響。研究結(jié)論顯示,政府補(bǔ)助成為地方政府“促投資、謀增長(zhǎng)”一種手段,促使企業(yè)“優(yōu)先選擇”對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)拉動(dòng)明顯的固定資產(chǎn)投資,而相對(duì)削減企業(yè)的對(duì)外投資和無(wú)形資產(chǎn)投資,結(jié)果可能導(dǎo)致固定資產(chǎn)投資過(guò)度和技術(shù)開發(fā)投入的相對(duì)不足,體現(xiàn)了經(jīng)濟(jì)粗放式增長(zhǎng)的特點(diǎn),不利于宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)升級(jí)和實(shí)現(xiàn)高質(zhì)量的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。 (4)文章研究了政府補(bǔ)助對(duì)公司投資支出及過(guò)度投資的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：政府補(bǔ)助激勵(lì)了上市公司投資的積極性,政府補(bǔ)助越多,公司資本投資越高；政府補(bǔ)助對(duì)非國(guó)有公司投資激勵(lì)比國(guó)有公司更敏感；各地區(qū)市場(chǎng)化程度和經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)業(yè)績(jī)水平顯著影響政府補(bǔ)助的投資,市場(chǎng)化程度越低、地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)骄徛牡貐^(qū),政府補(bǔ)助對(duì)公司投資支出影響程度越大。政府補(bǔ)助加劇了其過(guò)度投資；因此,從投資效率角度看,政府補(bǔ)助的政策配置尚需改進(jìn)。 本文的貢獻(xiàn)主要體現(xiàn)在：第一,本文提出了政府補(bǔ)助的投資激勵(lì)假說(shuō)和資本投向激勵(lì)偏假說(shuō),本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn)地方政府利益驅(qū)使政府以補(bǔ)助來(lái)引導(dǎo)企業(yè)投資,并進(jìn)一步影響企業(yè)資本投向,從而為政府決策對(duì)企業(yè)微觀行為的影響提供了新的證據(jù)。第二,以往研究多是研究政府補(bǔ)助對(duì)企業(yè)投資支出的總體影響,本文則從政府補(bǔ)助影響企業(yè)具體投資結(jié)構(gòu)和方向這一視角,深入闡釋了政府補(bǔ)助影響企業(yè)投資結(jié)構(gòu)因素及其后果,豐富了政府補(bǔ)助與企業(yè)投資關(guān)系研究的文獻(xiàn)。 以上的研究結(jié)論表明,從政府補(bǔ)助的投資激勵(lì)效用來(lái)看,政府補(bǔ)助是低效的�，F(xiàn)行的政績(jī)考核機(jī)制強(qiáng)化了地方政府通過(guò)補(bǔ)貼促進(jìn)企業(yè)優(yōu)先選擇對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)拉動(dòng)明顯的固定資產(chǎn)投資的動(dòng)機(jī),既干擾了微觀企業(yè)的自主決策行為,又不利于宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)現(xiàn)高質(zhì)量高效率的增長(zhǎng)。因此,政府補(bǔ)助政策尚待改進(jìn),文章提出了相應(yīng)的政策建議：規(guī)范政企關(guān)系,構(gòu)建和諧公平公正的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境；完善政府補(bǔ)助披露制度,建立補(bǔ)貼后監(jiān)控機(jī)制；建立和完善政府補(bǔ)助使用效率評(píng)價(jià)制度；真正改變單純的以經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)為導(dǎo)向的政績(jī)考核機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:The government subsidies as an important policy tool of the government's macro-control, the impact of.2008 important year by the financial crisis of enterprise behavior, market demand, enterprise efficiency decline, investment spending declined, increasing the downward pressure on economic growth, Chinese government introduced four trillion stimulus policies to promote economic growth, in the capital market, the government of listed companies subsidies increased significantly, according to the "Shanghai Securities News reported on 2012, over 90% listed companies receive government subsidies in various forms, more than more than 100 listed companies receive government subsidies amounting to billions of dollars, free" feast "government subsidies caused public and public attention.
