上市公司股權激勵的市場時機選擇實證研究
發(fā)布時間：2019-06-25 15:21
【摘要】：企業(yè)所有者與管理者利益沖突產(chǎn)生了委托-代理問題,股權激勵正是為解決此問題被提出來的。在股權激勵計劃中,行權價格(授予價格)的高低關系著管理者的成本收益,而行權價格的設定與資本市場股價息息相關。在我國現(xiàn)有的資本市場環(huán)境下,我國股票市場尚不成熟,投資者羊群行為嚴重,大量的同向買賣導致股價的大漲大跌,造成股價被高估或者被低估。作為內部人的公司管理者對企業(yè)價值有一個更清醒的認識,能較為理性地認識到資本市場股價對企業(yè)內在價值的偏離。我們可以設想:公司高管作為股權激勵方案的制定者與實施者,在追求自身利益最大化的驅動下,是否會利用股價與企業(yè)內在價值的偏離為自己謀取福利:在股價被高估時降低股權激勵強度,在股價被低估時提高股權激勵強度,使得股權激勵難以發(fā)揮應用的激勵作用,甚至會擴大代理問題,這是我們這篇研究主要關心的問題。有效的公司治理制度能對高管的擇機自利行為起到監(jiān)督作用,發(fā)揮股權激勵的激勵與監(jiān)督作用。獨立董事制度作為公司治理非常重要的制度構成,本文也探究了獨立董事制度在股權激勵中的必要性。基于上述問題,本文以2009年至2015年滬深兩市(主板、中小板與創(chuàng)業(yè)板)665家企業(yè)公布的802起股權激勵方案為研究樣本,通過建立多元回歸模型,利用市賬比與股權激勵草案公布前一年的股票年累積月度收益作為市場時機的替代變量,檢驗資本市場股價表現(xiàn)對股權激勵強度的影響,即驗證股權激勵中高管的擇機行為;同時檢驗公司治理水平對股權激勵高管擇機自利行為的約束機制。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)我國股權激勵草案存在市場時機選擇行為,股價被低估時,股權激勵強度大;股價被高估時,股權激勵強度小;(2)我國的獨立董事制度在股權激勵草案的制定實施過程中起到了對高管的有效監(jiān)督作用,獨立董事比例較高的樣本中不存在高管的擇機自利行為,這說明我國獨立董事制度建設取得一定效果;(3)相比較國有企業(yè)來說,民營企業(yè)股權激勵強度更高;由于管理層選拔機制與股權激勵機制實施的差異性導致我國民營企業(yè)股權激勵中高管的擇機自利行為更明顯。
[Abstract]:The conflict of interest between enterprise owners and managers gives rise to the principal-agent problem, and equity incentive is proposed to solve this problem. In the equity incentive plan, the price of exercise (award price) is related to the cost and benefit of managers, and the setting of exercise price is closely related to the stock price of capital market. In the existing capital market environment of our country, the stock market of our country is not yet mature, the herding behavior of investors is serious, a large number of co-trading leads to the rise and fall of the stock price, resulting in the stock price being overvalued or undervalued. As insiders, the managers of the company have a more clear understanding of the value of the enterprise, and can reasonably realize the deviation of the capital market stock price from the intrinsic value of the enterprise. We can imagine whether the executives, as the makers and implementers of the equity incentive scheme, will take advantage of the deviation between the stock price and the intrinsic value of the enterprise to seek their own benefits under the drive of pursuing the maximization of their own interests: to reduce the intensity of the equity incentive when the stock price is overvalued, to increase the intensity of the equity incentive when the stock price is undervalued, so that it is difficult for the equity incentive to play an applied incentive role, and even to expand the agency problem. This is the main concern of our study. Effective corporate governance system can play a supervisory role in the choice of opportunity and self-interest behavior of executives, and give full play to the incentive and supervision role of equity incentive. As a very important system of corporate governance, this paper also explores the necessity of independent director system in equity incentive. Based on the above problems, this paper takes 802 equity incentive schemes published by 665 enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets (main board, small and medium-sized board and gem) from 2009 to 2015 as research samples, and tests the influence of capital market stock price performance on equity incentive intensity by establishing multiple regression model and using the cumulative monthly return of stock year before the announcement of market-account ratio and equity incentive draft as an alternative variable of market timing. That is, to verify the opportunity selection behavior of executives in equity incentive; At the same time, it tests the restraint mechanism of corporate governance level on the behavior of equity incentive executives to choose their own interests. It is found that: (1) there is market timing behavior in the draft equity incentive in China, when the stock price is undervalued, the intensity of equity incentive is large, when the stock price is overvalued, the intensity of equity incentive is small; (2) in the process of formulating and implementing the draft equity incentive, the independent director system in our country plays an effective role in supervising the senior executives, and there is no opportunity self-interest behavior among the samples with a high proportion of independent directors, which indicates that the construction of the independent director system in our country has achieved some results. (3) compared with the state-owned enterprises, the equity incentive intensity of the private enterprises is higher; Due to the difference between the implementation of management selection mechanism and equity incentive mechanism, the opportunity self-interest behavior of executives in equity incentive of private enterprises in China is more obvious.
