本文選題：官員獨(dú)董 + 政治聯(lián)系　； 參考：《管理科學(xué)》2017年04期

【摘要】：上市公司聘請(qǐng)離退休官員擔(dān)任獨(dú)立董事(簡(jiǎn)稱"官員獨(dú)董"),在中國(guó)乃至世界范圍內(nèi)都是一種普遍現(xiàn)象。上市公司通過聘請(qǐng)官員獨(dú)董能夠建立起與政府部門的政治聯(lián)系,從而幫助其從政府手中獲得各種稀缺資源和優(yōu)惠政策,同時(shí)也需要承擔(dān)提供就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)、政府稅收、官員政治升遷等多種社會(huì)服務(wù)和政治任務(wù)。官員獨(dú)董給公司帶來了怎樣的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響,這是學(xué)術(shù)界和企業(yè)界長(zhǎng)期熱議的焦點(diǎn)問題,但一直沒有得到令人信服的科學(xué)檢驗(yàn)。為了探究官員獨(dú)董對(duì)所任職公司的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響,利用2013年10月19日中組部發(fā)布的《關(guān)于進(jìn)一步規(guī)范黨政領(lǐng)導(dǎo)干部在企業(yè)兼職(任職)問題的意見》(簡(jiǎn)稱"18號(hào)文")作為外生沖擊事件,手工收集2013年10月19日至2014年12月31日中國(guó)A股上市公司披露的790起獨(dú)立董事辭職公告,利用事件研究法檢驗(yàn)辭職公告的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng),以測(cè)量官員獨(dú)董在中國(guó)上市公司中發(fā)揮的實(shí)際作用。研究結(jié)果表明,投資者對(duì)官員獨(dú)董的辭職公告事件表現(xiàn)出顯著為正的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng),而且官員獨(dú)董辭職事件的正向市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)明顯強(qiáng)于非官員獨(dú)董辭職事件的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng),實(shí)際上非官員獨(dú)董辭職事件的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)顯著為負(fù),說明相對(duì)非官員獨(dú)董而言,官員獨(dú)董更多地扮演了"掠奪之手"的角色,進(jìn)而損害了公司價(jià)值。進(jìn)一步探索公司內(nèi)外部多個(gè)因素對(duì)官員獨(dú)董價(jià)值的可能影響,發(fā)現(xiàn)如果公司注冊(cè)地的政府監(jiān)管強(qiáng)度或者公司注冊(cè)地所在省市的市場(chǎng)化水平越高,該公司的官員獨(dú)董辭職公告事件所引發(fā)的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)就越積極,官員獨(dú)董的"扶持之手"角色越難以發(fā)揮作用,從而更加突顯了官員獨(dú)董的"掠奪之手"角色。但是,并沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)官員獨(dú)董的行政級(jí)別、行業(yè)專長(zhǎng)以及公司獲得政府補(bǔ)助的情況等內(nèi)部因素會(huì)影響官員獨(dú)董價(jià)值的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。創(chuàng)新之處在于增加了非官員獨(dú)董群體作為對(duì)照樣本,從而能夠更好地判斷和評(píng)估獨(dú)立董事政治聯(lián)系的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值,得到的相關(guān)研究結(jié)論具有更強(qiáng)的說服力。此外,利用官員獨(dú)董離職潮事件考察獨(dú)立董事政治聯(lián)系的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值,不僅豐富和深化了獨(dú)立董事領(lǐng)域的相關(guān)研究,而且拓展了政治聯(lián)系領(lǐng)域的研究成果,同時(shí)又為中組部發(fā)布"18號(hào)文"的政策意義提供了及時(shí)可靠的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。研究結(jié)果啟示企業(yè)不能盲目追求和構(gòu)建與政府的聯(lián)系,實(shí)際上與政府保持適度的距離將更有利于企業(yè)的發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:It is a common phenomenon that listed companies employ retired officials as independent directors. The listed companies can establish political ties with government departments by hiring officials as their chief executives, thereby helping them to obtain all kinds of scarce resources and preferential policies from the government. At the same time, they also have to bear the burden of providing employment opportunities and government taxes. Officials political promotion and other social services and political tasks. What kind of economic impact officials have had on the company has long been the focus of debate in academia and business, but has not been tested convincingly by science. In order to explore the economic impact of the executive director on the company, Using the opinions on further standardizing the Part-time (position) of leading cadres in Enterprises issued by the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee on October 19, 2013 (referred to as "article 18"), as an exogenous shock event, Collecting by hand 790 announcements of resignation of independent directors disclosed by listed companies listed in A shares from October 19, 2013 to December 31, 2014, and using the event study method to test the market reaction of resignation announcements, In order to measure the official Dong alone in China's listed companies to play a real role. The results of the study show that investors have shown a significantly positive market response to the resignation announcement of the official Chief Executive, and the positive market reaction to the resignation of the official Chief Executive is obviously stronger than the market reaction to the resignation of the non-official Chief Executive. As a matter of fact, the market reaction to the resignation of non-official chief executive is obviously negative, which shows that the official independent director plays a more role of "plunder hand" than non-official sole director, and thus damages the company value. To further explore the possible impact of many factors inside and outside the company on the value of the sole director of the company, it is found that the higher the level of government supervision in the place where the company is registered or the higher the level of marketization in the province or province where the company is registered, The more positive the market response caused by the announcement of the resignation of the company's chief executive, the more difficult the role of the "supporting hand" of the official sole director was, thus highlighting the role of the "predatory hand" of the official sole director. However, no empirical evidence has been found that internal factors such as executive rank, industry expertise, and the company's access to government subsidies may affect the value of government executives. The innovation lies in the addition of non-official independent groups as a control sample, which can better judge and evaluate the economic value of independent directors' political connections, and the relevant research conclusions are more persuasive. In addition, the economic value of independent directors' political ties has been investigated by using the incident of the departure tide of independent directors, which not only enriches and deepens the relevant research in the field of independent directors, but also expands the research results in the field of political relations. At the same time, it provides timely and reliable empirical evidence for the policy significance of the publication of document 18. The results suggest that enterprises should not blindly pursue and build a relationship with the government. In fact, keeping a proper distance from the government will be more conducive to the development of enterprises.
【作者單位】： 廈門大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金(71572160)~~
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F275;F832.51

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前8條

1 危慧惠;;事件研究方法在公司金融中的應(yīng)用[J];商業(yè)時(shí)代;2008年16期

2 王曉玉;晁鋼令;;企業(yè)營(yíng)銷負(fù)面曝光事件研究述評(píng)[J];外國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理;2009年02期

3 李凍菊;;股權(quán)分置改革的效應(yīng)研究——來自深市中小企業(yè)板的實(shí)證[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)緯;2006年04期

4 張偉強(qiáng);王s，

本文編號(hào)：2089850