內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量與公司治理的相關(guān)性研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-22 07:44
【摘要】：回顧國(guó)內(nèi)外出現(xiàn)的重大財(cái)務(wù)舞弊或公司違規(guī)操作案件,無論是國(guó)外的安然事件、東芝舞弊,還是國(guó)內(nèi)的中航油事件、獐子島事件等,究其根本,這些案件都是和公司的內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量較差有關(guān)。為此,各國(guó)紛紛提出多種辦法,以達(dá)到提高公司內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量的目的。在2002年,美國(guó)政府通過了《薩班斯法案》(簡(jiǎn)稱SOX法案),希冀以此來提高公司所披露信息的準(zhǔn)確性和可靠性,從而達(dá)到保護(hù)各利益相關(guān)者的目的。我國(guó)的有關(guān)部門也公布《企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制基本規(guī)范》和《企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制配套指引》等規(guī)章制度,以此來推動(dòng)我國(guó)公司的內(nèi)部控制建設(shè)、提高上市公司的內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量。國(guó)內(nèi)外所出臺(tái)的各種法律法規(guī),給內(nèi)部控制的研究提供了理論和法律支持。我國(guó)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)起步比較晚,研究?jī)?nèi)部控制的時(shí)間較短,盡管已經(jīng)學(xué)習(xí)和吸收了大量先進(jìn)的內(nèi)部控制理論,但是仍舊存在內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)不健全、公司內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量差等問題。現(xiàn)階段,我國(guó)的上市公司在內(nèi)部控制與公司治理方面還存在下列幾個(gè)問題:公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)不完善,致使公司的內(nèi)部控制效果比較差,財(cái)務(wù)舞弊、違規(guī)行為等時(shí)有發(fā)生;公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者的自利行為會(huì)導(dǎo)致其占用公司資源,為自身謀求利益,又由于信息不對(duì)稱,公司所有者和其他利益相關(guān)者不了解經(jīng)營(yíng)者的自利行為,不能有效約束經(jīng)營(yíng)者的行為。以往研究表明了,如果公司治理方面存在問題,則其內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量也比較差。因此,研究?jī)?nèi)部控制質(zhì)量與公司治理之間的相關(guān)性,可以從根本上了解影響內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量的因素,從而可以有針對(duì)性的對(duì)內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行優(yōu)化,使公司的內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量得到提高。本文的主要意義在于對(duì)內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量和公司治理的相關(guān)性進(jìn)行研究,通過實(shí)證方法,為提高內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量提供依據(jù),幫助公司更好地開展內(nèi)部控制建設(shè),提升公司經(jīng)營(yíng)效率、保護(hù)公司財(cái)產(chǎn)安全。本文以滬市主板A股上市公司2013-2015年的數(shù)據(jù)為研究對(duì)象,采用規(guī)范研究和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方法,在闡述理論、總結(jié)文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上構(gòu)建模型,通過實(shí)證方法研究?jī)?nèi)部控制質(zhì)量和公司治理的相關(guān)性。研究結(jié)果表明:內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量與公司治理存在相互影響的關(guān)系。其中,股權(quán)集中度、股東大會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)、董事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)、獨(dú)立董事參加會(huì)議次數(shù)對(duì)內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量的影響比較顯著。這一研究結(jié)論,為我們更好地了解內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量的影響因素提供了參考,也為公司進(jìn)一步優(yōu)化治理結(jié)構(gòu)、提高經(jīng)營(yíng)效率、保障公司的內(nèi)部控制運(yùn)行提供了研究基礎(chǔ)。
[Abstract]:Recalling the major cases of financial fraud or company irregularities at home and abroad, regardless of whether it was the Enron incident abroad, Toshiba fraud, the domestic aviation oil incident, the Swertia incident, and so on. These cases are related to the poor quality of the company's internal controls. Therefore, many countries have put forward a variety of methods to improve the quality of internal control. In 2002, the US government passed the Sarbanes Act (SOX Act) to improve the accuracy and reliability of the information disclosed by companies and to protect all stakeholders. In order to promote the construction of internal control and improve the quality of internal control of listed companies, the relevant departments of our country have also published rules and regulations such as "basic norms of internal control of enterprises" and "guidelines for supporting internal control of enterprises", so as to promote the construction of internal control of Chinese companies. Various laws and regulations at home and abroad provide theoretical and legal support for the study of internal control. The market economy of our country starts relatively late and the time of studying internal control is short. Although we have studied and absorbed a large number of advanced internal control theories, there are still some problems such as imperfect internal control system and poor internal control quality of the company. At present, the listed companies in our country still have the following problems in internal control and corporate governance: the corporate governance structure is not perfect, resulting in poor internal control effect, financial fraud, illegal behavior and so on; The self-interest behavior of the company managers will lead them to occupy the resources of the company and seek for their own interests, and because of the asymmetry of information, the owners and other stakeholders of the company do not understand the self-interest behavior of the managers, and can not effectively restrain the behavior of the operators. Previous studies have shown that if there are problems in corporate governance, the quality of internal control is also poor. Therefore, by studying the correlation between internal control quality and corporate governance, we can fundamentally understand the factors that affect the quality of internal control, so as to optimize the internal control system. Improve the quality of the company's internal control. The main meaning of this paper is to study the correlation between internal control quality and corporate governance. Through the empirical method, it provides the basis for improving the