發(fā)布時間：2018-06-27 20:53

  本文選題：董事聯(lián)結(jié) + 信息傳遞��； 參考：《南京大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：任何存在于社會中的企業(yè)都不是孤立存在的,都通過正式或非正式的制度相互聯(lián)系,在信息技術(shù)如此發(fā)達的今天,組織間的關(guān)聯(lián)關(guān)系對企業(yè)發(fā)展的重要性日漸凸顯。而組織之間各種社會關(guān)系的建立都是依靠人在社會交流與交往中發(fā)揮主觀能動性,它是組織關(guān)系形成的重要方式。董事會作為重要的公司治理機構(gòu),隨著我國董事會制度的發(fā)展和完善,由董事會成員在多家企業(yè)同時任職所形成的連鎖董事現(xiàn)象在我國普遍存在,董事兼職行為成為了企業(yè)之間形成聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系的重要形式,由此形成了企業(yè)之間相關(guān)信息、知識及經(jīng)驗的共享和傳遞。近年來,有關(guān)企業(yè)董事網(wǎng)絡對企業(yè)經(jīng)濟行為及企業(yè)績效所產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟后果已經(jīng)受到越來越多研究者的關(guān)注。本文以董事網(wǎng)絡的信息傳遞功能為基礎,基于我國2008年-2015年A股上市公司的數(shù)據(jù),集中探討了兩個方面的問題。第一,企業(yè)依靠董事聯(lián)結(jié)所形成的社會關(guān)系屬性是否能夠在一定程度上解釋企業(yè)的稅負水平;第二,企業(yè)的董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系與企業(yè)稅負水平之間的相關(guān)性是否受聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系的性質(zhì)及企業(yè)所處環(huán)境(包括企業(yè)所處網(wǎng)絡位置和外部監(jiān)管環(huán)境)的影響。在理論分析、文獻總結(jié)和回顧的基礎上,本研究采用MatlabR2016a進行矩陣處理,應用Ucinet6.0進行網(wǎng)絡分析,最后運用Stata14.0進行數(shù)據(jù)處理及回歸分析,借鑒前人研究成果,構(gòu)建模型,并進行了一系列實證分析,得出以下結(jié)論:連鎖董事聯(lián)結(jié)低稅負企業(yè)數(shù)量與企業(yè)稅負呈顯著負相關(guān)關(guān)系,當聯(lián)結(jié)的企業(yè)之間屬于同行業(yè)及企業(yè)處于整體網(wǎng)絡邊緣位置時,影響效果更為顯著。此外,高強度的稅收監(jiān)管能夠有效抑制兩者之間的負相關(guān)關(guān)系。本文在補充檢驗中驗證了董事跳槽行為形成的企業(yè)間關(guān)聯(lián)關(guān)系同樣也具有信息傳遞效應。在研究的最后提出了可能的進一步研究。
[Abstract]:Any enterprise existing in the society is not isolated, it is connected with each other through formal or informal institutions. Today, when information technology is so developed, the importance of inter-organizational relationship to the development of enterprises is becoming increasingly prominent. The establishment of various social relations among organizations depends on the subjective initiative of people in social communication and communication, which is an important way to form organizational relationships. As an important corporate governance institution, with the development and improvement of the board of directors system in our country, the phenomenon of chain directors formed by board members serving in many enterprises at the same time is widespread in our country. The part-time behavior of directors has become an important form of forming the connection relationship between enterprises, thus forming the sharing and transmission of relevant information, knowledge and experience among enterprises. In recent years, more and more researchers have paid more and more attention to the economic consequences of corporate director network on corporate economic behavior and corporate performance. Based on the information transmission function of the directors' network and the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2015, this paper focuses on two aspects. First, whether the attributes of social relations formed by the association of directors can explain to some extent the level of tax burden of enterprises; second, Whether the relationship between the director connection and the tax burden level of the enterprise is affected by the nature of the connection relationship and the environment of the enterprise (including the network location and the external regulatory environment of the enterprise). On the basis of theoretical analysis, literature summary and review, MatlabR2016a is used for matrix processing, Ucinet6.0 for network analysis, and Stata14.0 for data processing and regression analysis. A series of empirical analysis is carried out, and the following conclusions are drawn: there is a significant negative correlation between the number of low tax enterprises connected by chain directors and the tax burden of enterprises, and when the connected enterprises belong to the same industry and enterprises are on the edge of the whole network, The effect is more obvious. In addition, high-intensity tax regulation can effectively restrain the negative correlation between the two. In the supplementary test, this paper verifies that the relationship between the enterprises formed by the director's job-hopping behavior also has the effect of information transmission. At the end of the study, a possible further study is proposed.
【學位授予單位】：南京大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F812.42;F275.4
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本文編號：2075251