本文選題：股權激勵 + 信息技術企業(yè)�。� 參考：《湘潭大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：在“大眾創(chuàng)業(yè)、萬眾創(chuàng)新”的時代背景下,高新技術企業(yè)迫切需要改進激勵方式和優(yōu)化薪酬制度,從而吸引優(yōu)秀人才,提高員工積極性,增強企業(yè)核心競爭力,使企業(yè)在未來的市場競爭中占得先機。為了達到這一目的,創(chuàng)業(yè)板和中小板的許多高新技術企業(yè)都引入了股權激勵作為一項長效激勵機制。T信息公司是我國教育服務與手機游戲市場的領先者,為了適應激烈的市場競爭,該企業(yè)啟動了股權激勵計劃,其目的在于通過股權激勵提高公司員工的凝聚力,吸引更多的高新技術人才和優(yōu)秀管理人才,調動員工工作與創(chuàng)新的積極性,并將股東利益與經(jīng)理層利益、公司長遠利益與眼前利益有效結合。本文運用股權激勵的相關理論,結合當前我國的相關政策法規(guī),分析了T信息公司2010至2016年間的兩次股權激勵計劃并為其提出了優(yōu)化方案。T公司第一次股票期權激勵計劃因行權價格高于市場價格、業(yè)績目標未達預期等原因而被迫終止,第二次的限制性股票激勵計劃雖按期施行完畢,但對于提升公司長遠業(yè)績、穩(wěn)定優(yōu)秀員工等方面的效果遠未達到預期水平。本文通過對T公司實施股權激勵后的股價市場表現(xiàn)分析、績效橫向和縱向分析以及對于其激勵對象的離職情況分析得出其股權激勵效果不佳的結論,進而從股權激勵的幾大契約要素對原激勵方案進行了全面剖析,找出原股權激勵方案存在的幾點問題:第一,對實施環(huán)境認識不足;第二,激勵模式選取單一;第三,行權條件設立不科學;第四,激勵對象覆蓋面窄;第五,激勵有效期年限較短。在結合公司實際情況以及借鑒其他企業(yè)成功經(jīng)驗的基礎之上,文中為T信息公司設計出一套股權激勵優(yōu)化方案并提出方案實施的保障措施,具體內容如下:結合公司實際情況并根據(jù)激勵對象選擇激勵模式;分類確定激勵對象,擴大對技術研發(fā)人員的激勵范圍;嚴格按照員工價值評估得分授予激勵數(shù)量;在行權條件中引入非業(yè)績指標并對比行業(yè)水平;適當延長行權期限;從公司層面和社會政策兩方面提出保障股權激勵優(yōu)化方案實施的建議,包括完善公司治理結構、實施過程監(jiān)督、規(guī)范政策法規(guī)、加強市場建設。本文的研究能夠幫助T公司最大程度地發(fā)揮股權激勵的激勵作用。此外,T公司作為中小板上市公司中的信息技術企業(yè),對其股權激勵方案的研究能為其他公司提供一定的借鑒,而且能夠豐富我國股權激勵案例分析方面的研究。
[Abstract]:Under the background of the times of "mass entrepreneurship and mass innovation", high-tech enterprises urgently need to improve the incentive mode and optimize the compensation system, so as to attract outstanding talents, improve the enthusiasm of employees, and enhance the core competitiveness of enterprises. Make the enterprise take the lead in the market competition in the future. In order to achieve this goal, many high-tech enterprises in gem and small and medium board have introduced equity incentive as a long-term incentive mechanism. T information company is the leader in education service and mobile game market in China. In order to adapt to the fierce market competition, the enterprise launched the equity incentive plan, which aims to improve the cohesion of the employees through equity incentive, attract more high-tech talents and excellent management talents. Mobilize the enthusiasm of staff work and innovation, and effectively combine the interests of shareholders with the interests of managers, the long-term interests of the company and immediate interests. This paper applies the relevant theory of equity incentive, combined with the current relevant policies and regulations in China, This paper analyzes the two equity incentive plans of T Information Company from 2010 to 2016, and puts forward the optimized scheme. The first stock option incentive plan of T Company is forced to terminate because the exercise price is higher than the market price, the performance target is not up to expectations, and so on. Although the second restrictive stock incentive plan is completed on schedule, the effect of the second restrictive stock incentive plan on improving the company's long-term performance and stabilizing the outstanding employees is far from the expected level. Based on the analysis of stock market performance, horizontal and vertical performance analysis and turnover analysis of T Company, the paper draws the conclusion that the equity incentive effect is not good. Then from several major contract elements of equity incentive, the paper analyzes the original incentive scheme, and finds out some problems existing in the original equity incentive scheme: first, lack of understanding of the implementation environment; second, single incentive mode; third, The establishment of exercise conditions is unscientific; fourth, the coverage of incentive objects is narrow; fifthly, the period of validity of incentive is short. On the basis of the actual situation of the company and the successful experience of other enterprises, this paper designs a set of equity incentive optimization scheme for T information company and puts forward the safeguard measures for the implementation of the plan. The specific contents are as follows: according to the actual situation of the company and according to the incentive object to choose the incentive model; to classify and determine the incentive object to expand the scope of incentive to the technical R & D personnel; strictly according to the employee value evaluation score awarded incentive quantity; Introducing non-performance indicators and comparing the industry level in the exercise conditions; extending the exercise period appropriately; putting forward suggestions to ensure the implementation of equity incentive optimization plan from the company level and social policy, including improving the corporate governance structure. Implement process supervision, standardize policies and regulations, and strengthen market construction. The research in this paper can help T Company to maximize the incentive role of equity incentives. In addition, as an information technology enterprise in small and medium-sized board listed companies, the research on its equity incentive scheme can provide some reference for other companies, and can enrich the case study of equity incentive in China.
【學位授予單位】：湘潭大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F49

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本文編號：1942044