internal control quality, helps the company to carry out the internal control construction better, and promotes the management efficiency of the company. To protect the property of the company. This paper takes the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2013-2015 as the research object, adopts the method of combining normative research with empirical research, constructs the model on the basis of expounding the theory and summarizing the literature. The correlation between internal control quality and corporate governance is studied by empirical method. The results show that the quality of internal control and corporate governance have a mutual impact on each other. Among them, the degree of ownership concentration, the number of shareholders' meeting, the number of directors' meeting and the number of independent directors' participation have a significant effect on the quality of internal control. This conclusion provides a reference for us to better understand the influencing factors of internal control quality, and also provides a research basis for the company to further optimize the governance structure, improve management efficiency, and ensure the internal control operation of the company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江蘇大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F271
本文編號(hào)：2196452
[Abstract]:Recalling the major cases of financial fraud or company irregularities at home and abroad, regardless of whether it was the Enron incident abroad, Toshiba fraud, the domestic aviation oil incident, the Swertia incident, and so on. These cases are related to the poor quality of the company's internal controls. Therefore, many countries have put forward a variety of methods to improve the quality of internal control. In 2002, the US government passed the Sarbanes Act (SOX Act) to improve the accuracy and reliability of the information disclosed by companies and to protect all stakeholders. In order to promote the construction of internal control and improve the quality of internal control of listed companies, the relevant departments of our country have also published rules and regulations such as "basic norms of internal control of enterprises" and "guidelines for supporting internal control of enterprises", so as to promote the construction of internal control of Chinese companies. Various laws and regulations at home and abroad provide theoretical and legal support for the study of internal control. The market economy of our country starts relatively late and the time of studying internal control is short. Although we have studied and absorbed a large number of advanced internal control theories, there are still some problems such as imperfect internal control system and poor internal control quality of the company. At present, the listed companies in our country still have the following problems in internal control and corporate governance: the corporate governance structure is not perfect, resulting in poor internal control effect, financial fraud, illegal behavior and so on; The self-interest behavior of the company managers will lead them to occupy the resources of the company and seek for their own interests, and because of the asymmetry of information, the owners and other stakeholders of the company do not understand the self-interest behavior of the managers, and can not effectively restrain the behavior of the operators. Previous studies have shown that if there are problems in corporate governance, the quality of internal control is also poor. Therefore, by studying the correlation between internal control quality and corporate governance, we can fundamentally understand the factors that affect the quality of internal control, so as to optimize the internal control system. Improve the quality of the company's internal control. The main meaning of this paper is to study the correlation between internal control quality and corporate governance. Through the empirical method, it provides the basis for improving the internal control quality, helps the company to carry out the internal control construction better, and promotes the management efficiency of the company. To protect the property of the company. This paper takes the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2013-2015 as the research object, adopts the method of combining normative research with empirical research, constructs the model on the basis of expounding the theory and summarizing the literature. The correlation between internal control quality and corporate governance is studied by empirical method. The results show that the quality of internal control and corporate governance have a mutual impact on each other. Among them, the degree of ownership concentration, the number of shareholders' meeting, the number of directors' meeting and the number of independent directors' participation have a significant effect on the quality of internal control. This conclusion provides a reference for us to better understand the influencing factors of internal control quality, and also provides a research basis for the company to further optimize the governance structure, improve management efficiency, and ensure the internal control operation of the company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江蘇大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F271
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