本文選題：承銷商聲譽 + IPO�。� 參考：《南京大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：在我國,由于經(jīng)濟發(fā)展階段原因,資本市場為政府所主導,行政管制色彩濃厚。由于資源的供給稀缺,為了達到上市的標準,并且盡可能提高發(fā)行價,擬上市企業(yè)有較強的動機粉飾財務報表。企業(yè)上市要聘請專業(yè)的承銷商、會計師事務所和律師事務所,承銷商在企業(yè)上市過程中對提高信息披露質(zhì)量,促進資源配置發(fā)揮著獨特而不可替代的作用。承銷商利用其專業(yè)信息生產(chǎn)能力并發(fā)揮"第三方認證中介"作用,提高了市場的運行效率。然而,承銷商并沒有完全解決作為"信息生產(chǎn)者"可靠性的問題,一方面發(fā)行企業(yè)財務包裝手段精明,券商盡職調(diào)查可能沒有能夠識別;另一方面,承銷商也存在為了盡快發(fā)行,拿到承銷費用,與發(fā)行人合謀造假的情形。在這種情況下,不良記錄的承銷商會失去投資者的信任,高聲譽券商的價值便會凸顯出來。國外現(xiàn)有研究證實承銷商聲譽機制的存在,承銷商聲譽與盈余管理負相關(guān),高聲譽承銷商輔導的企業(yè)發(fā)行抑價更低,長期回報率更高。在我國承銷商聲譽機制是否已經(jīng)發(fā)揮開始發(fā)揮作用?本文將對此進行研究論證,以期獲得實證檢驗的證據(jù)。本文首先從文獻綜述和理論分析提出研究假設(shè),然后選取2007-2014年上市的公司作為樣本,按照M-W法采用承銷金額份額和承銷家數(shù)份額加權(quán)綜合作為承銷商聲譽的解釋變量,選擇修正的瓊斯模型計算應計盈余管理,綜合使用描述性統(tǒng)計、相關(guān)性分析及多元回歸分析檢驗假設(shè)。本文通過實證研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在中小板市場,承銷商聲譽能夠顯著抑制企業(yè)的盈余管理,承銷商聲譽與企業(yè)質(zhì)量的甄選機制也已初步顯著。這表明承銷商聲譽機制在中小板已初步建立。此外,本文研究了承銷商聲譽發(fā)揮的約束條件,研究發(fā)現(xiàn)競爭性行業(yè)、市場化進程較高、內(nèi)部控制較好的樣本組承銷商聲譽更能有效發(fā)揮作用,更能有效抑制企業(yè)的盈余管理。
[Abstract]:In our country, because of the economic development stage, the capital market is dominated by the government, and the color of administrative control is strong. Because the supply of resources is scarce, in order to reach the standard of listing and raise the issuing price as much as possible, the listed enterprises have strong motivation to whitewash the financial statements. The listed enterprises should employ professional underwriters, accounting firms and law firms. Underwriters play a unique and irreplaceable role in improving the quality of information disclosure and promoting the allocation of resources in the process of listing. The underwriters use their professional information production capacity and play the role of "third-party certification intermediary" to improve the efficiency of the market. However, underwriters do not fully address the issue of reliability as "information producers". On the one hand, issuing enterprises' financial packaging means shrewdly, securities firms may not be able to identify due diligence; on the other hand, The underwriter also exists in order to issue as soon as possible, get underwriting fee, conspire with the issuer to cheat. In this case, underwriters with bad records lose the trust of investors and the value of reputable brokerages highlights. Existing studies abroad confirm the existence of underwriter reputation mechanism. Underwriter reputation is negatively correlated with earnings management. The underpricing of high reputation underwriter tutors is lower and the long-term rate of return is higher. Does the underwriter reputation mechanism in our country have begun to play a role? This article will carry on the research demonstration to obtain the evidence of the empirical test. This paper first puts forward the research hypothesis from literature review and theoretical analysis, then selects the listed companies from 2007-2014 as the sample, and adopts the weighted synthesis of the underwriting amount share and the underwriting family share as the explanatory variable of the underwriter's reputation according to M-W method. The modified Jones model is used to calculate the accrual earnings management, and descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and multivariate regression analysis are used to test the hypothesis. Through empirical research, it is found that in small and medium-sized market, underwriter reputation can significantly inhibit earnings management, and the selection mechanism of underwriter reputation and enterprise quality is also preliminary significant. This indicates that the underwriter reputation mechanism in the small and medium board has been initially established. In addition, this paper studies the constraints of underwriter reputation. It is found that in competitive industry, the market-oriented process is higher, the sample group with better internal control can play a more effective role, and can effectively restrain the earnings management of the enterprise.
【學位授予單位】：南京大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51
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本文編號：2014040