【學位授予單位】：山東大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92
[Abstract]:The conflict of interest between enterprise owners and managers gives rise to the principal-agent problem, and equity incentive is proposed to solve this problem. In the equity incentive plan, the price of exercise (award price) is related to the cost and benefit of managers, and the setting of exercise price is closely related to the stock price of capital market. In the existing capital market environment of our country, the stock market of our country is not yet mature, the herding behavior of investors is serious, a large number of co-trading leads to the rise and fall of the stock price, resulting in the stock price being overvalued or undervalued. As insiders, the managers of the company have a more clear understanding of the value of the enterprise, and can reasonably realize the deviation of the capital market stock price from the intrinsic value of the enterprise. We can imagine whether the executives, as the makers and implementers of the equity incentive scheme, will take advantage of the deviation between the stock price and the intrinsic value of the enterprise to seek their own benefits under the drive of pursuing the maximization of their own interests: to reduce the intensity of the equity incentive when the stock price is overvalued, to increase the intensity of the equity incentive when the stock price is undervalued, so that it is difficult for the equity incentive to play an applied incentive role, and even to expand the agency problem. This is the main concern of our study. Effective corporate governance system can play a supervisory role in the choice of opportunity and self-interest behavior of executives, and give full play to the incentive and supervision role of equity incentive. As a very important system of corporate governance, this paper also explores the necessity of independent director system in equity incentive. Based on the above problems, this paper takes 802 equity incentive schemes published by 665 enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets (main board, small and medium-sized board and gem) from 2009 to 2015 as research samples, and tests the influence of capital market stock price performance on equity incentive intensity by establishing multiple regression model and using the cumulative monthly return of stock year before the announcement of market-account ratio and equity incentive draft as an alternative variable of market timing. That is, to verify the opportunity selection behavior of executives in equity incentive; At the same time, it tests the restraint mechanism of corporate governance level on the behavior of equity incentive executives to choose their own interests. It is found that: (1) there is market timing behavior in the draft equity incentive in China, when the stock price is undervalued, the intensity of equity incentive is large, when the stock price is overvalued, the intensity of equity incentive is small; (2) in the process of formulating and implementing the draft equity incentive, the independent director system in our country plays an effective role in supervising the senior executives, and there is no opportunity self-interest behavior among the samples with a high proportion of independent directors, which indicates that the construction of the independent director system in our country has achieved some results. (3) compared with the state-owned enterprises, the equity incentive intensity of the private enterprises is higher; Due to the difference between the implementation of management selection mechanism and equity incentive mechanism, the opportunity self-interest behavior of executives in equity incentive of private enterprises in China is more obvious.
【學位授予單位】：山東大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92
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