本文選題：高管 + 并購(gòu)��； 參考：《現(xiàn)代財(cái)經(jīng)(天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào))》2017年11期

【摘要】：由于委托代理問(wèn)題的存在,高管對(duì)并購(gòu)企業(yè)的價(jià)值創(chuàng)造具有重要的影響,我國(guó)的特殊國(guó)情決定了不同性質(zhì)企業(yè)的高管特征、激勵(lì)機(jī)制和行為對(duì)并購(gòu)企業(yè)的價(jià)值創(chuàng)造的影響不同。本文選取了2009-2014年期間的并購(gòu)企業(yè)作為樣本,分析了高管特征、激勵(lì)機(jī)制和行為對(duì)并購(gòu)企業(yè)的價(jià)值創(chuàng)造的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)高管特征對(duì)并購(gòu)企業(yè)的價(jià)值創(chuàng)造有顯著影響,任職時(shí)間越長(zhǎng)并購(gòu)后企業(yè)的價(jià)值提升越大,學(xué)歷和年齡對(duì)并購(gòu)企業(yè)的價(jià)值創(chuàng)造分別受另一方面因素的影響,并對(duì)價(jià)值創(chuàng)造的影響形成倒U型關(guān)系,且這一特征僅顯著體現(xiàn)在國(guó)有企業(yè)中。只有在股權(quán)集中度較高的企業(yè)或國(guó)有企業(yè)中,股權(quán)激勵(lì)才與并購(gòu)企業(yè)的價(jià)值創(chuàng)造有正相關(guān)關(guān)系,且只有當(dāng)高管有股權(quán)激勵(lì)時(shí),高管的行為選擇才會(huì)引發(fā)市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)。鑒于此,建議完善國(guó)有企業(yè)的高管選拔和股權(quán)激勵(lì)的制度建設(shè),改善國(guó)有企業(yè)制度建設(shè)的內(nèi)外部環(huán)境,提高國(guó)企競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。
[Abstract]:Due to the existence of the principal-agent problem, senior executives have an important impact on the value creation of M & A enterprises. The special situation of our country determines the characteristics of executives in different enterprises, and the incentive mechanism and behavior have different effects on the value creation of M & A enterprises. This paper selects M & A enterprises from 2009-2014 as a sample to analyze the influence of executive characteristics, incentive mechanism and behavior on the value creation of M & A enterprises. The study found that the characteristics of senior executives have a significant impact on the value creation of M & A enterprises. The longer the tenure is, the greater the value of M & A enterprises is. The educational background and age are respectively affected by the other factors on the value creation of M & A enterprises. And the influence on value creation forms inverted U-shaped relationship, and this characteristic is only reflected in the state-owned enterprises. Only in the enterprises with high equity concentration or state-owned enterprises, the equity incentive has a positive correlation with the value creation of M & A enterprises, and only when the executive has equity incentive, the executive behavior choice will lead to market reaction. In view of this, it is suggested to improve the system construction of senior management selection and equity incentive in state-owned enterprises, improve the internal and external environment of state-owned enterprises' system construction, and enhance the competitiveness of state-owned enterprises.
【作者單位】： 武漢大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院博士后流動(dòng)站;中國(guó)華融資產(chǎn)管理股份有限公司博士后工作站;
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F272.91;F272.92
，

本文編號(hào)：1911425