【摘要】：公平、合理、有效的薪酬激勵機(jī)制是公司生存、發(fā)展壯大的必備要素。學(xué)者對高管薪酬的研究由來已久,且形成了眾多研究成果。但無論是在學(xué)術(shù)界還是在實(shí)務(wù)界,對高管薪酬的關(guān)注卻從未減少。越來越多的學(xué)者研究發(fā)現(xiàn),薪酬契約并未很好地解決委托代理問題,相反其設(shè)置過程產(chǎn)生了新的代理問題:高管可以運(yùn)用自身權(quán)力自設(shè)薪酬。近些年,高管“天價薪酬”的出現(xiàn)越來越引起人們對高管薪酬合理性、有效性的思考。Bertrand和Mullainatha于2001年提出“運(yùn)氣薪酬”的概念,從這一角度對高管薪酬進(jìn)行合理性、有效性檢驗(yàn)。按照他們的定義,運(yùn)氣薪酬指企業(yè)為超出高管控制的可觀測要素導(dǎo)致的業(yè)績變動,而向高管支付的酬勞。本文以最優(yōu)契約理論為理論出發(fā)點(diǎn),以行業(yè)加權(quán)平均收益率ROA(剔除公司自身影響)作為運(yùn)氣的衡量工具,檢驗(yàn)企業(yè)向高管支付的薪酬中是否含有運(yùn)氣成份,以及通過改善監(jiān)事會結(jié)構(gòu)能否降低高管的運(yùn)氣薪酬。本文的理論部分闡述了薪酬作為解決委托代理問題契約所依賴的理論基礎(chǔ)——信息不對稱理論、委托代理理論、最優(yōu)契約理論、管理層權(quán)力理論。本文的實(shí)證部分,以2007-2015年間所有上市公司數(shù)據(jù)(共9984個數(shù)據(jù))形成非平衡面板數(shù)據(jù),用STATA12統(tǒng)計(jì)軟件,通過2SLS回歸,研究了我國上市公司高管薪酬與運(yùn)氣之間的關(guān)系,并以監(jiān)事會規(guī)模、監(jiān)事會持股比例、未領(lǐng)取薪酬的監(jiān)事人數(shù)作為監(jiān)事會的代理變量,研究監(jiān)事會與高管運(yùn)氣薪酬的關(guān)系。本文的研究結(jié)論主要有以下三點(diǎn):(1)我國上市公司普遍向高管支付了運(yùn)氣薪酬,且運(yùn)氣對高管薪酬的影響僅次于高管才能對高管薪酬的影響。總體來看,業(yè)績好的公司中,運(yùn)氣對高管薪酬的影響更大。(2)監(jiān)事會規(guī)模、監(jiān)事會持股比例、未領(lǐng)取薪酬的監(jiān)事人數(shù)能夠影響高管運(yùn)氣薪酬。監(jiān)事會保持在正常規(guī)模3人時,監(jiān)事會對高管運(yùn)氣薪酬具有較好的治理作用。監(jiān)事會持股比例越多,未領(lǐng)取薪酬的監(jiān)事人數(shù)越少,高管運(yùn)氣薪酬越低。(3)業(yè)績比較好的公司中,監(jiān)事會規(guī)模、未領(lǐng)取薪酬的監(jiān)事人數(shù)對高管運(yùn)氣薪酬的治理作用更強(qiáng),而在業(yè)績比較差的公司中,監(jiān)事會持股比例對高管運(yùn)氣薪酬的治理作用更強(qiáng)。最后,根據(jù)實(shí)證結(jié)果,本文認(rèn)為,由于每個公司多元化、規(guī)模等具體情況存在較大差異,因此對監(jiān)事會的規(guī)模要求也不同。但是對于一般公司來說,將監(jiān)事會規(guī)模保持在正常水平3人左右并提高監(jiān)事會持股比例、減少監(jiān)事會中未領(lǐng)取薪酬的監(jiān)事人數(shù),可以有效改善監(jiān)事會對高管運(yùn)氣薪酬的治理作用。
[Abstract]:Fair, reasonable and effective salary incentive mechanism is the essential factor for the survival and development of the company. Scholars' research on executive compensation has a long history, and has formed a lot of research results. But whether in academia or in practice, the focus on executive compensation has never diminished. More and more scholars have found that the compensation contract does not solve the principal-agent problem very well, on the contrary, the process of setting up it has created a new agency problem: executives can use their own power to set up their own compensation. In recent years, the appearance of "sky-high compensation" has caused more and more people to think about the rationality and effectiveness of executive compensation. Bertrand and Mullainatha put forward the concept of "luck compensation" in 2001, from which the rationality and effectiveness of executive compensation are tested. By their definition, luck pay is the remuneration that companies pay executives for changes in performance caused by observable elements beyond the control of their executives. Based on the optimal contract theory and the industry-weighted average rate of return (ROA) as a measure of luck, this paper examines whether the compensation paid to senior executives contains luck. And by improving the structure of the board of supervisors can reduce executive luck pay. The theoretical part of this paper expounds the compensation as the theoretical basis for solving the principal-agent problem contract-information asymmetry theory, principal-agent theory, optimal contract theory, management power theory. In the empirical part of this paper, using the data of all listed companies (9984 data) from 2007 to 2015 to form non-equilibrium panel data, using STATA12 statistical software and 2SLS regression, the relationship between executive compensation and luck of listed companies in China is studied. Taking the scale of the board of supervisors, the proportion of the board of supervisors holding shares and the number of supervisors who have not received compensation as the proxy variables of the board of supervisors, the relationship between the board of supervisors and the compensation of executive luck is studied. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) China's listed companies generally pay executive compensation, and the impact of luck on executive compensation is second only to that of executive talent. Overall, luck has a greater impact on executive compensation in companies with good performance. (2) the size of the board of supervisors, the proportion of shares held by the board of supervisors, and the number of supervisors who do not receive compensation can affect executive luck pay. When the board of supervisors remains in the normal size of 3 people, the board of supervisors has a good governance role on executive luck compensation. The more the share of the board of supervisors, the less the number of supervisors who do not receive compensation, and the lower the compensation of executives' luck. (3) in the companies with better performance, the size of the board of supervisors and the number of supervisors who do not receive compensation have a stronger effect on the governance of executive luck compensation. In companies with poor performance, the proportion of board of supervisors has a stronger governance effect on executive luck compensation. Finally, according to the empirical results, this paper argues that because of the diversity of each company, the size of the board of supervisors is different. But for ordinary companies, we should keep the size of the board of supervisors at a normal level of about 3 people and increase the proportion of shares held by the board of supervisors, so as to reduce the number of unpaid supervisors on the board of supervisors. Can effectively improve the board of supervisors on executive luck compensation governance role.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F271;F272.92

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