本文選題：多渠道 + 渠道選擇　； 參考：《工業(yè)技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)》2017年11期

【摘要】：本文針對(duì)擁有網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道的制造商,考慮零售商實(shí)體渠道促銷努力水平及消費(fèi)者的搭便車行為,在Nash博弈和零售商主導(dǎo)的Stackelberg博弈下,就零售商開通網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道的問題進(jìn)行研究。通過理論和數(shù)值分析,得到以下結(jié)論:零售商渠道地位對(duì)其開通網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道影響不大;開通后,制造商利潤(rùn)減小,當(dāng)實(shí)體渠道基本市場(chǎng)份額較小時(shí),零售商利潤(rùn)增大;零售商應(yīng)根據(jù)實(shí)體渠道基本市場(chǎng)份額大小來決定是否開通網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道。
[Abstract]:This paper, aiming at the manufacturers with network direct channel, considers the promotion effort level of the retailer and the free riding behavior of the consumers. Under the Nash game and the retailer dominated Stackelberg game, this paper makes a research on the retailer's opening network channel. Through theoretical and numerical analysis, the following conclusions are obtained: the retailer channel It has little influence on its network channel. After the opening, the profit of the manufacturer is reduced. When the basic market share of the real channel is small, the retailer's profit increases, and the retailer should decide whether to open the network channel according to the basic market share of the entity channel.
【作者單位】： 大連海事大學(xué)交通運(yùn)輸管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社科基金項(xiàng)目“大數(shù)據(jù)背景下網(wǎng)購消費(fèi)者行為模式與網(wǎng)購評(píng)語引導(dǎo)機(jī)理研究”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):15CGL031) 大連市科技計(jì)劃項(xiàng)目“基于超電子的城市交通出行行為動(dòng)態(tài)模型與算法研究”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):2015A11GX016) 大連市高層次人才創(chuàng)新支持計(jì)劃項(xiàng)目“交通運(yùn)輸大數(shù)據(jù)的知識(shí)挖掘與規(guī)則提取”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):2015R063) 中央高�；究蒲袠I(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):3132016306,3132017085)
【分類號(hào)】：F274
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本文編號(hào)：2058853