本文選題：薪酬管制 + 國有企業(yè)　； 參考：《北京理工大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國的國有企業(yè)承擔(dān)著經(jīng)濟發(fā)展和維護(hù)社會穩(wěn)定的責(zé)任,不少國企的負(fù)責(zé)人是具有較高行政級別的公務(wù)員,由政府直接行政任命。由于國企高管身份的特殊性,其薪酬一直備受社會各界的關(guān)注,這一方面關(guān)系到國有企業(yè)薪酬制度的有效性,另一方面也反映了社會各界對社會貧富分化和社會公平的關(guān)注。近年來,國企高管與普通職工之間的薪酬差距越來越大,為形成高管與普通職工之間的合理工資收入分配關(guān)系,合理調(diào)節(jié)不同行業(yè)高管之間的薪酬差距,我國先后出臺了《關(guān)于進(jìn)一步規(guī)范中央企業(yè)負(fù)責(zé)人薪酬管理的指導(dǎo)意見》、《中央管理企業(yè)負(fù)責(zé)人薪酬制度改革方案》等制度,對國企高管的薪酬進(jìn)行管制。學(xué)術(shù)界當(dāng)前對高管薪酬的研究對高管的絕對薪酬關(guān)注較多,但對締約當(dāng)事人在薪酬契約訂立過程中可能存在的行為心理,如參照點設(shè)定和損失厭惡等對簽約結(jié)果的影響則關(guān)注較少。參照點契約理論把契約視為締約各方在交易關(guān)系中判斷得失的唯一參照點,為締約各方交易關(guān)系的締結(jié)提供了一種進(jìn)行利益得失判斷的基準(zhǔn)。本文基于參照點契約理論,結(jié)合我國國有企業(yè)薪酬管制的制度背景,以中國A股2009-2014年上市公司為檢驗樣本,選取國有企業(yè)同行的薪酬基準(zhǔn)(同行高管薪酬的行業(yè)均值)為契約參照點,實證檢驗了我國國有企業(yè)高管薪酬的參照點效應(yīng)及政府薪酬管制政策的影響,為提高國有企業(yè)業(yè)績、有效激勵高管提供思路,為國家監(jiān)管部門制定高管薪酬管制政策提供參考。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)我國國有企業(yè)高管薪酬對同行薪酬基準(zhǔn)表現(xiàn)出顯著的參照點效應(yīng),且這種參照點效應(yīng)對公司業(yè)績具有促進(jìn)作用。政府的薪酬管制政策會削弱國有企業(yè)高管薪酬對公司業(yè)績、同行薪酬基準(zhǔn)的敏感性,但對同行薪酬基準(zhǔn)敏感性的削弱十分有限。本文建議國有企業(yè)高管薪酬決策者要充分考慮契約當(dāng)事人決策過程中的行為因素,通過調(diào)整高管的薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)提升高管薪酬對公司業(yè)績的敏感性,消除薪酬管制政策的負(fù)面影響;政府主管部門要以政府監(jiān)督為主,充分發(fā)揮市場的作用、不斷完善國有企業(yè)的內(nèi)部治理機制,才能在激勵國有企業(yè)高管的同時,有效約束高管的行為,形成國有企業(yè)高管與企業(yè)職工之間合理的收入分配關(guān)系,實現(xiàn)薪酬水平適當(dāng)、結(jié)構(gòu)合理、管理規(guī)范和監(jiān)督有效。
[Abstract]:The state-owned enterprises of our country bear the responsibility of economic development and maintaining social stability. Many of the responsible persons of state-owned enterprises are civil servants with higher administrative levels appointed directly by the government. Because of the particularity of the executive status of state-owned enterprises, its compensation has been concerned by all walks of life. On the one hand, it is related to the effectiveness of the compensation system of state-owned enterprises, on the other hand, it also reflects the concern of all walks of life about the social polarization between the rich and the poor and the social equity. In recent years, the pay gap between the top executives of state-owned enterprises and ordinary workers has become wider and larger. In order to form a reasonable distribution of wages and income between executives and ordinary workers, the pay gap between executives in different industries can be adjusted rationally. In China, the guidelines on further standardizing the compensation Management of the responsible Persons in Central Enterprises and the Plan for the Reform of the compensation system of the responsible Persons in the Central Management Enterprises have been promulgated successively to regulate the compensation of senior executives in state-owned enterprises. At present, the academic research on executive compensation pays more attention to the absolute compensation of executives, but about the behavior psychology of the contracting parties in the process of making the salary contract. The effect of reference point setting and loss aversion on the signing result is less concerned. The reference point contract theory regards the contract as the only reference point for the parties to judge the gain and loss in the transaction relationship, which provides a basis for the conclusion of the transaction relationship between the contracting parties. Based on the reference point contract theory and the background of the compensation control system of state-owned enterprises in China, this paper takes the A share listed companies of China from 2009-2014 as the test samples. This paper selects the compensation benchmark of the state-owned enterprises (the industry average of the peer executive compensation) as the contract reference point, and empirically tests the reference point effect of the executive compensation of state-owned enterprises and the influence of the government salary control policy, in order to improve the performance of the state-owned enterprises. To provide effective incentives for senior executives to provide ideas for national regulatory departments to formulate executive compensation control policy to provide a reference. It is found that the executive compensation of state-owned enterprises has a significant reference point effect on the peer compensation benchmark and this reference point effect can promote the performance of the company. The government's pay control policy would weaken the sensitivity of executive compensation to corporate performance, peer pay benchmarks, but very little to peer pay benchmarks. This paper suggests that the executive compensation decision makers of state-owned enterprises should fully consider the behavioral factors in the decision-making process of the contract parties, improve the sensitivity of executive compensation to the performance of the company by adjusting the executive compensation structure, and eliminate the negative impact of the salary control policy. The competent government departments should give priority to government supervision, give full play to the role of the market, and constantly improve the internal governance mechanism of state-owned enterprises, in order to encourage the senior executives of state-owned enterprises to effectively restrain their behavior at the same time. To form a reasonable income distribution relationship between the executives of state-owned enterprises and the staff and workers of the enterprises, to realize the appropriate salary level, the reasonable structure, the effective management standard and the supervision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F272.92;F276.1

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