【摘要】：20世紀90年代末,以La porta為代表的一些學者首次提出了終極控股股東的概念,他們發(fā)現(xiàn)在大多數(shù)國家所有權集中的現(xiàn)象更為普遍,所以對這些國家來說,在公司治理的過程中,其主要矛盾不僅體現(xiàn)在管理者和所有者之間,還體現(xiàn)在控股股東和中小股東之間。我國上市公司主要是集中持股的所有權形式,在這樣的結構下,公司內(nèi)部通常有一個終極控制人,該終極控制人對公司所具有的控制權可能會大于其股票持有比例所賦予的權力,終極控制人大多構建了金字塔結構。董事會作為重要的公司內(nèi)控手段在公司治理起到非常重要的作用,與金字塔結構緊密相關。本文從終極控制人的視角,使用我國2010-2014年家族上市公司的面板數(shù)據(jù)進行實證研究,研究了終極控制人所擁有的控制權、現(xiàn)金流權、控制權與現(xiàn)金流權之間的偏離對公司績效的影響,并在此基礎上考察了董事會對終極控制人侵占行為的約束作用。研究結果表明:在金字塔股權結構的家族上市公司中,終極控制人的控制權與公司績效沒有顯著相關關系;終極控制人的現(xiàn)金流權與公司績效呈顯著正相關關系;終極控制人的兩權分離與公司績效呈顯著負相關關系,存在著塹壕效應;獨立董事比例有效約束終極控制人因兩權分離引起的侵占行為,說明了獨立董事會加強對終極控制人行為的監(jiān)督,提高了侵占行為成本,從而降低了終極控制人的侵占行為的意愿;董事會規(guī)模有效調(diào)增終極控制人因兩權分離引起的侵占行為,董事會規(guī)模的增加降低了監(jiān)督效率,難以對終極控制人的行為實施有效監(jiān)督,更加劇了董事會內(nèi)黨派的形成,使得終極控制人的侵害行為得以縱容。
[Abstract]:In the late 1990s, some scholars represented by La porta put forward the concept of ultimate controlling shareholder for the first time. They found that the phenomenon of ownership concentration is more common in most countries, so for these countries, in the process of corporate governance, The main contradiction is not only between manager and owner, but also between controlling shareholder and minority shareholder. The main form of ownership of listed companies in China is centralized ownership. Under such a structure, there is usually an ultimate controller within the company. The ultimate controller may have more control over the company than its share holding ratio, and most of the ultimate controllers have built a pyramid structure. As an important internal control method, board of directors plays a very important role in corporate governance and is closely related to pyramid structure. In this paper, from the perspective of ultimate controller, we use the panel data of family listed companies from 2010 to 2014 to study the control rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate controllers. The deviation between control power and cash flow right has an impact on corporate performance, and on the basis of this, the constraint of board of directors on the ultimate controller's encroachment behavior is investigated. The results show that there is no significant correlation between the control of ultimate controller and corporate performance in the family listed companies with pyramid ownership structure, while the cash flow right of ultimate controller has a significant positive correlation with corporate performance. There is a significant negative correlation between the separation of two rights of ultimate controller and corporate performance, and there is trench effect. The proportion of independent directors effectively constrains the encroachment behavior of the ultimate controller caused by the separation of the two powers, which shows that the independent board of directors strengthens the supervision of the ultimate controller's behavior and increases the cost of the encroachment. Thus it reduces the will of the ultimate controller. The scale of the board of directors effectively increases the encroachment behavior of the ultimate controller caused by the separation of the two powers, the increase of the size of the board of directors reduces the efficiency of supervision, it is difficult to carry out effective supervision on the behavior of the ultimate controller, and the formation of parties in the board of directors is aggravated. So that the ultimate control of the violations can be condoned.
【學位授予單位】：浙江理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F271

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