Scholars have conducted a series of studies, the existing literature on government subsidy problem is concerned with the influence of government subsidies and government subsidies on factors of enterprise performance influence, innovation and employment, industrial restructuring and other social effects. The research is focus on the impact of government subsidies to the enterprise production and R & D investment, but its effect on for the direction of business investment is relatively small. As everyone knows, the enterprise investment behavior is not only influenced by the enterprise's own ability, but also restricted by the market conditions and the economic and political environment, in certain political economic and market environment, the enterprise behavior is bound by government policy. After the reform and opening up, China's economy maintained a sustained thirty years high speed growth, the government plays a leading role in economic development, the pattern of China's economic growth has driven economic growth model is a typical government currently. In the transitional period of market economy and economic transformation, the government's willingness to directly participate in the economy is strong. Therefore, enterprise investment is based on the external control of the government, and the result of self decision is that the government subsidy has great influence on the investment behavior of enterprises.
Study on the Chinese problems must be combined with the institutional environment Chinese, institutional logic implied this research problem is that fiscal decentralization and economic growth oriented performance concept determines the motivation interest orientation and behavior of local government officials, government subsidies can become an important means of local government policy intervention in the expansion of business investment, government subsidies may affect enterprise the investment behavior. In view of the four trillion economic stimulus policies, government subsidies to increase the phenomenon, this article will focus on government subsidy policy intention is intended to promote the investment to promote economic growth, so enterprises, this paper mainly through the inspection of government subsidies and investment of the listed companies internal relationship, so as to study the government policy effect subsidies. At the same time, other related problems are also studied for government subsidies, such as corporate political association The impact of such impacts on government subsidies will help to examine the policy effect of the current government subsidy from the perspective of macro policy's impact on micro enterprises, and also provide new evidence for studying the mechanism of macro policy's impact on micro enterprise behavior.
This paper from China's fiscal decentralization system and economic growth oriented performance evaluation mechanism as the basis, the government in the pursuit of economic growth motivation as the main line, with investment incentives from the perspective of the government subsidies incentive hypothesis and investment incentive hypothesis to invest capital in China's capital market, A shares of listed companies as a sample, the above problems the inspection of government subsidies, to measure the policy effect of government subsidies, the conclusion of the study enriches the research on the relationship between government subsidies and corporate investment literature helps to more accurately understand and grasp the mechanism of the micro function of government subsidies to the enterprise investment, provide an important reference for government policy optimization.
The main contents and conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) after the outbreak of the economic crisis, China government launched four trillion economic stimulus policies, listed companies receive government subsidies increased significantly, the subsidies for listed companies in the government in recent years statistical analysis, mainly from the industry distribution, regional distribution and other aspects of analysis. From the government subsidy in the industry, in the total amount of government subsidies the top five major industries, the government tend to subsidize public service industry and high-tech industry two listed companies, on the one hand reflects the government preference for the area of high-tech listed company support and funding, that government attaches great importance to innovation, on the other hand, it provides the public service to some of the a listed company may undertake compensation because of social goals; from the regional distribution of government subsidies, financial and economic development of water subsidies obviously depend on the local government Flat, although the government in the western region to support listed companies gradually increased, but the increase is not obvious, and lower than the eastern region, the reason lies in the western region the overall financial strength is limited, the local government financial subsidies to local enterprises more unbalanced, which will undoubtedly further intensify the development of regional economy, caused by the poor become rich and getting richer; from the property right perspective, the government showed a rising trend of non state-owned listed companies subsidies, but compared to state-owned companies, subsidies intensity is low; from government subsidies in total and strength, compared with other companies, the company received government subsidies of ST is relatively low, visible. The main purpose of the subsidy way to change the situation of the company ST help Paul shell may have not government subsidies.
