【摘要】：民營企業(yè)在我國社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展中扮演越來越重要角色,占據(jù)非常重要作用,職業(yè)經(jīng)理人作為民營企業(yè)的專業(yè)經(jīng)營管理人員,對(duì)民營企業(yè)的發(fā)展也非常重要。股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一種長期激勵(lì)機(jī)制,利于綁定股東利益與職業(yè)經(jīng)理人利益,打造民營企業(yè)中的利益共同體,在激發(fā)職業(yè)經(jīng)理人工作能動(dòng)性和積極性基礎(chǔ)上,大大降低民營企業(yè)的“委托-代理”成本,為民營企業(yè)創(chuàng)造更大價(jià)值。本文選擇Y民營企業(yè)為研究對(duì)象,該企業(yè)為我國炊具行業(yè)第一家上市的民營企業(yè),從成立至今企業(yè)發(fā)生很多變化,從家族企業(yè)變更為外資企業(yè),先后實(shí)施三次股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度,但仍有不少高管人員離職,對(duì)于研究民營企業(yè)職業(yè)經(jīng)理人股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制問題具有代表性和典型性。通過對(duì)我國民營企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制實(shí)施現(xiàn)狀的研究,并以Y民營企業(yè)為例,對(duì)研究主題進(jìn)行論證,得出研究結(jié)論:(1)民營企業(yè)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)利于打造民營企業(yè)利益共同體,利于吸引人才,留住人才,提升民營企業(yè)競(jìng)爭力,利于職業(yè)經(jīng)理人關(guān)注長期發(fā)展,但也面臨股票市場(chǎng)帶來的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),職業(yè)經(jīng)理人短期惡意行為,導(dǎo)致民營企業(yè)業(yè)績和會(huì)計(jì)信息反映失真等弊端;(2)將民營企業(yè)不同發(fā)展階段劃分為初創(chuàng)期、成長期、成熟期和衰退期,在初創(chuàng)期民營企業(yè)不適合股權(quán)激勵(lì),在成長期和成熟期應(yīng)結(jié)合民營企業(yè)實(shí)際情況,選擇恰當(dāng)?shù)墓蓹?quán)激勵(lì)模式,在衰退期民營企業(yè)應(yīng)用股權(quán)激勵(lì)關(guān)注核心員工和新生力量;(3)以Y民營企業(yè)為例,在家族企業(yè)產(chǎn)權(quán)和外資公司產(chǎn)權(quán)背景下,相繼實(shí)施三次股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案,在實(shí)施中存在Y民營企業(yè)內(nèi)部環(huán)境動(dòng)蕩,公司前景堪憂,股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案存在缺陷等問題。通過對(duì)Y民營企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案實(shí)施操作要點(diǎn)的概述,說明股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度實(shí)施情況,通過對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)和激勵(lì)效果評(píng)價(jià),表明第三套股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案實(shí)施效果要優(yōu)于前兩套股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案;(4)完善我國股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度環(huán)境建議包括培育有效資本市場(chǎng),完善法律法規(guī),完善職業(yè)經(jīng)理人市場(chǎng)。通過對(duì)民營企業(yè)職業(yè)經(jīng)理人股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制的研究,為民營企業(yè)吸引和留住職業(yè)經(jīng)理人,有效管理職業(yè)經(jīng)理人提供有益借鑒,促進(jìn)民營企業(yè)持續(xù)發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Private enterprises play a more and more important role in the social and economic development of our country and occupy a very important role. As professional management personnel of private enterprises, professional managers are also very important to the development of private enterprises. As a long-term incentive mechanism, equity incentive is conducive to binding the interests of shareholders with the interests of professional managers, creating a community of interests in private enterprises, on the basis of arousing the initiative and enthusiasm of professional managers. Greatly reduce the cost of the private enterprise-agent, and create greater value for the private enterprise. This article chooses Y private enterprise as the research object, this enterprise is the first listed private enterprise in cooking utensils industry of our country. Many changes have taken place since the establishment of the enterprise, the family enterprise has changed into the foreign capital enterprise, and the equity incentive system has been implemented three times successively. However, there are still many senior executives leaving, which is representative and typical for the study of private enterprise professional manager equity incentive mechanism. Through the research on the actualization of the stock right incentive mechanism of the private enterprises in our country, and taking Y private enterprise as an example, the research theme is demonstrated, and the conclusions are as follows: (1) the implementation of the equity incentive in the private enterprise is conducive to the creation of the community of interests of the private enterprise. In order to attract talents, retain talents, enhance the competitiveness of private enterprises, and help professional managers pay attention to long-term development, but also face the risk of the stock market, professional managers short-term malicious behavior, (2) the different development stages of private enterprises are divided into initial stage, growth period, maturity period and decline period, which is not suitable for equity incentive. In the period of growth and maturity, we should combine the actual situation of private enterprises, choose the appropriate equity incentive mode, and apply equity incentive to pay attention to the core staff and the new forces during the recession. (3) take Y private enterprise as an example, Under the background of the property rights of family enterprises and foreign companies, three stock incentive schemes have been implemented one after another. In the process of implementation, there are some problems, such as the instability of the internal environment of private enterprises, the worrying prospects of the companies, the defects of the equity incentive schemes, and so on. Through the summary of the key points of the implementation of the equity incentive scheme in Y private enterprises, the paper explains the implementation of the equity incentive system, and evaluates the market reaction and incentive effect of the equity incentive scheme. It shows that the implementation effect of the third equity incentive scheme is better than that of the first two equity incentive schemes. (4) the environmental suggestions for perfecting China's equity incentive system include cultivating effective capital market, perfecting laws and regulations, and perfecting professional manager market. Through the research on the incentive mechanism of the private enterprise professional manager's equity, this paper provides a useful reference for the private enterprise to attract and retain the professional manager, effectively manage the professional manager, and promote the sustainable development of the private enterprise.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華僑大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F426.92

