非執(zhí)行董事與獨(dú)立董事對(duì)高管在職消費(fèi)的影響研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-23 19:57
【摘要】：作為契約不完備性的產(chǎn)物,在職消費(fèi)可能是對(duì)高管的隱性激勵(lì)。但是,媒體頻頻曝光的“天價(jià)煙酒”、“天價(jià)名片”等諸多事實(shí)表明,在職消費(fèi)遠(yuǎn)超出了合理范圍,會(huì)帶來(lái)不利經(jīng)濟(jì)后果,成為股東與高管之間代理沖突的重要表現(xiàn)形式之一。如何有效抑制高管過(guò)度在職消費(fèi)行為是董事會(huì)職責(zé)的重要內(nèi)容。以往文獻(xiàn)一度以獨(dú)立董事的治理結(jié)果代表董事會(huì)治理效果,較少關(guān)注其他類別的董事。事實(shí)上,我國(guó)上市公司董事會(huì)成員包括執(zhí)行董事、獨(dú)立董事和非執(zhí)行董事三類,直接由股東派駐的非執(zhí)行董事相對(duì)于內(nèi)部管理者可能更獨(dú)立,在監(jiān)督治理過(guò)程中不易受到高管的牽制。非執(zhí)行董事是否同獨(dú)立董事一樣提高董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性、監(jiān)督高管,從而約束高管機(jī)會(huì)主義行為、緩解委托代理沖突是本文的研究重點(diǎn)�；谝酝芯�,本文從高管在職消費(fèi)角度研究非執(zhí)行董事與獨(dú)立董事的監(jiān)督治理作用,同時(shí)比較非執(zhí)行董事與獨(dú)立董事的治理效果。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文進(jìn)一步探索不同股權(quán)性質(zhì)或不同股權(quán)制衡度情形下,非執(zhí)行董事與獨(dú)立董事對(duì)高管在職消費(fèi)的監(jiān)督治理。本文選取2009-2013年我國(guó)滬市A股上市公司為樣本,運(yùn)用SPSS軟件進(jìn)行多元線性回歸檢驗(yàn)研究假設(shè)。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明,高管在職消費(fèi)與非執(zhí)行董事比例呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,而高管在職消費(fèi)與獨(dú)立董事比例呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,說(shuō)明非執(zhí)行董事能夠抑制高管在職消費(fèi),獨(dú)立董事沒(méi)有發(fā)揮預(yù)期作用,反而加大了高管在職消費(fèi)程度,且非執(zhí)行董事對(duì)高管在職消費(fèi)的治理效果優(yōu)于獨(dú)立董事。研究還發(fā)現(xiàn),相比在國(guó)有公司中,在非國(guó)有公司中非執(zhí)行董事對(duì)高管在職消費(fèi)的監(jiān)督作用更明顯,在股權(quán)制衡度高時(shí)非執(zhí)行董事對(duì)高管在職消費(fèi)的監(jiān)督抑制作用更明顯;在國(guó)有公司或股權(quán)制衡度低的公司中,高管在職消費(fèi)水平與獨(dú)立董事比例的相關(guān)關(guān)系顯著為正。本文深入分析董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)和獨(dú)立性,從新的視角豐富了董事會(huì)治理效果的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。本文的研究也為我國(guó)政府監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)、上市公司進(jìn)一步完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、緩解代理沖突及降低代理成本提供新的思路和啟示。
[Abstract]:As the product of contract incompleteness, on-the-job consumption may be a hidden incentive to executives. However, many facts such as "sky-price tobacco and wine" and "sky-price business card" frequently exposed by the media show that the consumption on the job is far beyond the reasonable range, which will bring adverse economic consequences and become one of the important forms of proxy conflict between shareholders and executives. How to effectively restrain executives' excessive on-the-job consumption behavior is an important content of board duties. The previous literature used to represent the governance effect of the board of directors by the governance results of independent directors, and less attention was paid to other categories of directors. In fact, the board members of listed companies in China include executive directors, independent directors and non-executive directors. The non-executive directors who are directly assigned by shareholders may be more independent than internal managers. In the supervision of governance process is not easy to be constrained by the executive. Whether the non-executive directors and independent directors improve the independence of the board of directors, supervise the senior executives, so as to restrain the executive opportunism behavior, alleviate the principal-agent conflict is the focus of this paper. Based on the previous studies, this paper studies the supervisory governance role of non-executive directors and independent directors from the perspective of in-service consumption of executives, and compares the governance effects of non-executive directors and independent directors at the same time. On this basis, this paper further explores the non-executive directors and independent directors' supervision and governance of the executive's in-service consumption under the circumstances of different equity nature or different equity checks and balances. In this paper, A shares listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2013 are selected as samples, and the hypothesis of multivariate linear regression test is tested by using SPSS software. The empirical results show that there is a negative correlation between the in-service consumption of senior executives and the proportion of non-executive directors, while there is a positive correlation between in-service consumption of senior executives and the proportion of independent directors, indicating that non-executive directors can restrain the in-service consumption of senior executives. Independent directors did not play the expected role, but increased the level of in-service consumption of senior executives, and non-executive directors of the executive consumption of in-service management effect is better than that of independent directors. It is also found that the non-executive directors in non-state-owned companies have a more obvious supervisory effect on the in-service consumption of senior executives than