本文選題：內(nèi)部控制 + 內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量�。� 參考：《哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)是契約管理模式，股東作為出資人是委托人，管理者是代理人對企業(yè)的事項進(jìn)行經(jīng)營決策，對委托人承擔(dān)責(zé)任，其經(jīng)營決策直接影響委托人的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益。而外部信息使用者和企業(yè)內(nèi)部之間信息不對稱的現(xiàn)象，為經(jīng)營者提供了隱秘空間。經(jīng)營者為謀取短期利益，對企業(yè)財務(wù)報表進(jìn)行調(diào)整或者進(jìn)行虛假交易操作，直接影響股東的長期利益，導(dǎo)致信息質(zhì)量下降。如何提高企業(yè)信息披露質(zhì)量，抑制上市公司盈余管理操作，成為重中之重。近年來，我國在內(nèi)部控制制度方面做出巨大努力，2010年頒布了《企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制應(yīng)用指南第1號——組織框架》等規(guī)范，內(nèi)部控制制度的完善可以在一定程度上規(guī)范管理者的行為，上市公司整體的信息披露質(zhì)量也有所提高，但是制度之下企業(yè)仍有各種規(guī)避手段，一些企業(yè)信息披露質(zhì)量仍不容樂觀。因此，研究內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量對企業(yè)盈余管理程度的影響的重要性，并且分析內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量對哪一種盈余管理具有作用效果，并提出相應(yīng)的政策措施是目前亟待解決的問題。 本文以2011年滬深兩市主板的1616家上市公司作為研究對象，采用是否自愿披露內(nèi)部控制鑒證報告、是否披露合理保證的內(nèi)部控制鑒證報告作為被解釋變量、采用瓊斯模型計量的會計選擇盈余管理、真實活動盈余管理（操縱性現(xiàn)金流量、操縱性生產(chǎn)成本、操縱性酌量費用）作為被解釋變量，采用經(jīng)營周期、企業(yè)規(guī)模、每股收益等作為控制變量，，構(gòu)建內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量與盈余管理相關(guān)關(guān)系的回歸模型。運用EXCEL和SPSS17.0軟件，對樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行描述性分析、共線性分析、回歸分析，最后得出結(jié)論是內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量與會計選擇盈余管理程度具有負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，對真實活動盈余管理不具有相關(guān)性。 根據(jù)實證結(jié)論，分析原因，主要是內(nèi)部控制制度不夠完善。雖然內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量提高對會計選擇盈余管理有較好抑制作用，但其不能及時地規(guī)避企業(yè)的賬外操作，使得真實活動盈余管理有可操作空間，具有較強(qiáng)的隱秘性。因此提出建立外部監(jiān)督體系、完善財經(jīng)法律法規(guī)、完善企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制制度、優(yōu)化董事會結(jié)構(gòu)和規(guī)模、加速經(jīng)營周期提高企業(yè)流動性、完善薪酬管理制度等政策建議。
[Abstract]:The modern enterprise is the contract management mode, the shareholder as the investor is the principal, the manager is the agent carries on the management decision to the enterprise affairs, undertakes the responsibility to the trustor, its management decision directly affects the trustor's economic benefit. The phenomenon of information asymmetry between external information users and enterprises provides hidden space for operators. In order to obtain short-term benefits, operators adjust financial statements or conduct false transactions, which directly affect the long-term interests of shareholders and lead to a decline in the quality of information. How to improve the quality of information disclosure and restrain the earnings management of listed companies has become the top priority. In recent years, China has made great efforts in the field of internal control system. In 2010, it promulgated the guidelines for the Application of Enterprise Internal Control No. 1-organizational Framework, etc. The perfection of internal control system can standardize the behavior of managers to a certain extent. The quality of information disclosure of listed companies has also been improved, but under the system, enterprises still have a variety of evasive means, some enterprises are still not optimistic about the quality of information disclosure. Therefore, it is important to study the influence of internal control quality on the degree of earnings management, to analyze which kind of earnings management the internal control quality has the effect, and to put forward the corresponding policy measures are the problems to be solved. This paper takes 1616 listed companies on the main board of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2011 as the research object, and adopts whether to voluntarily disclose the internal control authentication report and whether to disclose the reasonable assurance internal control authentication report as the explained variable. Accounting choice earnings management based on Jones model, real activity earnings management (manipulative cash flow, manipulative production cost, manipulative discretionary cost) are used as explanatory variables. As control variables, earnings per share (EPS) are used to build a regression model of the relationship between internal control quality and earnings management. By using EXCEL and SPSS17.0 software, the sample data are analyzed by descriptive analysis, linear analysis and regression analysis. It is concluded that the quality of internal control has a negative correlation with the degree of earnings management in accounting selection. It is not relevant to the earnings management of real activities. According to the empirical conclusion, the main reason is that the internal control system is not perfect. Although the improvement of internal control quality can restrain the accounting choice of earnings management, it can not avoid the off-account operation of the enterprise in time, which makes the real earnings management have operational space and strong secrecy. Therefore, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions, such as establishing external supervision system, perfecting financial laws and regulations, perfecting internal control system of enterprises, optimizing the structure and scale of board of directors, speeding up the operation cycle, improving the liquidity of enterprises, perfecting the salary management system, and so on.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F276.6

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