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 張春穎;蘇桂賓;;股權(quán)激勵(lì)與上市公司經(jīng)營績效關(guān)系研究綜述[J];長春大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2017年01期

2 陳琪;劉衛(wèi);;新型股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制與新興企業(yè)上市研究[J];上海對(duì)外經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2017年01期

3 宋玉臣;李連偉;;股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)上市公司治理效率的影響測(cè)度[J];山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2017年03期

4 姜山水;徐浩;;技術(shù)研發(fā)聯(lián)盟關(guān)系性資產(chǎn)投入的股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制研究[J];重慶工商大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(自然科學(xué)版);2016年06期

5 韓業(yè)順;應(yīng)志方;;浙江民營上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施效果研究[J];特區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì);2016年12期

6 應(yīng)韻;;基于核心競(jìng)爭力的高新技術(shù)企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)研究——以阿里巴巴為例[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2016年35期

7 趙華偉;;股權(quán)激勵(lì)、公司治理與企業(yè)業(yè)績——基于我國上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2016年12期

8 楊華領(lǐng);宋常;;員工股權(quán)激勵(lì)范圍與公司經(jīng)營績效[J];當(dāng)代財(cái)經(jīng);2016年12期

9 辛連珠;王自榮;陳愛明;;完善改進(jìn)股權(quán)激勵(lì)企業(yè)所得稅政策[J];中國稅務(wù);2016年12期

10 尹磊;陳延榮;樊正軍;;股權(quán)激勵(lì)出新政 正確運(yùn)用是關(guān)鍵[J];中國稅務(wù);2016年12期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 李雪斌;股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)理研究[D];財(cái)政部財(cái)政科學(xué)研究所;2013年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 張孜偉;國有上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)問題探析[D];江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2013年

2 蔣艷玲;民營上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與經(jīng)營績效的實(shí)證分析[D];西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2013年

3 聶迎科;論中國上市家族公司職業(yè)經(jīng)理人股權(quán)激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制[D];西華大學(xué);2012年

4 裴穎;我國市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下的職業(yè)經(jīng)理人股權(quán)激勵(lì)研究[D];重慶交通大學(xué);2009年

，

本文編號(hào)：2128428