in state-owned companies, and the non-executive directors have more obvious supervision and restraint on the in-service consumption of senior executives when the degree of equity checks and balances is high. In state-owned companies or companies with low equity checks and balances, the correlation between the level of in-service consumption and the proportion of independent directors is significantly positive. This paper deeply analyzes the structure and independence of the board of directors, which enriches the empirical evidence of the governance effect of the board of directors from a new perspective. The research in this paper also provides new ideas and inspiration for our government supervision and listed companies to further improve the corporate governance structure, alleviate agency conflicts and reduce agency costs.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F272.91
本文編號(hào)：2199755
[Abstract]:As the product of contract incompleteness, on-the-job consumption may be a hidden incentive to executives. However, many facts such as "sky-price tobacco and wine" and "sky-price business card" frequently exposed by the media show that the consumption on the job is far beyond the reasonable range, which will bring adverse economic consequences and become one of the important forms of proxy conflict between shareholders and executives. How to effectively restrain executives' excessive on-the-job consumption behavior is an important content of board duties. The previous literature used to represent the governance effect of the board of directors by the governance results of independent directors, and less attention was paid to other categories of directors. In fact, the board members of listed companies in China include executive directors, independent directors and non-executive directors. The non-executive directors who are directly assigned by shareholders may be more independent than internal managers. In the supervision of governance process is not easy to be constrained by the executive. Whether the non-executive directors and independent directors improve the independence of the board of directors, supervise the senior executives, so as to restrain the executive opportunism behavior, alleviate the principal-agent conflict is the focus of this paper. Based on the previous studies, this paper studies the supervisory governance role of non-executive directors and independent directors from the perspective of in-service consumption of executives, and compares the governance effects of non-executive directors and independent directors at the same time. On this basis, this paper further explores the non-executive directors and independent directors' supervision and governance of the executive's in-service consumption under the circumstances of different equity nature or different equity checks and balances. In this paper, A shares listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2013 are selected as samples, and the hypothesis of multivariate linear regression test is tested by using SPSS software. The empirical results show that there is a negative correlation between the in-service consumption of senior executives and the proportion of non-executive directors, while there is a positive correlation between in-service consumption of senior executives and the proportion of independent directors, indicating that non-executive directors can restrain the in-service consumption of senior executives. Independent directors did not play the expected role, but increased the level of in-service consumption of senior executives, and non-executive directors of the executive consumption of in-service management effect is better than that of independent directors. It is also found that the non-executive directors in non-state-owned companies have a more obvious supervisory effect on the in-service consumption of senior executives than in state-owned companies, and the non-executive directors have more obvious supervision and restraint on the in-service consumption of senior executives when the degree of equity checks and balances is high. In state-owned companies or companies with low equity checks and balances, the correlation between the level of in-service consumption and the proportion of independent directors is significantly positive. This paper deeply analyzes the structure and independence of the board of directors, which enriches the empirical evidence of the governance effect of the board of directors from a new perspective. The research in this paper also provides new ideas and inspiration for our government supervision and listed companies to further improve the corporate governance structure, alleviate agency conflicts and reduce agency costs.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F272.91
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