發(fā)布時間：2018-05-14 12:30

  本文選題：國企混合所有制改革 + 現(xiàn)金持有��； 參考：《石河子大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：信息不對稱下的融資約束與代理沖突是影響公司現(xiàn)金持有的關(guān)鍵因素,亦形成了價值“較高觀”與“較低觀”的現(xiàn)金持有之謎。已有研究大都默認公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的固定不變,而忽略了股東的進入與退出促使股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)一直處于動態(tài)變化的現(xiàn)實背景。加之系列政策及文件的頻繁出臺,積極發(fā)展國有資本、集體資本及非國有資本等交叉持股、相互融合的混合所有制改革正在深化加快。而相關(guān)文獻卻少有研究國企混合所有制改革(以下簡稱“國企混改”)對公司現(xiàn)金持有水平的可能影響。基于上述背景,本文以2003-2015年我國滬深A股國有上市公司的平衡面板數(shù)據(jù)為研究樣本,集中探討了國企混改對公司現(xiàn)金持有水平的作用關(guān)系、影響機理及其經(jīng)濟后果。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)股權(quán)多樣性(前十大股東的類別)與現(xiàn)金持有水平的關(guān)系尚不明顯,股權(quán)分散度(股權(quán)多元化程度)及融合度(國有股與非國有股的制衡程度)與現(xiàn)金持有水平正相關(guān),控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移與現(xiàn)金持有水平的關(guān)系也尚不顯著;(2)按行業(yè)特征與市場化進程細分發(fā)現(xiàn),股權(quán)分散度及融合度與現(xiàn)金持有水平的正相關(guān)關(guān)系在競爭行業(yè)與高市場化進程中尤為凸顯。控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移在競爭行業(yè)與高市場化進程中與現(xiàn)金持有水平呈現(xiàn)明顯的負相關(guān)關(guān)系;(3)機制檢驗的結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),國企混改并未通過融資約束渠道影響公司現(xiàn)金持有水平。股權(quán)分散度和融合度主要通過減少超額持現(xiàn)的過度投資(競爭行業(yè)與高市場化進程中尤甚)、增加研發(fā)投入的治理效應路徑促使現(xiàn)金持有水平有所增加(股權(quán)多樣性并未有效發(fā)揮上述作用),而控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移在減少國企過度投資(競爭行業(yè)與高市場化進程中更強)、增加研發(fā)投入的同時還增加了股利支付進而引致現(xiàn)金持有水平也未發(fā)生明顯變化;(4)經(jīng)濟后果的檢驗發(fā)現(xiàn),整體而言,股權(quán)多樣性、分散度及融合度對現(xiàn)金持有競爭效應的提升作用有限(分散度在競爭行業(yè)和高市場化進程地區(qū)的提升作用有所凸顯),控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移則強化了現(xiàn)金持有的競爭效應(競爭行業(yè)和高市場化進程中尤甚)。股權(quán)多樣性也未帶來現(xiàn)金持有價值的提升,分散度作用有限,而融合度和控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移的價值提升作用則較為明顯(競爭行業(yè)與高市場化進程中更為明顯)。本文可能的理論貢獻與現(xiàn)實意義在于:(1)基于我國國企深化改革過程中股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的動態(tài)變化視角來探究其對公司現(xiàn)金持有的可能影響,在揭示國企現(xiàn)金持有背后成因的同時,也豐富和完善了現(xiàn)金持有水平與價值的已有研究;(2)我國國企混改方面的理論研究明顯滯后于改革實踐。尤其是我國法律法規(guī)尚需完善的現(xiàn)實背景下,針對其改革方式與改革績效,現(xiàn)存爭論不休、結(jié)論不一。本文則試圖從現(xiàn)金持有的微觀視角來反觀時下我國國企混改及不同的混改方式是否有效提升了企業(yè)價值,以揭示我國國企混改現(xiàn)存分歧原因所在的同時,也能為系統(tǒng)全面地評價國企混改的經(jīng)濟后果提供部分經(jīng)驗證據(jù),還能為今后國企混改的不斷深化提供部分政策參考和經(jīng)驗借鑒。
[Abstract]:The financing constraint and the agency conflict under information asymmetry are the key factors that affect the company's cash holdings, and they also form the riddle of cash holding of "higher outlook" and "lower view". Most of the existing research has defaults on the fixed ownership structure of the company, but neglects the entry and exit of shareholders to make the ownership structure change dynamically. With the frequent introduction of the series of policies and documents, the cross ownership of state-owned capital, collective capital and non state capital is actively developed, and the mixed ownership reform is deepening. Based on the above background, this paper takes the balance panel data of China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A share listed companies as the research samples for 2003-2015 years, concentrates on the relationship between the state-owned enterprises' cash holding level, the influence mechanism and its economic consequences. (1) the (1) equity diversity (the category of the top ten shareholders) and the present The relationship between the ownership level and the degree of ownership diversification (equity diversification) and the degree of balance between the state-owned shares and non state stocks is positively related to the level of cash holdings, and the relationship between the transfer of control rights and the level of cash holding is not yet significant; (2) it is found that the degree of ownership dispersion and degree of convergence and degree of convergence are divided according to the industrial characteristics and marketization process. The positive correlation of cash holding level is particularly prominent in the competition industry and the process of high marketization. The transfer of control rights has a significant negative correlation with the level of cash holding in the competition industry and the high market process. (3) the result of the mechanism test found that the state-owned enterprise mixed reform did not pass through the financing constraint channels to influence the company's cash holding level. The degree of ownership dispersion and convergence is mainly through the reduction of overinvested overinvestment (especially in the process of competitive industry and high marketization). Increasing the governance effect path of R & D investment increases the level of cash holdings (equity diversity does not play the role of the above), and the control right is transferred to reduce excessive investment in state-owned enterprises (competition industry). In the process of high marketization, the increase of R & D investment also increased the dividend payment and the level of cash holding did not change obviously. (4) the test of economic consequences found that, on the whole, the share diversity, dispersion and degree of convergence have limited promotion effect on the competition effect of cash holding (dispersion degree in the competition industry and higher) The role of control transfer strengthens the competitive effect of cash holding (especially in the competition industry and the process of high marketization). The diversity of equity has not brought about the promotion of the value of cash holdings, and the decentralization is limited, while the value of convergence and the transfer of control rights are more obvious (competition). The possible theoretical contributions and practical significance of this paper are as follows: (1) based on the dynamic change of the ownership structure in the process of deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises, the possible influence on the cash holdings of the company is explored, and the reasons behind the cash holdings of state-owned enterprises are revealed, and the cash holdings are enriched and perfected. The research on the level and value of our country; (2) the theoretical research of China's state-owned enterprises' mixed reform is obviously lagging behind the reform practice. In particular, under the realistic background that the laws and regulations of our country still need to be perfected, the existing debate and conclusion are different in view of the reform mode and the performance of the reform. This article tries to look back on the current China from the micro perspective of cash holdings. Whether the enterprise mixed reform and the different mixing methods have effectively promoted the enterprise value, in order to reveal the reasons of the existing differences in the state-owned enterprises' mixed reform in China, can also provide some empirical evidence for the systematic and comprehensive evaluation of the economic consequences of the state-owned enterprises' mixed reform, and also provide some policy reference and experience for the continuous deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises in the future.

【學位授予單位】：石河子大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F276.1;F275

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本文編號：1887857