本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 信息技術(shù)企業(yè)　； 參考：《湘潭大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：在“大眾創(chuàng)業(yè)、萬(wàn)眾創(chuàng)新”的時(shí)代背景下,高新技術(shù)企業(yè)迫切需要改進(jìn)激勵(lì)方式和優(yōu)化薪酬制度,從而吸引優(yōu)秀人才,提高員工積極性,增強(qiáng)企業(yè)核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,使企業(yè)在未來(lái)的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中占得先機(jī)。為了達(dá)到這一目的,創(chuàng)業(yè)板和中小板的許多高新技術(shù)企業(yè)都引入了股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一項(xiàng)長(zhǎng)效激勵(lì)機(jī)制。T信息公司是我國(guó)教育服務(wù)與手機(jī)游戲市場(chǎng)的領(lǐng)先者,為了適應(yīng)激烈的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng),該企業(yè)啟動(dòng)了股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃,其目的在于通過(guò)股權(quán)激勵(lì)提高公司員工的凝聚力,吸引更多的高新技術(shù)人才和優(yōu)秀管理人才,調(diào)動(dòng)員工工作與創(chuàng)新的積極性,并將股東利益與經(jīng)理層利益、公司長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)利益與眼前利益有效結(jié)合。本文運(yùn)用股權(quán)激勵(lì)的相關(guān)理論,結(jié)合當(dāng)前我國(guó)的相關(guān)政策法規(guī),分析了T信息公司2010至2016年間的兩次股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃并為其提出了優(yōu)化方案。T公司第一次股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃因行權(quán)價(jià)格高于市場(chǎng)價(jià)格、業(yè)績(jī)目標(biāo)未達(dá)預(yù)期等原因而被迫終止,第二次的限制性股票激勵(lì)計(jì)劃雖按期施行完畢,但對(duì)于提升公司長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)業(yè)績(jī)、穩(wěn)定優(yōu)秀員工等方面的效果遠(yuǎn)未達(dá)到預(yù)期水平。本文通過(guò)對(duì)T公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)后的股價(jià)市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)分析、績(jī)效橫向和縱向分析以及對(duì)于其激勵(lì)對(duì)象的離職情況分析得出其股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果不佳的結(jié)論,進(jìn)而從股權(quán)激勵(lì)的幾大契約要素對(duì)原激勵(lì)方案進(jìn)行了全面剖析,找出原股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案存在的幾點(diǎn)問(wèn)題:第一,對(duì)實(shí)施環(huán)境認(rèn)識(shí)不足;第二,激勵(lì)模式選取單一;第三,行權(quán)條件設(shè)立不科學(xué);第四,激勵(lì)對(duì)象覆蓋面窄;第五,激勵(lì)有效期年限較短。在結(jié)合公司實(shí)際情況以及借鑒其他企業(yè)成功經(jīng)驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)之上,文中為T信息公司設(shè)計(jì)出一套股權(quán)激勵(lì)優(yōu)化方案并提出方案實(shí)施的保障措施,具體內(nèi)容如下:結(jié)合公司實(shí)際情況并根據(jù)激勵(lì)對(duì)象選擇激勵(lì)模式;分類確定激勵(lì)對(duì)象,擴(kuò)大對(duì)技術(shù)研發(fā)人員的激勵(lì)范圍;嚴(yán)格按照員工價(jià)值評(píng)估得分授予激勵(lì)數(shù)量;在行權(quán)條件中引入非業(yè)績(jī)指標(biāo)并對(duì)比行業(yè)水平;適當(dāng)延長(zhǎng)行權(quán)期限;從公司層面和社會(huì)政策兩方面提出保障股權(quán)激勵(lì)優(yōu)化方案實(shí)施的建議,包括完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、實(shí)施過(guò)程監(jiān)督、規(guī)范政策法規(guī)、加強(qiáng)市場(chǎng)建設(shè)。本文的研究能夠幫助T公司最大程度地發(fā)揮股權(quán)激勵(lì)的激勵(lì)作用。此外,T公司作為中小板上市公司中的信息技術(shù)企業(yè),對(duì)其股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的研究能為其他公司提供一定的借鑒,而且能夠豐富我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)案例分析方面的研究。
[Abstract]:Under the background of the times of "mass entrepreneurship and mass innovation", high-tech enterprises urgently need to improve the incentive mode and optimize the compensation system, so as to attract outstanding talents, improve the enthusiasm of employees, and enhance the core competitiveness of enterprises. Make the enterprise take the lead in the market competition in the future. In order to achieve this goal, many high-tech enterprises in gem and small and medium board have introduced equity incentive as a long-term incentive mechanism. T information company is the leader in education service and mobile game market in China. In order to adapt to the fierce market competition, the enterprise launched the equity incentive plan, which aims to improve the cohesion of the employees through equity incentive, attract more high-tech talents and excellent management talents. Mobilize the enthusiasm of staff work and innovation, and effectively combine the interests of shareholders with the interests of managers, the long-term interests of the company and immediate interests. This paper applies the relevant theory of equity incentive, combined with the current relevant policies and regulations in China, This paper analyzes the two equity incentive plans of T Information Company from 2010 to 2016, and puts forward the optimized scheme. The first stock option incentive plan of T Company is forced to terminate because the exercise price is higher than the market price, the performance target is not up to expectations, and so on. Although the second restrictive stock incentive plan is completed on schedule, the effect of the second restrictive stock incentive plan on improving the company's long-term performance and stabilizing the outstanding employees is far from the expected level. Based on the analysis of stock market performance, horizontal and vertical performance analysis and turnover analysis of T Company, the paper draws the conclusion that the equity incentive effect is not good. Then from several major contract elements of equity incentive, the paper analyzes the original incentive scheme, and finds out some problems existing in the original equity incentive scheme: first, lack of understanding of the implementation environment; second, single incentive mode; third, The establishment of exercise conditions is unscientific; fourth, the coverage of incentive objects is narrow; fifthly, the period of validity of incentive is short. On the basis of the actual situation of the company and the successful experience of other enterprises, this paper designs a set of equity incentive optimization scheme for T information company and puts forward the safeguard measures for the implementation of the plan. The specific contents are as follows: according to the actual situation of the company and according to the incentive object to choose the incentive model; to classify and determine the incentive object to expand the scope of incentive to the technical R & D personnel; strictly according to the employee value evaluation score awarded incentive quantity; Introducing non-performance indicators and comparing the industry level in the exercise conditions; extending the exercise period appropriately; putting forward suggestions to ensure the implementation of equity incentive optimization plan from the company level and social policy, including improving the corporate governance structure. Implement process supervision, standardize policies and regulations, and strengthen market construction. The research in this paper can help T Company to maximize the incentive role of equity incentives. In addition, as an information technology enterprise in small and medium-sized board listed companies, the research on its equity incentive scheme can provide some reference for other companies, and can enrich the case study of equity incentive in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F49

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本文編號(hào)：1942044