本文選題：總經(jīng)理變更 + 應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理��； 參考：《大連理工大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：在中國上市公司中,高管變更事件時(shí)有發(fā)生,并帶來了諸如人事變動(dòng)、戰(zhàn)略調(diào)整以及股價(jià)波動(dòng)等一系列連鎖反應(yīng)。作為高管決策的一部分,盈余管理行為是高層管理者權(quán)衡利弊后做出的選擇。高管變更對盈余管理的影響問題,一直是學(xué)者們研究的熱點(diǎn)。總經(jīng)理作為高層管理團(tuán)隊(duì)的核心人物,在制定重大決策時(shí)有著舉足輕重的地位。但現(xiàn)有研究多集中在總經(jīng)理變更對應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理的影響,相比之下,總經(jīng)理變更與真實(shí)盈余管理關(guān)系的研究較少,并且在研究不同變更類型對盈余管理的影響差異時(shí),多集中于變更發(fā)生前期�；谏鲜霰尘�,本文選取了中國滬深兩市A股的上市公司共11114個(gè)觀測樣本,選取2008-2014年為研究區(qū)間,采用OLS回歸方法分別研究了總經(jīng)理變更當(dāng)期以及變更后第一、二期對應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理和真實(shí)盈余管理的影響,進(jìn)而選取2437個(gè)發(fā)生總經(jīng)理變更事件的樣本,將變更類型區(qū)分為非正常變更和正常變更,檢驗(yàn)了不同變更類型對應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理和真實(shí)盈余管理的影響程度是否不同。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明,出于自身發(fā)展利益和績效薪酬的考慮,新任總經(jīng)理會(huì)在上任當(dāng)期利用應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目顯著調(diào)減盈余水平,在上任后的第一、二年會(huì)顯著調(diào)增應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余。但繼任者在上任當(dāng)年并沒有顯著的真實(shí)盈余操縱跡象,在上任后續(xù)年度會(huì)進(jìn)行顯著的正向真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余調(diào)整。此外,在非正常變更情形下,繼任總經(jīng)理會(huì)在上任當(dāng)期進(jìn)行顯著的應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余調(diào)減行為,但不會(huì)過多地使用不易操縱的真實(shí)活動(dòng)進(jìn)行盈余管理。針對以上結(jié)論,本文提出了有利于資本市場建設(shè)的政策建議。一方面,證監(jiān)會(huì)應(yīng)當(dāng)要求發(fā)生總經(jīng)理變更的上市公司詳細(xì)披露盈余信息,對異常盈余水平給出合理解釋；另一方面,上市公司應(yīng)當(dāng)加強(qiáng)自身管理,盡量保持高管團(tuán)隊(duì)構(gòu)成的穩(wěn)定性,適當(dāng)關(guān)注繼任總經(jīng)理的心理特征,努力培養(yǎng)與繼任高管的長期合作關(guān)系,鼓勵(lì)總經(jīng)理通過提高公司價(jià)值來提升自己的地位,通過制定合理的激勵(lì)機(jī)制來滿足總經(jīng)理的自我實(shí)現(xiàn)需要。
[Abstract]:Among listed companies in China, executive changes have occurred from time to time, and have brought about a series of chain reactions, such as personnel changes, strategic adjustments and stock price fluctuations. As a part of executive decision, earnings management is a choice made by senior managers after weighing advantages and disadvantages. The impact of executive change on earnings management has been a hot topic for scholars. As the core of senior management team, general manager plays an important role in making important decisions. However, most of the existing studies focus on the effect of the change of general manager on earnings management. In contrast, the relationship between the change of general manager and the real earnings management is less studied, and the difference of the effect of different types of change on earnings management is also studied. Focus on the early stages of the change. Based on the above background, this paper selects a total of 11114 observation samples of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China, selects 2008-2014 as the study interval, and uses OLS regression method to study the current period of general manager change and the first one after the change, respectively. The second phase corresponds to the impact of earnings management and real earnings management. Then 2437 samples of general manager changes are selected, and the types of changes are classified as abnormal changes and normal changes. The effects of different change types on accounting earnings management and real earnings management are tested. The empirical results show that due to the consideration of self-development interests and performance compensation, the new general manager will make use of the accrual items significantly to reduce the surplus level in the current period, and increase the accrual earnings significantly in the first and second years after taking office. But the successor has no significant signs of real earnings manipulation in the year he takes office, and will make a significant positive adjustment to real activity earnings in the following year. In addition, in the case of abnormal changes, the successor general manager will carry out significant accrual earnings reduction in the current period of office, but not too much use of difficult to manipulate the real activities for earnings management. In view of the above conclusions, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions in favor of capital market construction. On the one hand, the CSRC should require listed companies whose general managers have changed to disclose earnings information in detail to give a reasonable explanation for the level of abnormal earnings; on the other hand, listed companies should strengthen their own management. To maintain the stability of the top management team, pay due attention to the psychological characteristics of the successor general manager, strive to cultivate long-term cooperative relationship with the successor, encourage the general manager to improve his status by improving the company value. Through the establishment of a reasonable incentive mechanism to meet the needs of the General Manager self-actualization.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：大連理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F275

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