本文選題：高管激勵(lì) + 治理效應(yīng)　； 參考：《杭州電子科技大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：大數(shù)據(jù)信息經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)代,信息成為最有價(jià)值的資源之一,同時(shí)隨著資本市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展,會(huì)計(jì)信息成為投資者評(píng)價(jià)公司的重要依據(jù),會(huì)計(jì)信息的重要性日益提升。較高的會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量能夠優(yōu)化企業(yè)資源配置、降低各利益相關(guān)方信息不對(duì)稱、保障證券市場(chǎng)平穩(wěn)健康發(fā)展。但是我國(guó)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)違規(guī)案件頻現(xiàn),涉及金額巨大,嚴(yán)重影響證券市場(chǎng)有序、持續(xù)發(fā)展。高管作為會(huì)計(jì)信息的決策主體,可以通過(guò)公司績(jī)效、投資效率、財(cái)務(wù)狀況、內(nèi)部控制效果等各個(gè)方面影響企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)信息。因此如何進(jìn)行有效激勵(lì)以防范企業(yè)管理者出現(xiàn)“逆向選擇”和“道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”,提升企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量具有重要意義。本文根據(jù)委托代理理論、激勵(lì)理論、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理論、信號(hào)傳遞理論,以2012-2015年深圳A股上市公司1612個(gè)樣本為研究對(duì)象,采用規(guī)范分析與實(shí)證分析相結(jié)合的研究方法,深入研究了高管激勵(lì)、市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的關(guān)系,揭示內(nèi)部治理要素(高管激勵(lì))和外部治理要素(產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng))對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的治理效應(yīng)。基于馬斯洛需求層次理論,將高管激勵(lì)方式劃分為顯性激勵(lì)與隱性激勵(lì),利用Ordered Logistic模型進(jìn)行回歸分析,實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示,高管薪酬激勵(lì)、股權(quán)激勵(lì)以及晉升激勵(lì)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量具有正向作用,而控制權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量產(chǎn)生了負(fù)面效應(yīng);產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)會(huì)促進(jìn)高管薪酬、股權(quán)以及晉升激勵(lì)效應(yīng)的有效發(fā)揮,能與這三者激勵(lì)形成有效的協(xié)同治理效應(yīng),但是并沒(méi)有改善控制權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的負(fù)面效應(yīng),反而加劇了該負(fù)面影響。研究表明高管顯性激勵(lì)能對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量產(chǎn)生正面效應(yīng),而隱性激勵(lì)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的影響不同。高管控制權(quán)激勵(lì)雖然可以簡(jiǎn)化領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)提升公司運(yùn)營(yíng)效率,但并沒(méi)有因此提高企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量,高管過(guò)大的控制權(quán)為其謀取私利、掩蓋財(cái)務(wù)信息提供了更大的空間,晉升制度使得管理層結(jié)構(gòu)得到改善,對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量產(chǎn)生了顯著的正面效應(yīng)。市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)作為重要的外部治理對(duì)企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)具有不可替代的作用,它能與內(nèi)部治理發(fā)生協(xié)同效應(yīng),對(duì)企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的提升產(chǎn)生促進(jìn)作用。這為企業(yè)如何采取有效的激勵(lì)措施以及根據(jù)企業(yè)自身所處的行業(yè)選擇有效的高管激勵(lì)方式提供了理論依據(jù),適當(dāng)?shù)募?lì)機(jī)制和良性的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)有助于提升會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量,從而促進(jìn)我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的健康高速發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:In the era of big data information economy, information has become one of the most valuable resources. With the development of capital market, accounting information has become an important basis for investors to evaluate companies, and the importance of accounting information is increasing day by day. The higher quality of accounting information can optimize the allocation of enterprise resources, reduce the information asymmetry of all stakeholders, and ensure the stable and healthy development of the securities market. However, the financial violation cases of listed companies in China occur frequently, involving huge amounts, which seriously affect the orderly and sustainable development of the securities market. As the decision-making body of accounting information, executives can influence the financial information of enterprises through various aspects, such as corporate performance, investment efficiency, financial situation, internal control effect, etc. Therefore, it is of great significance to promote the quality of enterprise accounting information through effective incentives to prevent the occurrence of "adverse selection" and "moral hazard" by enterprise managers. Based on the principal-agent theory, incentive theory, competition theory and signal transmission theory, this paper takes 1612 samples of Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012-2015 as the research object, and adopts the research method of combining normative analysis with empirical analysis. The relationship between executive incentive, market competition and accounting information quality is deeply studied, and the governance effects of internal governance elements (executive incentive) and external governance elements (product market competition) on accounting information quality are revealed. Based on Maslow's hierarchy of demand theory, the executive incentive is divided into explicit incentive and implicit incentive. The empirical results show that the executive compensation incentive is based on the Ordered Logistic model. Equity incentive and promotion incentive have positive effect on accounting information quality, while control right incentive has negative effect on accounting information quality. It can form an effective synergistic governance effect with these three incentives, but it does not improve the negative effect of the control incentive on the quality of accounting information, on the contrary, it intensifies the negative effect. The research shows that executive explicit incentive can produce positive effect on accounting information quality, while implicit incentive has different influence on accounting information quality. Although the incentive of executive control can simplify the leadership structure and improve the efficiency of the company, it does not improve the quality of accounting information. The promotion system improves the management structure and has a significant positive effect on the quality of accounting information. As an important external governance, market competition plays an irreplaceable role in enterprise management. It can produce synergistic effect with internal governance and promote the improvement of accounting information quality. This provides a theoretical basis for enterprises to take effective incentive measures and to choose effective incentives according to their own industry. Appropriate incentive mechanism and benign market competition are helpful to improve the quality of accounting information. In order to promote the healthy and high-speed development of China's capital market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：杭州電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F272.91;F273

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