發(fā)布時間：2018-08-14 18:13

【摘要】：許多文獻(xiàn)表明,良好的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量具有正向影響。這一觀點(diǎn)也可從近年來資本市場上大量由于公司治理問題導(dǎo)致上市公司信息違規(guī)披露事件中略見一斑。公司本質(zhì)上是“人”的組織,公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)則是公司各利益相關(guān)者在法律、制度和規(guī)則框架下博弈的結(jié)果。因此,股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、管理層結(jié)構(gòu)等決定公司權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)的公司治理特征,才是上市公司在面對外部壓力時,尤其是來自資本市場規(guī)制中的閾值壓力時會計(jì)信息違規(guī)披露的深層原因。而這一點(diǎn),卻常被學(xué)術(shù)界忽視。本文則試圖以公司治理視角重新審視博元投資違規(guī)信息披露案。本文的結(jié)構(gòu)安排如下,第一章介紹了本文的寫作背景,并對國內(nèi)外公司治理和會計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的研究現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行評述;第二章首先介紹本文的理論基礎(chǔ),而后對公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對會計(jì)信息披露質(zhì)量的影響機(jī)制進(jìn)行理論分析;第三章介紹博元投資違規(guī)信息披露案始末;第四章使用第二章理論分析的結(jié)果,從公司治理視角深入剖析博元投資違規(guī)信息披露案的原因,并提出改進(jìn)建議;第五章是本文的啟示和研究的局限。本文認(rèn)為,博元投資公司分散化的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是違規(guī)信息披露的深層原因。這種股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)導(dǎo)致公司的控制權(quán)與剩余收益分享權(quán)不匹配,當(dāng)經(jīng)營業(yè)績下滑,公司面臨資本市場閾值壓力時,實(shí)際控制人要么選擇出逃策略,表現(xiàn)為公司頻繁易主;要么通過會計(jì)造假排解壓力,鋌而走險。若要提高公司信息披露質(zhì)量,本文的建議是,一是提高股權(quán)集中度,即提高控制權(quán)與剩余收益分享權(quán)的匹配程度;二是加大機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的持股比例;三是充分發(fā)揮獨(dú)立董事制度、監(jiān)事會制度對實(shí)際控制人的制衡機(jī)制;四是提高上市公司違規(guī)信息披露的成本,即證監(jiān)會對違規(guī)信息披露的上市公司加大處罰力度,增加退市制度的執(zhí)行力。
[Abstract]:Many literatures show that good corporate governance has a positive impact on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies. This view can also be seen in recent years in a large number of capital markets due to corporate governance problems resulting in information disclosure of listed companies. The company is essentially a "person" organization, while the corporate governance structure is the result of a game between the stakeholders under the framework of laws, systems and rules. Therefore, the corporate governance characteristics, such as ownership structure, management structure and so on, are the deep reasons for the listed companies to disclose accounting information illegally when facing the external pressure, especially the threshold pressure from the capital market regulation. This point, however, is often ignored by the academic community. This paper tries to re-examine the case of information disclosure in the perspective of corporate governance. The structure of this paper is as follows: the first chapter introduces the background of this paper, and reviews the current research situation of corporate governance and accounting information quality at home and abroad. Then it analyzes the influence mechanism of corporate governance structure on the quality of accounting information disclosure in theory; chapter three introduces the beginning and end of the case of investment violation information disclosure; the fourth chapter uses the results of theoretical analysis in chapter two. From the perspective of corporate governance, this paper deeply analyzes the reasons of the information disclosure cases and puts forward suggestions for improvement. The fifth chapter is the inspiration and limitations of this paper. This paper argues that the decentralized ownership structure of Boyuan Investment Company is the deep reason for the illegal information disclosure. This kind of ownership structure leads to the mismatch between the control right of the company and the share right of residual income. When the company faces the pressure of capital market threshold, the actual controller either chooses the escape strategy, which shows that the company frequently changes its ownership. Either through accounting fraud to relieve the pressure, desperate. In order to improve the quality of corporate information disclosure, the suggestions of this paper are: first, to improve the degree of ownership concentration, that is, to increase the matching degree between control right and residual income sharing right; second, to increase the shareholding ratio of institutional investors; Third, to give full play to the system of independent directors and the system of the board of supervisors to the system of checks and balances on actual controllers; fourth, to increase the cost of information disclosure by listed companies in violation of regulations, that is, the CSRC should increase penalties for listed companies that violate the disclosure of information. To increase the executive power of the delisting system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.39;F275

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本文編號：2183698