發(fā)布時間：2018-05-19 02:31

  本文選題：減排行為 + 環(huán)境管理��； 參考：《江蘇大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：作為制造業(yè)世界工廠,我國環(huán)境污染形勢嚴(yán)峻。出人意料的是,很多產(chǎn)生嚴(yán)重污染的企業(yè)被曝光出是名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)的供應(yīng)商。這些污染事故引起了公眾的極大關(guān)注,并促使人們從名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)對供應(yīng)商的環(huán)境管理視角思考企業(yè)的環(huán)境管理問題:一方面,消費者通常會把供應(yīng)商不良環(huán)境行為的責(zé)任歸屬給名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè),對供應(yīng)商的環(huán)境管理是名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)不可回避的問題;另一方面,名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)在供應(yīng)鏈運作中處于核心地位,有能力對供應(yīng)商的環(huán)境行為選擇產(chǎn)生重要影響。供應(yīng)商、名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)、消費者等參與主體的交互性、異質(zhì)性和自適應(yīng)性使供應(yīng)商減排行為的研究面臨著復(fù)雜性的挑戰(zhàn)。社會科學(xué)計算實驗方法在復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)的研究方面具有優(yōu)勢,已被國內(nèi)外學(xué)者成功運用在包括環(huán)境管理的多個領(lǐng)域。基于此,本研究運用計算實驗方法探究名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)環(huán)境管理下的供應(yīng)商減排行為的演化規(guī)律,目的是探究名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)對供應(yīng)商進行環(huán)境管理的有效策略和關(guān)鍵影響因素,為推動企業(yè)減排的實際問題提供新的思路和解決方案。本研究首先詳細分析了名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)對供應(yīng)商進行環(huán)境管理的動機;其次,探究了國內(nèi)外名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)對供應(yīng)商進行環(huán)境管理的實踐,總結(jié)出采購量分配機制和環(huán)境補貼機制兩種管理策略;隨后,闡述了名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)的環(huán)境管理對供應(yīng)商減排行為的影響機理;最后,分別構(gòu)建了采購量分配機制和環(huán)境補貼機制下的供應(yīng)商減排行為研究的計算實驗?zāi)Ｐ?基于Repast Simphony平臺采用面向?qū)ο缶幊碳夹g(shù)產(chǎn)生參與主體及其交互行為,并賦予實驗參數(shù),設(shè)定不同的情景,探究供應(yīng)商減排行為和主體收益的演化規(guī)律。本研究得出以下結(jié)論:(1)消費者環(huán)境意識提高引起的產(chǎn)品需求的增加驅(qū)動名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)對供應(yīng)商進行環(huán)境管理。采購量分配機制和環(huán)境補貼機制是兩種科學(xué)有效的對供應(yīng)商的環(huán)境管理策略。(2)供應(yīng)商報價情形下,名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)運用采購量分配機制能簡單有效地實現(xiàn)對供應(yīng)商的環(huán)境管理;名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)定價情形下,僅僅運用采購量分配機制不能使系統(tǒng)達到最優(yōu),名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)還有必要對供應(yīng)商進行環(huán)境補貼。(3)隨著采購量分配中對環(huán)境因素的重視程度的增加,演化穩(wěn)定后的供應(yīng)商減排量增加,但名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)收益呈現(xiàn)先增加后減少的演化規(guī)律。名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)要把握好激勵力度,才能達到既推動供應(yīng)商減排又提高自身收益的“雙贏效果”。相比靜態(tài)采購量分配機制,名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)運用動態(tài)采購量分配機制能夠獲得更高的收益。(4)當(dāng)名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)掌握供應(yīng)鏈定價權(quán)時,可以先充分利用采購量分配機制,通過供應(yīng)商群體之間的采購量競爭迫使供應(yīng)商進行減排。當(dāng)供應(yīng)商減排量趨于穩(wěn)定時,再實施減排補貼機制,并設(shè)定減排目標(biāo)稍高于供應(yīng)商當(dāng)前的平均減排量,充分利用供應(yīng)商決策的有限理性特征,從而獲得較高的收益。(5)消費者購買是推動供應(yīng)商減排的根本動力。名牌產(chǎn)品企業(yè)不能將對上游供應(yīng)商的環(huán)境管理策略視為唯一手段,還應(yīng)從下游消費者的需求入手,加強環(huán)保宣傳,努力擴大市場需求規(guī)模。
[Abstract]:As a world factory in the manufacturing industry, the situation of environmental pollution in China is severe. Surprisingly, many enterprises which have produced serious pollution have been exposed as suppliers of famous brand products. These pollution accidents have aroused great public concern and prompted people to think about the environmental management from the perspective of the environmental management of the famous brand products enterprises. On the one hand, on the one hand, the consumers usually assign the responsibility of the bad environmental behavior to the famous brand product enterprises, and the environmental management of the suppliers is an unavoidable problem for the famous brand products enterprises. On the other hand, the famous brand products enterprises are at the core position in the supply chain operation, and have the ability to make the choice of the environmental behavior of the suppliers seriously. The interaction, heterogeneity and adaptability of the participants, such as the supplier, the famous brand product enterprise, the