本文選題：高管薪酬 + 創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)向　； 參考：《石河子大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：“大眾創(chuàng)業(yè),萬眾創(chuàng)新”背景下,創(chuàng)業(yè)越來越成為我國眾多企業(yè)的重要選擇,企業(yè)層面的創(chuàng)業(yè)亦備受學(xué)術(shù)界關(guān)注。對于創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)來說,如何提升創(chuàng)業(yè)績效是一個熱點話題,也是企業(yè)界亟待解決的重要難題。創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)向本質(zhì)上是企業(yè)實施的一種增長戰(zhàn)略導(dǎo)向,對企業(yè)追求良好的績效具有重要推動作用。論文在已有研究基礎(chǔ)上,引入創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)向變量,積極探求創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)向在高管薪酬激勵與創(chuàng)業(yè)績效關(guān)系之間扮演的角色,以把握研究的現(xiàn)實意義和理論價值。論文以分析高管薪酬、創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)向與創(chuàng)業(yè)績效三者之間的關(guān)系為主,進一步探究了高管薪酬激勵對創(chuàng)業(yè)績效之間的作用機制。首先,界定了高管薪酬、創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)向及創(chuàng)業(yè)績效的概念,并通過文獻分析法梳理了變量之間的關(guān)系。其次,在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上,提出了高管薪酬、創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)向與創(chuàng)業(yè)績效三者相互關(guān)系的不同假設(shè),同時從不同角度重點闡述了創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)向在高管薪酬與創(chuàng)業(yè)績效關(guān)系之間的作用假設(shè)。第三,以2011-2015年的創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司為研究樣本,建立混合面板回歸模型,以經(jīng)驗數(shù)據(jù)驗證高管薪酬激勵對企業(yè)創(chuàng)業(yè)績效的影響以及之間的作用路徑或機制。實證研究結(jié)果表明:高管貨幣薪酬、權(quán)益薪酬與薪酬差距與創(chuàng)業(yè)績效顯著正相關(guān);高管貨幣薪酬、權(quán)益薪酬與薪酬差距與創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)向顯著正相關(guān);創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)向在高管貨幣薪酬、權(quán)益薪酬、薪酬差距與創(chuàng)業(yè)績效之間關(guān)系的中介效應(yīng)成立;同時,創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)向還調(diào)節(jié)高管貨幣薪酬、權(quán)益薪酬與創(chuàng)業(yè)績效之間的關(guān)系,但對薪酬差距與創(chuàng)業(yè)績效之間關(guān)系的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)不成立。這些結(jié)論對創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)的戰(zhàn)略管理有以下啟示:優(yōu)化高管薪酬契約,提升企業(yè)內(nèi)部創(chuàng)業(yè)治理水平;大力培養(yǎng)企業(yè)家精神,打造創(chuàng)業(yè)型高管;積極培育創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)向,促進積極引導(dǎo)創(chuàng)新創(chuàng)業(yè)活動;構(gòu)建有效的風(fēng)險學(xué)習(xí)、規(guī)避機制,確保創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)向轉(zhuǎn)化為良好組織績效。論文以公司創(chuàng)業(yè)為研究主題,嘗試將高管薪酬作為研究的切入點,采用二手?jǐn)?shù)據(jù)實證探討其對公司創(chuàng)業(yè)績效的作用機制,并得出了一些重要結(jié)論,這也與現(xiàn)有許多學(xué)者的研究結(jié)論相吻合�？傊�,論文豐富了高管薪酬激勵對企業(yè)績效影響的微觀機制,拓展了當(dāng)前創(chuàng)業(yè)理論研究的視角,也為企業(yè)設(shè)計具有創(chuàng)業(yè)型薪酬契約提供理論借鑒。
[Abstract]:Under the background of "mass entrepreneurship, mass innovation", entrepreneurship has become an important choice for many enterprises in our country, and entrepreneurship at the enterprise level has attracted much attention from the academic community. For entrepreneurial enterprises, how to improve entrepreneurial performance is a hot topic, but also an important problem to be solved. Entrepreneurial orientation is essentially a kind of growth strategy orientation implemented by enterprises, which plays an important role in promoting enterprises' pursuit of good performance. On the basis of existing research, this paper introduces entrepreneurial orientation variables and actively explores the role of entrepreneurial orientation in the relationship between executive compensation incentives and entrepreneurial performance, in order to grasp the practical significance and theoretical value of the research. Based on the analysis of the relationship among executive compensation, entrepreneurial orientation and entrepreneurial performance, the paper further explores the mechanism of executive compensation incentive on entrepreneurial performance. Firstly, it defines the concepts of executive compensation, entrepreneurial orientation and entrepreneurial performance, and combs the relationship between variables through literature analysis. Secondly, on the basis of theoretical analysis, different assumptions of the relationship among executive compensation, entrepreneurial orientation and entrepreneurial performance are put forward. At the same time, the hypothesis of the relationship between executive compensation and entrepreneurial performance is expounded from different angles. Thirdly, taking the listed companies in the gem from 2011-2015 as the research sample, a mixed panel regression model is established to verify the impact of executive compensation incentives on entrepreneurial performance and the path or mechanism between them. The empirical results show that: executive monetary compensation, equity compensation and salary gap and entrepreneurial performance significantly positive correlation; executive monetary compensation, equity compensation and salary gap and entrepreneurial orientation significantly positive correlation; entrepreneurial orientation in executive monetary compensation, The intermediary effect of the relationship between equity compensation, salary gap and entrepreneurial performance is established. At the same time, entrepreneurship orientation also adjusts the relationship between executive monetary compensation, equity compensation and entrepreneurial performance. However, the effect of adjustment on the relationship between salary gap and entrepreneurial performance is untenable. These conclusions have the following enlightenment to the strategic management of the entrepreneurial enterprise: optimize the executive compensation contract, enhance the level of entrepreneurial governance within the enterprise; vigorously cultivate entrepreneurship, create entrepreneurial executives; actively cultivate entrepreneurial orientation, To promote the active guidance of innovative entrepreneurial activities; to build effective risk learning, avoid mechanisms to ensure that entrepreneurial orientation into good organizational performance. In this paper, we take entrepreneurship as the research theme, try to take executive compensation as the starting point of the research, use second-hand data to explore the mechanism of its effect on corporate entrepreneurship performance, and draw some important conclusions. This also coincides with the existing research conclusions of many scholars. In short, the paper enriches the micro mechanism of executive compensation incentive to enterprise performance, expands the perspective of current entrepreneurial theory research, and provides theoretical reference for enterprises to design entrepreneurial compensation contract.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F279.2

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