本文選題：成本控制 + 契約��； 參考：《工業(yè)工程與管理》2017年01期

【摘要】：在制造業(yè)企業(yè)成本控制活動中,管理者和生產型員工間產生了委托代理問題,并由此簽訂成本控制契約。由于員工敬業(yè)行為對其成本控制業(yè)績產生著影響,因而將敬業(yè)度引入成本控制契約,研究了員工成本控制能力、努力成本和管理者精神激勵成本等變量對員工最優(yōu)風險分擔、敬業(yè)度、努力程度和管理者最優(yōu)收益的影響。研究結果表明:最優(yōu)風險分擔系數和本職最優(yōu)努力水平、員工成本控制能力呈正相關,與努力成本、風險偏好程度、風險方差呈負相關;最優(yōu)行為敬業(yè)度和最優(yōu)額外努力水平與員工能力呈正相關,與努力成本、管理者精神激勵成本呈負相關;最優(yōu)總努力水平和管理者最優(yōu)收益與員工能力、特質敬業(yè)度呈正相關,與努力成本、風險偏好程度、風險方差、管理者精神激勵成本呈負相關。
[Abstract]:In the cost control activities of manufacturing enterprises, the problem of principal and agent is generated between managers and productive employees, and the cost control contracts are signed. Due to the impact of employee engagement on its cost control performance, it introduces the degree of respect to the cost control contract, and studies the cost control ability of the staff, the effort cost and the manager. The results show that the optimal risk sharing coefficient and the level of the best effort are positively related to the ability of employee cost control, and it has a negative correlation with the effort cost, risk preference and risk variance, and the optimal behavior is respected. The degree and the optimal level of extra effort are positively related to the employee's ability, and have a negative correlation with the cost of effort and the mental incentive cost of the managers. The optimal total effort level and the manager's optimal income are positively related to the employee's ability and the trait respect degree, and have a negative correlation with the effort cost, the risk preference, the wind risk variance and the manager's spiritual incentive cost.
【作者單位】： 哈爾濱工程大學經濟管理學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金資助項目(71072075) 國家社會科學基金資助項目(16BJY078)
【分類號】：F272.92

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本文編號：1979046