consumer and so on, make the research on the emission reduction behavior of the supplier face the challenge of complexity. The social science computing experiment method has the advantage in the research of complex systems, and has been successfully applied by domestic and foreign scholars to the multiple environmental management. Based on this, this study uses the method of calculation to explore the evolution law of the behavior of reducing the emission of suppliers under the environment management of famous brand products. The purpose is to explore the effective strategy and key factors of the environmental management of the famous brand products enterprises, and to provide new ideas and solutions for the practical problems of reducing the enterprises. This study first analyzes the motivation of the brand product enterprises to manage the environment of the suppliers in detail. Secondly, it explores the practice of environmental management for the suppliers at home and abroad, summarizes the two management strategies of the purchase quantity distribution mechanism and the environmental subsidy mechanism, and then expounds the supply of the environmental management of the famous brand products enterprises to the supply. In the end, the experimental model of the supplier reduction behavior research under the purchase quantity distribution mechanism and the environmental subsidy mechanism is constructed. Based on the Repast Simphony platform, the participants and their interactive behavior are produced by the object-oriented programming technology, and the experimental parameters are given, and the different scenarios are set up to explore the supply. The following conclusions are drawn as follows: (1) the increase of the product demand caused by the increase of consumer environmental awareness raises the environmental management of the famous brand products enterprises. The purchase quantity distribution mechanism and the environmental subsidy mechanism are two scientific and effective environmental management strategies for the suppliers. (2) Under the case of quotient quotation, the famous brand product enterprises can use the purchase quantity distribution mechanism to realize the environmental management of the suppliers simply and effectively. Under the pricing situation of the famous brand products enterprises, only using the purchase quantity distribution mechanism can not make the system achieve the best. The famous brand product enterprises are also necessary to carry on the environmental subsidy to the suppliers. (3) with the distribution of the purchase quantity With the increasing attention to environmental factors, the quantity of supplier reduction increases after the evolution of the stable supplier, but the enterprise income of famous brand products presents the evolution law that increases first and then decreases. With the mechanism, the famous brand product enterprises can obtain higher returns by using the dynamic purchase quantity distribution mechanism. (4) when the famous brand products enterprises grasp the supply chain pricing power, they can make full use of the purchase quantity distribution mechanism and force the suppliers to reduce the reduction through the procurement competition among the suppliers. Implementing emission reduction subsidy mechanism, and setting emission reduction targets slightly higher than the current average reduction of suppliers, making full use of the limited rational characteristics of supplier decision making, so as to gain higher income. (5) consumer purchase is the fundamental driving force to promote the reduction of suppliers. One means should start with the needs of downstream consumers, strengthen environmental publicity, and strive to expand the scale of market demand.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江蘇大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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本文編號：1908335