【摘要】：隨著整個產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈的主導權逐漸由上游廠商向下游廠商轉(zhuǎn)移,下游廠商對市場控制能力不斷上升,所具有的討價還價能力也不斷增強,進而導致上游廠商對中間品實行區(qū)別定價,并對下游弱勢廠商產(chǎn)生"水床效應"。本文以上游壟斷-下游寡頭的市場結(jié)構為基準,在上下游廠商都具有一定討價還價能力的情形下分析中間品區(qū)別定價的競爭效應。結(jié)果表明,當上游廠商選擇討價還價能力強的下游廠商進行統(tǒng)一定價協(xié)商時,統(tǒng)一定價時的消費者福利高于區(qū)別定價情形;當上游廠商選擇討價還價能力弱的下游廠商進行統(tǒng)一定價協(xié)商時,統(tǒng)一定價時的消費者福利低于區(qū)別定價情形;不論上游廠商選擇強勢或弱勢下游廠商進行價格協(xié)商,統(tǒng)一定價時下游廠商的利潤和社會總福利總是高于區(qū)別定價情形。因此,對中間品區(qū)別定價行為的反壟斷規(guī)制應考慮到上下游廠商的討價還價能力,應將"市場支配地位"標準延伸至"相對經(jīng)濟優(yōu)勢"。
[Abstract]:As the leading power of the whole industry chain is gradually transferred from the upstream manufacturer to the downstream firm, the downstream manufacturer's ability to control the market is constantly rising, and the bargaining power of the downstream manufacturer is also continuously enhanced, which leads to the upstream manufacturer to carry out the differentiated pricing of the intermediate goods. And to the downstream weak manufacturer produces "the water bed effect". Based on the market structure of upstream monopoly and downstream oligopoly, this paper analyzes the competitive effect of intermediate differential pricing under the condition that upstream and downstream firms have a certain bargaining power. The results show that when upstream firms choose downstream firms with strong bargaining power to negotiate unified pricing, consumers' welfare is higher than differential pricing. When upstream firms choose downstream firms with weak bargaining power to negotiate unified pricing, consumers' welfare is lower than differential pricing when unified pricing; whether upstream firms choose strong or weak downstream firms to negotiate prices, The profits and total social welfare of downstream firms are always higher than those of differential pricing. Therefore, the antitrust regulation of differentiated pricing of intermediate products should take into account the bargaining power of upstream and downstream firms, and extend the criterion of "market dominant position" to "relative economic advantage".
【作者單位】： 湖南農(nóng)業(yè)大學經(jīng)濟學院;中南財經(jīng)政法大學工商管理學院;肇慶學院經(jīng)濟與管理學院;
【基金】：國家社科基金青年項目,項目編號:15CJY001 湖南省社科基金項目,項目編號:14YBA203 湖南省教育廳優(yōu)秀青年項目資助 湖南省社科成果評審委員會課題,項目編號:XSP17YBZC086
【分類號】：F274

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