(2) from the institutional environment of China's analysis of the government incentive and behavior logic of Fiscal Decentralization under the institutional arrangements, and the resulting change of relationship between government and enterprises, and then study the fiscal decentralization and the rent-seeking mechanism of government subsidies. The study found that the impact of fiscal decentralization on government subsidies significantly, in particular, the degree of fiscal decentralization the higher, more local government subsidies given local state-owned enterprises, local governments give private enterprise subsidies less, that government subsidies have obvious unfair distribution phenomenon, there are still obvious ownership discrimination of local government; the study also found that the company and the government to establish political relations will get government subsidies in this company. Means that the company should fully consider the rent-seeking behavior decision of government subsidies, government subsidies to avoid the resulting unconscionability. This chapter research shows that fiscal decentralization has become political The institutional logic of government's pursuit of economic growth is based on the following theory. The purpose of this study is to study the policy intentions of government grants to encourage investment in pursuit of economic growth and its impact on corporate investment behavior.
(3) this paper examines the impact of government subsidies on capital investment direction. The study found that government subsidies significantly affect the company's capital investment direction, in particular, the government grants the one hand stimulate the company to expand the level of investment in fixed assets, on the other hand, the company reduced foreign investment level, that company occupy foreign the investment for the expansion of investment; the relative performance of economic growth has significant influence of positive relationship between government subsidies and investment in fixed assets, economic growth rate higher areas, the positive correlation significantly reduced government subsidies; positive role in promoting the corporate R & D investment; compared to the central enterprises, the subsidy is more significant the investment incentive effect of local government control of the enterprise. The study shows that the economic growth of the competitive motivation prompted the local government by government grants party to lead The company's investment, encourage the company to expand the scale to achieve the intention of promoting economic growth significantly; excessive government subsidies have a certain influence on the result of fixed assets investment. The conclusion of the study shows that government subsidies become to promote investment in local government, seeking a means to promote growth of enterprises "preference" on economic growth was fixed asset investment, foreign investment and the relative reduction in corporate and investment of intangible assets, the relative lack of results may lead to excessive investment in fixed assets and investment in technology development, embodies the characteristics of extensive economic growth, is not conducive to the realization of high quality economic growth and upgrade macroeconomic structure.
(4) this paper studies the impact of government subsidies for investment spending and excessive investment. The study found: the enthusiasm of government subsidies incentive of the listed companies of investment, more government subsidies, corporate capital investment is high; government investment subsidies for non state-owned companies incentive is more sensitive than state-owned companies; the degree of Marketization and economic growth the level of performance significantly affect government subsidized investment, lower marketization, regional economic growth performance is more slow, the greater the degree of government subsidies on investment spending. Government subsidies increased the excessive investment; therefore, from the perspective of investment efficiency, government subsidy policy configuration needs to be improved.
The contribution of this paper is mainly reflected in: first, this paper puts forward the government subsidies incentive hypothesis and investment capital to invest partial incentive hypothesis, this study found that the local government interests in government subsidies to guide the enterprise investment, and further affect the capital investment, so as to provide new evidence for the influence of government decision-making on Corporation behaviors. Second, previous research is the overall effect of government subsidies on enterprise investment expenditure, this article from the perspective of government subsidies influence enterprise specific investment structure and direction, in-depth interpretation of the government subsidies influence enterprise investment structure factors and their consequences, enrich the relationship between government subsidies and corporate investment in the literature.
The above conclusions show that from government subsidies investment incentive, government subsidies are inefficient. The current performance evaluation mechanism to strengthen the local government to promote enterprise priority on economic growth significantly in fixed asset investment motivation through subsidies, not only interfere with the decision-making behavior of micro enterprise, and is not conducive to high quality and high efficiency the growth of macro economy. Therefore, the policy of government subsidies are yet to be improved, this paper puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations: to build a harmonious relationship between norms, fair and equitable market environment; improve the government subsidies disclosure system, the establishment of subsidies supervision mechanism; establishing and perfecting the government subsidies efficiency evaluation system; real change only to economic growth oriented performance evaluation mechanism.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F276.6

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